VOLUME TWO

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
or
THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

FOREWORD

This part of the logic which contains the *Doctrine of the Notion* and constitutes the third part of the whole, is also issued under the particular title *System of Subjective Logic*, for the convenience of those friends of this science who are accustomed to take a greater interest in the matters here treated and included in the scope of logic commonly so called, than in the further logical topics treated in the first two parts. For these earlier parts I could claim the indulgence of fair-minded critics on account of the scant preliminary studies in this field which could have afforded me a support, material, and a guiding thread. In the case of the present part, I may claim their indulgence rather for the opposite reason; for the logic of the *Notion*, a completely ready-made and solidified, one may say, ossified material is already to hand, and the problem is to render this material fluid and to re-kindle the spontaneity of the Notion in such dead matter. If the building of a new city in a waste land is attended with difficulties, yet there is no shortage of materials; but the abundance of materials presents all the more obstacles of another kind when the task is to remodel an ancient city, solidly built, and maintained in continuous possession and occupation. Among other things one must resolve to make no use at all of much material that has hitherto been highly esteemed.

But above all, the grandeur of the subject matter may be advanced as an excuse for the imperfect execution. For what subject matter can cognition have that is more sublime than *truth* itself! Yet the doubt whether it is not just this subject matter that requires an excuse may occur to us if we recall the sense in which Pilate put the question, *What is truth?* In the words of the poet: 'With the courtier's mien that purblind yet smiling condemns the cause of the earnest soul.'[1] Pilate's question bears the meaning—which may be regarded as an element in good manners —together with a reminder of it, that the aim of attaining truth is, as everyone knows, something given up and long since set aside, and that the unattainableness of truth is recognized even among professional philosophers and logicians. But if the question that *religion* raises as to the value of things, insights, and actions—a question which in its import has a like meaning—is once more

[1] Klopstock: *Der Messias*, seventh canto.

vindicating its claims in our days, then philosophy must surely hope that it will no longer be thought so strange if it, too, in its immediate domain once more asserts its true aim, and, after having lapsed into the manner and method of other sciences and their renunciation of the claim to truth, strives to rise again to that aim. In respect of this attempt, it is not, strictly speaking, permissible to offer any apology; but in respect of the execution, I may plead in excuse that my official duties and other personal circumstances allowed me but scattered hours of labour at a science that demands and deserves undistracted and undivided exertion.

Nuremberg, *July* 21, 1816

THE NOTION IN GENERAL

What the *nature of the Notion* is, can no more be stated offhand than can the Notion of any other object. It might perhaps seem that, in order to state the Notion of an object, the logical element were presupposed and that therefore this could not in turn have something else for its presupposition, nor be deduced; just as in geometry logical propositions as applied to magnitude and employed in that science, are premised in the form of *axioms*, determinations of cognition that *have not been and cannot be deduced*. Now although it is true that the Notion is to be regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as the *absolute foundation*, yet it can be so only in so far as it has *made* itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt a *first*; yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of mediation.

From this aspect the *Notion* is to be regarded in the first instance simply as the third to *being* and *essence*, to the *immediate* and to *reflection*. Being and essence are so far the moments of its *becoming*; but it is their *foundation* and *truth* as the identity in which they are submerged and contained. They are contained in it because it is their *result*, but no longer as *being* and *essence*. That determination they possess only in so far as they have not withdrawn into this their unity.

Objective logic therefore, which treats of *being* and *essence* constitutes properly the *genetic exposition of the Notion*. More precisely, *substance* is already *real essence*, or *essence* in so far as it is united with *being* and has entered into actuality. Consequently, the Notion has substance for its immediate presupposition; what is *implicit* in substance is *manifested* in the Notion. Thus the *dialectical movement* of *substance* through causality and reciprocity is the immediate *genesis* of the *Notion*, the exposition of the process of its becoming. But the significance of its *becoming*, as of every becoming, is that it is the reflection of the transient into its *ground* and that the at first apparent *other* into which the former has passed constitutes its *truth*. Accordingly the Notion is the *truth* of substance; and since substance has *necessity* for its

specific mode of relationship, freedom reveals itself as the *truth of necessity* and as *the mode of relationship proper to the Notion.*

The progressive determination of substance necessitated by its own nature, is the *positing* of what is *in and for itself.* Now the Notion is that absolute unity of being and reflection in which being is *in and for itself* only in so far as it is no less *reflection* or *positedness*, and *positedness* is no less being that is *in and for itself.* This abstract result is elucidated by the exposition of its concrete genesis; that exposition contains the nature of the Notion whose treatment it must have preceded. The chief moments of this exposition (which has been given in detail in the Second Book of the Objective Logic) can therefore only be briefly summarized here.

Substance is the *absolute*, the actuality that is in and for itself—*in itself* as the simple identity of possibility and actuality, absolute essence containing all actuality and possibility *within itself*; and *for itself*, being this identity as absolute *power* or purely self-related *negativity*. The movement of substantiality posited by these moments consists in the following stages:

1. Substance, as absolute power or self-related negativity, differentiates itself into a relationship in which what were at first only simple moments are substances and original presuppositions. Their specific relationship is that of a *passive* substance, of the original immediacy of the simple *inwardness* or *in-itself* which, powerless to posit itself, is only an original *positedness*—and of an *active* substance, the *self-related* negativity which as such has posited itself in the form of an other and relates itself *to this* other. This other is simply the passive substance which the active substance through its own originative power has *presupposed* for itself as condition. This presupposing is to be understood in the sense that the movement of substance itself is, in the first instance, under the form of one of the moments of its Notion, the *in-itself*, and the determinateness of one of the *substances* standing in relationship is also the determinateness of this *relationship* itself.

2. The other moment is *being-for-self*, which means that the power posits *itself* as *self-related* negativity, thereby sublating again what was *presupposed.* The active substance is the cause; it *acts*, that is, it now *posits*, whereas previously it only *presupposed*; so that (*a*) to the power is now added the *illusory show* [*Schein*] of power, to the positedness the *illusory show* of positedness. What in

the presupposition was *original*, becomes in causality, *through the relation to an other*, what it is in itself; the cause produces an effect, and that, too, in another substance; it is now power in relation to an other and thus *appears* as a cause, but *is* a cause only in virtue of this *appearing*. (*b*) The effect enters the passive substance, whereby it now also appears as a *positedness*, but *is* a passive substance only as such positedness.

3. But there is still more present in this than only this *appearance*, namely: (*a*) the cause acts on the passive substance and *alters* its determination; but this is positedness, there is nothing else in it to alter; the other determination, however, that it receives is causality; the passive substance therefore becomes cause, power and activity: (*b*) the effect is *posited* in it by the cause; but that which is posited by the cause is the cause itself which, in acting, is identical with itself; it is this that puts itself in the place of the passive substance. Similarly, with regard to the active substance, (*a*) the action is the translation of the cause into the effect, into the other of the cause, into positedness, and (*b*) the cause reveals itself in the effect as what it is; the effect is identical with the cause, is not an other; thus the cause in acting reveals the posited being as that which the cause essentially is. Each side, therefore, in both its identical and negative relation to the other becomes the *opposite* of itself, so that the other, and therefore also each, remains *identical with itself*. But the identical and the negative relations are both one and the same; substance is self-identical only in its opposite and this constitutes the absolute identity of the substances posited as a duality. Active substance, through the act of positing itself as the opposite of itself, an act which is at the same time the sublating of its *presupposed otherness*, of passive substance, is manifested as cause or originative substantiality. Conversely, through being acted on, posited being is manifested *as* posited, the negative *as* negative, and therefore passive substance as *self-related* negativity, the cause meeting in this other simply and solely with its own self. Through this positing, then, the *presupposed* or *implicit* originativeness becomes *explicit* or *for itself*; yet this being that is in and for itself is such only in so far as this positing is equally a *sublating* of what was presupposed; in other words, absolute substance has returned to itself and so become absolute, only *out of* and *in* its *positedness*. Hence this reciprocity is the appearance that again sublates itself, the revelation that the

illusory being of causality in which the cause appears *as* cause, *is illusory being*. This infinite reflection-into-self, namely, that being is in and for itself only in so far as it is posited, is the *consummation of substance*. But this consummation is no longer *substance* itself but something higher, the *Notion*, the *subject*. The transition of the relation of substantiality takes place through its own immanent necessity and is nothing more than the manifestation of itself, that the Notion is its truth, and that freedom is the truth of necessity.

I have already mentioned in the Second Book of the Objective Logic[1] that the philosophy which adopts the standpoint of *substance* and stops there is the system of Spinoza. I also indicated there the defect of that system alike as to form and to matter. But the *refutation* of the system is another matter. With respect to the refutation of a philosophical system I have elsewhere also made the general observation that one must get rid of the erroneous idea of regarding the system as out and out *false*, as if the *true* system by contrast were only *opposed* to the false. The context itself in which Spinoza's system here finds mention provides the true standpoint of the system and the question whether it is true or false. The relation of substance resulted from the nature of essence; this relation and its exposition as a developed totality in a system is, therefore, a *necessary standpoint* assumed by the absolute. Such a standpoint, therefore, is not to be regarded as an opinion, a subjective, arbitrary way of thinking of an individual, as an aberration of speculation; on the contrary, speculative thinking in the course of its progress finds itself necessarily occupying that standpoint and to that extent the system is perfectly true; but *it is not the highest standpoint*. Yet this does not mean that the system can be regarded as *false*, as requiring and being capable of refutation; on the contrary, the only thing about it to be considered false is its claim to be the highest standpoint. Consequently, the *true* system cannot have the relation to it of being merely *opposed* to it; for if this were so, the system, as this opposite, would itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true system as the higher, must contain the subordinate system within itself.

Further, the refutation must not come from outside, that is, it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question and inconsistent with it. The system need only refuse

[1] p. 536, Remark.

to recognize those assumptions; the *defect* is a defect only for him who starts from the requirements and demands based on those assumptions. Thus it has been said that for anyone who does not presuppose as an established fact the freedom and self-subsistence of the self-conscious subject there cannot be any refutation of Spinozism. Besides, a standpoint so lofty and so intrinsically *rich* as the relation of substance, far from ignoring those assumptions even contains them: one of the attributes of Spinoza's substance is *thinking*. On the contrary, Spinozism knows how to resolve and assimilate the determinations in which these assumptions conflict with it, so that they appear *in the system*, but in the modifications appropriate to it. The nerve, therefore, of the external refutation consists solely in clinging stubbornly to the antitheses of these assumptions, for example, to the absolute self-subsistence of the thinking individual as against the form of thought posited in absolute substance as identical with extension. The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent's stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not. The only possible refutation of Spinozism must therefore consist, in the first place, in recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic. The relationship of substance considered simply and solely in its own intrinsic nature leads on to its opposite, to the Notion. The exposition of substance (contained in the last book) which leads on to the Notion is, therefore, the sole and genuine refutation of Spinozism. It is the *unveiling* of substance, and this is the *genesis of the Notion*, the chief moments of which have been brought together above. The *unity* of substance is its relation of *necessity*; but this unity is only an *inner* necessity; in positing itself through the moment of absolute negativity it becomes a *manifested* or *posited identity*, and thereby the *freedom* which is the identity of the Notion. The Notion, the totality resulting from the reciprocal relation, is the unity of the *two substances* standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for they no longer possess their identity as something blind, that is to say, as something merely *inner*; on the contrary, the substances now have essentially the status of an *illusory being*, of being moments of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united with its other or its positedness and each

contains its positedness *within itself*, and consequently in its other is posited as simply and solely identical with itself.

With the Notion, therefore, we have entered the realm of *freedom*. Freedom belongs to the Notion because that identity which, as absolutely determined, constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated or is a positedness, and this positedness as self-related is simply that identity. The mutual opacity of the substances standing in the causal relationship has vanished and become a self-transparent clarity, for the originality of their self-subsistence has passed into a positedness; the *original* substance is original in that it is only *the cause of itself*, and this is *substance raised to the freedom of the Notion*.

This at once provides us with a more precise determination of the Notion. Because being that is in and for itself is immediately a *positedness*, the Notion in its simple self-relation is an absolute *determinateness* which, however, as purely self-related is no less immediately a simple identity. But this self-relation of the determinateness as the union of itself with itself is equally the negation of the determinateness, and the Notion as this equality with itself is the *universal*. But this identity has equally the determination of negativity; it is the negation or determinateness which is self-related; thus the Notion is the *individual*. Each of them, the universal and the individual, is the totality, each contains within itself the determination of the other and therefore these totalities are *one* and one only, just as this unity is the differentiation of itself into the free *illusion* of this duality—of a duality which, in the difference of the individual and the universal, appears as a complete opposition, yet an opposition which is so entirely *illusory* that in thinking and enunciating the one, the other also is immediately thought and enunciated.

The foregoing is to be regarded as the *Notion of the Notion*. It may seem to differ from what is elsewhere understood by 'notion' and in that case we might be asked to indicate how that which we have here found to be the Notion is contained in other conceptions or explanations. On the one hand, however, there can be no question of a confirmation based on the *authority* of the ordinary understanding of the term; in the science of the Notion its content and character can be guaranteed solely by the *immanent deduction* which contains its genesis and which already lies behind us. On the other hand, the Notion as here deduced must,

of course, be recognizable in principle in what is elsewhere presented as the concept of the Notion. But it is not so easy to discover what others have said about the nature of the Notion. For in the main they do not concern themselves at all with the question, presupposing that everyone who uses the word automatically knows what it means. Latterly one could have felt all the more relieved from any need to trouble about the Notion since, just as it was the fashion for a while to say everything bad about the imagination, and then the memory, so in philosophy it became the habit some time ago, a habit which in some measure still exists, to heap every kind of slander on the Notion, on what is supreme in thought, while the incomprehensible and non-comprehension are, on the contrary, regarded as the pinnacle of science and morality.

I will confine myself here to a remark which may help one to grasp the notions here developed and may make it easier to find one's bearings in them. The Notion, when it has developed into a *concrete existence* that is itself free, is none other than the *I* or pure self-consciousness. True, I *have* notions, that is to say, determinate notions; but the *I* is the pure Notion itself which, as Notion, has come into *existence*. When, therefore, reference is made to the fundamental determinations which constitute the nature of the *I*, we may presuppose that the reference is to something familiar, that is, a commonplace of our ordinary thinking. But the *I* is, *first*, this pure self-related unity, and it is so not immediately but only as making abstraction from all determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As such it is *universality*; a unity that is unity with itself only through its *negative* attitude, which appears as a process of abstraction, and that consequently contains all determinedness dissolved in it. *Secondly*, the *I* as self-related negativity is no less immediately *individuality* or is *absolutely determined*, opposing itself to all that is other and excluding it—*individual personality*. This absolute *universality* which is also immediately an absolute *individualization*, and an absolutely determined being, which is a pure positedness and is this *absolutely determined* being only through its unity with the *positedness*, this constitutes the nature of the *I* as well as of the Notion; neither the one nor the other can be truly comprehended unless the two indicated moments are grasped at the same time both in their abstraction and also in their perfect unity.

When one speaks in the ordinary way of the *understanding possessed by the I*, one understands thereby a *faculty* or *property* which stands in the same relation to the *I* as the property of a thing does to the *thing* itself, that is, to an indeterminate substrate that is not the genuine ground and the determinant of its property. According to this conception I *possess* notions and *the* Notion, just as I also possess a coat, complexion, and other external properties. Now Kant went beyond this external relation of the understanding, as the faculty of notions and of the Notion itself, to the *I*. It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the *unity* which constitutes the nature of the *Notion* is recognized as the *original synthetic* unity of *apperception*, as unity of the *I think*, or of self-consciousness. This proposition constitutes the so-called *transcendental* deduction of the categories; but this has always been regarded as one of the most difficult parts of the Kantian philosophy, doubtless for no other reason than that it demands that we should go beyond the mere *representation* of the relation in which the *I* stands to the *understanding*, or notions stand to a thing and its properties and accidents, and advance to the *thought* of that relation. *An object*, says Kant,[1] is that in the *notion* of which the *manifold* of a given intuition is *unified*. But all unifying of representations demands a *unity of consciousness* in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is this *unity of consciousness* which alone constitutes the connection of the representations with the object and therewith their *objective validity* and on which rests even the *possibility of the understanding*. Kant distinguishes this unity from the *subjective unity* of consciousness, the unity of representation whereby I am conscious of a manifold as either *simultaneous* or *successive*, this being dependent on empirical conditions. On the other hand, the principles of the *objective* determination of notions are, he says, to be derived solely from the principle of the *transcendental unity of apperception*. Through the categories which are these objective determinations, the manifold of given representations is so determined as to be brought into the *unity of consciousness*. According to this exposition, the unity of the notion is that whereby something is not a mere *mode of feeling*, an *intuition*, or even a mere *representation*, but is an *object*, and this objective unity is the unity of the ego with itself. In point of fact, the *com-*

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd edition, p 137.

prehension of an object consists in nothing else than that the ego makes it *its own*, pervades it and brings it into *its own form*, that is, into the *universality* that is immediately a *determinateness*, or a determinateness that is immediately universality. As intuited or even in ordinary conception, the object is still something *external* and *alien*. When it is comprehended, the being-in-and-for-self which it possesses in intuition and pictorial thought is transformed into a *positedness*; the *I* in *thinking* it pervades it. But it is *only* as it is in thought that the object is truly *in and for itself*; in intuition or ordinary conception it is only an *Appearance*. Thought sublates the *immediacy* with which the object at first confronts us and thus converts the object into a positedness; but this its *positedness* is *its being-in-and-for-self*, or its *objectivity*. The object therefore has its objectivity in the *Notion* and this is the *unity of self-consciousness* into which it has been received; consequently its objectivity, or the Notion, is itself none other than the nature of self-consciousness, has no other moments or determinations than the *I* itself.

Thus we are justified by a cardinal principle of the Kantian philosophy in referring to the nature of the *I* in order to learn what the *Notion* is. But conversely, it is necessary for this purpose to have grasped the *Notion* of the *I* as stated above. If we cling to the mere *representation* of the *I* as it floats before our ordinary consciousness, then the *I* is only the simple *thing*, also called *soul*, in which the Notion *inheres* as a possession or property. This representation which makes no attempt to comprehend either the *I* or the Notion cannot serve to facilitate or bring nearer the comprehension of the Notion.

The Kantian exposition cited above contains two other features which concern the Notion and necessitate some further observations. In the first place, the stage of the understanding is supposed to be preceded by the stages of *feeling* and *intuition*, and it is an essential proposition of the Kantian transcendental philosophy that *without intuitions notions* are *empty* and are valid solely as *relations* of the *manifold* given by intuition. Secondly, the Notion has been declared to be the *objective* element of knowledge, and as such, the *truth*. But on the other hand, the Notion is taken as something *merely subjective* from which we cannot *extract reality*, by which is to be understood objectivity, since reality is contrasted with subjectivity; and, in general, the Notion and the logical

element are declared to be something merely *formal* which, since it abstracts from the content, does not contain truth.

Now, in the first place, as regards the relation of the understanding or the Notion to the stages *presupposed* by it, the *form* of these stages is determined by the particular science under consideration. In our science, that of pure *logic*, these stages are *being* and *essence*. In *psychology* the antecedent stages are *feeling* and *intuition*, and then *ideation* generally. In the *phenomenology* of spirit, which is the doctrine of consciousness, the ascent to the understanding is through the stages of *sensuous consciousness* and then *perception*. Kant presupposes only feeling and intuition. How incomplete to begin with this scale of stages is is revealed by the fact that he himself adds as an *appendix* to the transcendental logic or doctrine of the understanding a *treatise on the concepts of reflection*—a sphere lying between *intuition* and the *understanding* or *being* and the *Notion*.

About these stages themselves it must be remarked, first of all, that the forms of intuition, ideation and the like belong to the *self-conscious* spirit which, as such, does not fall to be considered in the science of logic. It is true that the pure determinations of being, essence and the Notion constitute the ground plan and the inner simple framework of the forms of the spirit; spirit as *intuiting* and also as *sensuous consciousness* is in the form of immediate being; and, similarly, spirit as *ideating* and as *perceiving* has risen from being to the stage of essence or reflection. But these concrete forms as little concern the science of logic as do the concrete forms assumed by the logical categories in nature, which would be *space and time*, then space and time self-filled with a content as *inorganic nature*, and lastly, *organic nature*. Similarly here, too, the Notion is to be regarded not as the act of the self-conscious understanding, not as the *subjective understanding*, but as the Notion in its own absolute character which constitutes a *stage of nature* as well as of *spirit*. Life, or organic nature, is the stage of nature at which the Notion emerges, but as blind, as unaware of itself and unthinking; the Notion that is self-conscious and thinks pertains solely to spirit. But the logical form of the Notion is independent of its non-spiritual, and also of its spiritual, shapes. The necessary premonition on this point has already been given in the Introduction. It is a point that must not wait to be established within *logic* itself but must be cleared up *before* that science is begun.

Now whatever may be the forms of the stages which precede the Notion, we come secondly to the *relation* in which the *Notion is thought to these forms*. The conception of this relation both in ordinary psychology and in the Kantian transcendental philosophy is that the empirical *material*, the manifold of intuition and representation, first *exists on its own account*, and that then the understanding *approaches* it, brings *unity* into it and by abstraction raises it to the form of *universality*. The understanding is in this way an intrinsically empty *form* which, on the one hand, obtains a reality through the said *given* content and, on the other hand, *abstracts* from that content, that is to say, *lets it drop* as something useless, but useless only for the Notion. In both these actions the Notion is not the independent factor, not the essential and true element of the prior given material; on the contrary, it is the material that is regarded as the absolute reality, which cannot be extracted from the Notion.

Now it must certainly be admitted that the Notion *as such* is not yet complete, but must rise to the *Idea* which alone is the unity of the Notion and reality; and this must be shown in the sequel to be the *spontaneous outcome of the nature of the Notion itself*. For the reality which the Notion gives itself must not be received by it as something external but must, in accordance with the requirement of the science, be derived from the Notion itself. But the truth is that it is not the material given by intuition and representation that ought to be vindicated as the *real* in contrast to the Notion. People often say, 'It is only a notion,' contrasting the notion not only with the Idea but with sensuous, spatial and temporal, palpable reality as something more excellent than the Notion; and then the *abstract* is held to be of less account than the concrete because it lacks so much of this kind of material. In this view, to abstract means to select from the concrete object for *our subjective purposes this or that mark* without thereby detracting from the worth and status of the many other properties and features left out of account; on the contrary, these as *real* retain their validity completely unimpaired, only they are left yonder, on the other side; thus it is only the *inability* of the understanding to assimilate such wealth that compels it to content itself with the impoverished abstraction. Now to regard the given material of intuition and the manifold of representation as the *real* in contrast to what is *thought*, to the Notion, is a view, the abandonment of which is not

only a condition of philosophizing but is already presupposed by religion; for how can there be any need for religion, how can religion have any meaning, if the fleeting and superficial phenomena of the world of sensuous particulars are still regarded as the truth? But philosophy gives a *reasoned* insight into the true state of the case with regard to the reality of sensuous being; it assumes the stages of feeling and intuition as precedent to the understanding in so far as they are conditions of its genesis, but only in the sense that it is conditioned by their *reality*. Abstract thinking, therefore, is not to be regarded as a mere setting aside of the sensuous material, the reality of which is not thereby impaired; rather is it the sublating and reduction of that material as mere *phenomenal appearance* to the *essential*, which is manifested only in the *Notion*. Of course, if what is taken up into the Notion from the concrete phenomenon is to serve only as a *mark* or *sign*, it certainly may be any mere random sensuous particular determination of the object, selected from the others on the basis of any random external interest and of a similar kind and nature as the rest.

A capital misunderstanding which prevails on this point is that the *natural* principle or the *beginning* which forms the starting point in the *natural* evolution or in the *history* of the developing individual, is regarded as the *truth*, and the *first* in the *Notion*. Now in the order of nature, intuition or being are undoubtedly first, or are the condition for the Notion, but they are not on that account the absolutely unconditioned; on the contrary, their reality is sublated in the Notion and with it, too, the illusory show they possessed of being the conditioning reality. When it is a question, not of *truth* but merely of *history*, as in pictorial and phenomenal thinking, we need not of course go beyond merely narrating that we start with feelings and intuitions and that from the manifold of these the understanding extracts a universality or an abstraction and naturally requires for this purpose the said substrate of feelings and intuitions which, in this process of abstraction, remains for representation in the same complete reality with which it first presented itself. But philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is *true* in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition, to *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening.

If the superficial conception of what the Notion is, leaves all manifoldness *outside* the Notion and attributes to the latter only

the form of abstract universality or the empty identity of reflection, we can at once appeal to the fact that quite apart from the view here propounded, the statement or definition of a notion expressly includes not only the genus, which itself is, properly speaking, more than a purely abstract universality, but also the *specific determinateness*. If one would but reflect attentively on the meaning of this fact, one would see that *differentiation* must be regarded as an equally essential moment of the Notion. Kant has introduced this consideration by the extremely important thought that there are synthetic judgements *a priori*. This original synthesis of apperception is one of the most profound principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of a true apprehension of the nature of the Notion and is completely opposed to that empty identity or abstract universality which is not within itself a synthesis. The further development, however, does not fulfil the promise of the beginning. The very expression *synthesis* easily recalls the conception of an *external* unity and a *mere combination* of entities that are *intrinsically separate*. Then, again, the Kantian philosophy has not got beyond the psychological reflex of the Notion and has reverted once more to the assertion that the Notion is permanently conditioned by a manifold of intuition. It has declared intellectual cognition and experience to be a *phenomenal* content, not because the categories themselves are only finite but, on the ground of a psychological idealism, because they are *merely* determinations originating in self-consciousness. It is in keeping with this standpoint, too, that the Notion without the manifold of intuition is again declared to be *empty* and *devoid of content* despite the fact that it is a synthesis *a priori*; as such, it surely does contain determinateness and difference within itself. Moreover, since the determinateness is that of the Notion and therefore *absolute determinateness*, *individuality*, the Notion is the ground and source of all finite determinateness and manifoldness.

The merely formal position that the Notion holds as understanding is fully confirmed in the Kantian exposition of what reason is. In reason, the highest stage of thought, one ought to have expected the Notion to lose the conditionedness in which it still appears at the stage of understanding and to attain to perfect truth. But this expectation is disappointed. For Kant defines the relation of reason to the categories as merely *dialectical* and, indeed, takes the result of this dialectic to be the *infinite nothing*—

just that and nothing more. Consequently, the infinite unity of reason, too, is still deprived of the synthesis, and with it the beginning referred to above of a speculative, truly infinite Notion; reason becomes the familiar, wholly formal, merely regulative *unity of the systematic employment of the understanding*. It is declared to be an abuse when logic, which is supposed to be merely a *canon of judgment*, is regarded as an *organon* for the production of *objective* insights. The notions of reason in which we could not but have an intimation of a higher power and a profounder significance, no longer possess a *constitutive* character as do the categories, they are *mere* Ideas; certainly, we are *quite at liberty* to use them, but by these intelligible entities in which all *truth* should be completely revealed, we are to understand nothing more than *hypotheses*, and to ascribe absolute truth to them would be the height of caprice and foolhardiness, for they—*do not occur in any experience*. Would one ever have thought that philosophy would deny truth to intelligible entities because they lack the spatial and temporal material of the sensuous world?

Directly connected with this is the question of the point of view from which the Notion and the character of logic generally are to be considered, a question on which the Kantian philosophy holds the same view as is commonly taken: that is to say, in what *relation* do the *Notion* and the *science of the Notion* stand to *truth* itself. We have already quoted from the Kantian deduction of the categories that according to it the object, as that in which the manifold of intuition is *unified*, is this unity solely *through the unity of self-consciousness*. Here, therefore, the *objectivity of thought* is specifically enunciated, an identity of Notion and thing, which is *truth*. In the same way, it is also commonly admitted that when thinking appropriates a given object, this thereby suffers an alteration and is changed from something sensuous to something thought; and yet that not only is the essential nature of the object not affected by this alteration but that it is only in its Notion that it is in its *truth*, whereas in the immediacy in which it is given it is only *appearance* and a *contingency*; that the cognition that truly comprehends the object is the cognition of it as it is *in and for itself*, and that the Notion is its very objectivity. But, on the other hand, it is equally maintained that we *cannot after all, know things as they truly are in themselves* and that *truth is inaccessible to the cognitive powers of reason*; that the aforesaid truth which consists in the

unity of the object and the Notion is, after all, only Appearance, and this time, again on the ground that the content is only the manifold of intuition. On this point we have already remarked that, on the contrary, it is precisely in the Notion that this manifoldness, in so far as it pertains to intuition in contrast to the Notion, is sublated and that through the Notion the object is reduced to its non-contingent essential nature. The latter enters into the sphere of Appearance and for that very reason the Appearance is not devoid of essential being, but is a manifestation of essence. But the completely liberated manifestation of essence is the Notion. These propositions of which we here remind the reader are not dogmatic assertions, for the reason that they are results that have issued from the entire immanent development of *essence*. The present standpoint to which this development has led is that the form of the *absolute* which is higher than being and essence is the *Notion*. Regarded from this aspect, the Notion has *subjugated* being and essence, which from other starting points include also feeling and intuition and representation, and which appeared as its antecedent conditions, and has proved itself to be their *unconditioned ground*. There now remains the *second* aspect, to the treatment of which this Third Book of the Logic is devoted, namely the exposition of how the Notion builds up in and from itself the reality that has vanished in it. It has therefore been freely admitted that the cognition that stops short at the Notion purely as such, is still incomplete and has only as yet arrived at *abstract truth*. But its incompleteness does not lie in its lack of that presumptive reality given in feeling and intuition but rather in the fact that the Notion has not yet given itself a reality of its *own*, a reality produced from its own resources. The demonstrated absoluteness of the Notion relatively to the material of experience and, more exactly, to the categories and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this material as it appears *apart from* and *prior* to the Notion has no *truth*; this it has solely in its ideality or its identity with the Notion. The *derivation* of the *real* from it if we want to call it derivation, consists in the first place essentially in this, that the Notion in its formal abstraction reveals itself as incomplete and through its own immanent dialectic passes over into reality; but it does not fall back again onto a ready-made reality confronting it and take refuge in something which has shown itself to be the unessential element of Appearance because, having looked around

for something better, it has failed to find it; on the contrary, it produces the reality from its own resources. It will always stand out as a marvel how the Kantian philosophy recognized the relation of thought to sensuous reality, beyond which it did not advance, as only a relative relation of mere Appearance, and perfectly well recognized and enunciated a higher unity of both in the Idea in general and, for example, in the Idea of an intuitive understanding, and yet stopped short at this relative relation and the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separate from reality—thus asserting as *truth* what it declared to be finite cognition, and denouncing as an unjustified extravagance and a figment of thought what it recognized as *truth* and of which it established the specific notion.

Since it is primarily logic and not science generally with whose relation to truth we are here concerned, it must further be conceded that logic as the *formal science* cannot and should not contain that reality which is the content of the further parts of philosophy, namely, the philosophical sciences of nature and of spirit. These concrete sciences do, of course, present themselves in a more real form of the Idea than logic does; but this is not by turning back again to the reality abandoned by the consciousness which has risen above its mode as Appearance to the level of science, nor by reverting to the use of forms such as the categories and concepts of reflection, whose finitude and untruth have been demonstrated in the logic. On the contrary, logic exhibits the elevation of the *Idea* to that level from which it becomes the creator of nature and passes over to the form of a concrete *immediacy* whose Notion, however, breaks up this shape again in order to realize itself as *concrete spirit*. As contrasted with these concrete sciences (although these have and retain as their inner formative principle that same logical element, or the Notion, which had served is their archetype), logic is of course a formal science; but it is the science of the *absolute form* which is within itself a totality and contains the *pure Idea of truth itself*. This absolute form has in its own self its content or reality; the Notion, not being a trivial, empty identity, possesses in its moment of negativity or of absolute determining, the differentiated determinations; the content is simply and solely these determinations of the absolute form and nothing else—a content posited by the absolute form itself and consequently also adequate to it. For this reason, this form is of quite another nature

than logical form is ordinarily taken to be. It is already *on its own account truth*, since this content is adequate to its form, or the reality to its Notion; and it is the *pure truth* because the determinations of the content do not yet have the form of an absolute otherness or of absolute immediacy. When Kant, in connection with logic[1] comes to discuss the old and famous question: *what is truth?* he first of all *presents* to the reader as a triviality the explanation of the term as the agreement of cognition with its object—a definition of great, indeed of supreme, value. If we remember this definition in connection with the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism, that reason as cognitive is incapable of apprehending *things-in-themselves*, that *reality* lies *absolutely* outside the *Notion*, then it is at once evident that a *reason* such as this which is unable to put itself in agreement with its object, the things-in-themselves, and *things-in-themselves* that are not in agreement with the Notion of reason, the Notion that is not in agreement with reality, and a reality that does not agree with the Notion, are *untrue conceptions*. If Kant had considered the Idea of an *intuitive understanding* in the light of the above definition of truth, he would have treated that Idea which expresses the required agreement, not as a figment of thought but rather as the truth.

'What we require to know' Kant goes on to say, 'is a universal and sure criterion of any cognition whatever; it would be such a criterion as would be valid for all cognitions *without distinction of their objects*; but since with such a criterion abstraction would be made from *all content* of the cognition (*relation to its object*) and truth concerns precisely this content, it would be quite *impossible* and *absurd* to ask for a mark of the *truth of this content* of cognitions.' Here, the usual conception of the formal function of logic is expressed very definitely and the argument adduced has a very convincing air. But first of all it is to be observed that it usually happens with such formal ratiocination that it forgets in its discourse the very point on which it has based its argument and of which it is speaking. It is alleged that it would be absurd to ask for the criterion of the *truth of the content* of cognition; but according to the definition it is not the *content* that constitutes the truth, but the agreement of the content with the Notion. A content such as is here spoken of, *without the Notion*, is something notionless, and

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 83.

hence without essential being; certainly we cannot ask for the criterion of the truth of such a content, but for the very opposite reason; not, that is, because the content, as something notionless, is not the required agreement, but simply because it cannot be anything more than a mere truthless opinion. Let us leave on one side the content which causes the confusion here—the confusion into which formalism falls whenever it sets out to explain something and which makes it say the opposite of what it intends—and let us stop at the abstract view that logic is only formal and, in fact, abstracts from all content; we then have a one-sided cognition which is not to contain any object, an empty, blank form which therefore is no more an *agreement*—for an agreement essentially requires *two* terms—than it is truth. In the *a priori* synthesis of the Notion, Kant possessed a higher principle in which a duality in a unity could be cognised, a cognition, therefore, of what is required for truth; but the material of sense, the manifold of intuition, was too strong for him and he was unable to get away from it to a consideration of the Notion and the categories *in and for themselves* and to a speculative method of philosophising.

Logic being the science of the absolute form, this formal science, in order to be *true*, must possess in its own self a *content* adequate to its form; and all the more, since the formal element of logic is the pure form, and therefore the truth of logic must be the *pure truth* itself. Consequently this formal science must be regarded as possessing richer determinations and a richer content and as being infinitely more potent in its influence on the concrete than is usually supposed. The laws of logic by themselves (not counting the heterogeneous accretions of applied logic and the rest of the psychological and anthropological material) are commonly restricted, apart from the law of contradiction, to some meagre propositions concerning the conversion of judgements and the forms of syllogisms. Even here the forms which come up for treatment as well as their further modifications are only, as it were, historically taken up; they are not subjected to criticism to determine whether they are in and for themselves *true*. Thus, for example, the form of the positive judgement is accepted as something perfectly correct in itself, the question whether such a judgement is true depending solely on the content. Whether this form is *in its own self* a form of truth, whether the proposition it enunciates, the *individual* is a *universal*, is not inherently dialectical, is a question

that no one thinks of investigating. It is straightway assumed that this judgement is, on its own account, capable of containing truth and that the proposition enunciated by any positive judgement is true, although it is directly evident that it lacks what is required by the definition of truth, namely, the agreement of the Notion and its object; if the predicate, which here is the universal, is taken as the Notion, and the subject, which is the individual, is taken as the object, then the one does not agree with the other. But if the *abstract* universal which is the predicate falls short of constituting a Notion, for a Notion certainly implies something more, and if, too, a subject of this kind is not yet much more than a grammatical one, how should the judgement possibly contain truth seeing that either its Notion and object do not agree, or it lacks both Notion and object? On the contrary, then, what is *impossible* and *absurd* is to attempt to grasp the truth in such forms as the positive judgement and the judgement generally. Just as the Kantian philosophy did not consider the categories in and for themselves but declared them to be finite determinations incapable of containing truth, on the wrong ground that they are subjective forms of self-consciousness, still less did that philosophy subject to criticism the forms of the Notion which are the content of ordinary logic; on the contrary, it has adopted a portion of them, namely, the functions of judgement, for the determination of the categories and accepted them as valid presuppositions. Even if we are to see in logical forms nothing more than formal functions of thought, they would for that very reason be worthy of investigation to ascertain how far, on their own account, they correspond to the *truth*. A logic that does not perform this task can at most claim the value of a descriptive natural history of the phenomena of thinking just as they occur. It is an infinite merit of Aristotle, one that must fill us with the highest admiration for the powers of that genius, that he was the first to undertake this description. It is necessary however to go further and to ascertain both the systematic connection of these forms and their value.

DIVISION

The foregoing consideration of the Notion shows it to be the unity of *being* and *essence*. Essence is the *first negation* of being, which has thereby become *illusory being*; the Notion is the *second negation* or the negation of this negation, and is therefore *being* once more, but being that has been restored as the infinite mediation and negativity of being within itself. Consequently, *being* and *essence* in the Notion no longer have the same determination that they had as *being* and *essence*, nor are they merely in a unity such that each has an *illusory being* in the other. Therefore the Notion does not differentiate itself into these determinations. It is the truth of the relationship of substance in which being and essence achieve the fulfilment of their self-subsistence and their determination through each other. The truth of substantiality proved to be the *substantial identity* which is no less a *positedness* and only as such is *substantial identity*. The positedness is a *determinate being* and *differentiation*; consequently, in the Notion, being-in-and-for-itself has attained a true and adequate reality, for the positedness is itself being-in-and-for-itself. This positedness constitutes the difference of the Notion within itself; because the positedness is immediately being-in-and-for-itself, the *different moments* of the Notion are themselves the *whole Notion, universal in their determinateness and identical with their negation.*

This, now, is the very Notion of the Notion. But it is *as yet only* its Notion; or, this Notion is itself *only* the Notion. Because it is equally being-in-and-for-self and also a positedness, or the absolute substance that manifests the *necessity* of distinct substances as an *identity*, this identity must itself posit what it is. The moments of the movement of the relationship of substantiality through which the Notion *has come to be* and the reality thereby exhibited are still only in transition into the Notion; this reality does not yet possess the determination of being the Notion's *own, self-evolved* determination; it fell in the sphere of necessity; but the Notion's own determination can only be the result of its *free* determining, a determinate being in which the Notion is identical with itself, its moments also being Notions and *posited* by the Notion itself.

At first, therefore, the Notion is only *in itself* or *implicitly* the truth; because it is *only* something *inner*, it is equally *only outer*.

It is at first simply an *immediate* and in this guise its moments have the form of immediate, *fixed determinations*. It appears as the *determinate Notion*, as the sphere of the mere *understanding*. Because this form of immediacy is still inadequate to the nature of the Notion, for this is *free*, being in relation only with itself, it is an *external* form in which the Notion cannot count as a being-in-and-for-self, but only as something *posited* or *subjective*. The Notion in the guise of immediacy constitutes the point of view for which the Notion is a subjective thinking, a reflection *external* to the subject matter. This stage, therefore, constitutes *subjectivity*, or the *formal Notion*. Its externality is manifested in the *fixed being* of its *determinations* each of which appears independently as an *isolated*, *qualitative* something which is only externally related to its other. But the *identity* of the Notion, which is precisely their *inner* or *subjective* essence, sets them dialectically in movement, with the result that their separatedness vanishes and with it the separation of the Notion from the object, and there emerges as their truth the *totality* which is the *objective Notion*.

Secondly, the Notion in its *objectivity* is the *subject matter in and for itself*. Through its necessary, progressive determination the *formal* Notion makes *itself* its subject matter and in this way is rid of the relation of subjectivity and externality to the object. Or, conversely, objectivity is the *real Notion* that *has emerged from its inwardness* and passed over into determinate being. In this identity with the object, the Notion thus has a *free* determinate being of *its own*. But this freedom is still only an *immediate*, not yet a *negative*, freedom. As one with the object, the Notion is *submerged* in it; its distinct moments are objective existences in which it is itself again only the *inner*. As the soul [*Seele*] of objective reality it must *give itself* the form of *subjectivity* which, as formal Notion, belonged to it immediately; thus, *in the form* of the free Notion, a form which in objectivity it still lacked, it opposes itself to that objectivity and in so doing makes the identity with it which, as *objective* Notion it possesses *in and for itself*, also a *posited* identity.

In this consummation in which it has the form of freedom even in its objectivity, the *adequate Notion* is the *Idea*. *Reason*, which is the sphere of the Idea, is the *self-revealed truth* in which the Notion possesses the realization that is wholly adequate to it, and is free, inasmuch as it cognizes this its objective world in its subjectivity and its subjectivity in its objective world.

Section One: Subjectivity

The Notion is, in the first instance, *formal*, the Notion in its *beginning* or the *immediate Notion*. In the immediate unity, its difference or positedness is itself *at first* simple and only an *illusory being* [*Schein*], so that the moments of the difference are immediately the totality of the Notion and are simply the *Notion as such*.

Secondly, however, because it is absolute negativity, it sunders itself and posits itself as the *negative* or as the *other* of itself; and further, because as yet it is only the *immediate* Notion, this positing or differentiation is characterized by the fact that the moments become *indifferent to one another* and each becomes for itself; in this *partition*, its unity is still only an external *connexion*. As such *connexion* of its moments, which are posited as *self-subsistent* and *indifferent*, it is *judgement*.

Thirdly, though the judgement does contain the unity of the Notion that has vanished into its self-subsistent moments, yet this unity is not *posited*. It becomes so through the dialectical movement of the judgement, through which it has become the *syllogism*, the Notion posited in its completeness; for in the syllogism there is posited not only the moments of the Notion as *self-subsistent* extremes, but also their *mediating unity*.

But since this *unity* itself as the unifying *middle*, and the *moments* as *self-subsistent* extremes, are in the first instance *immediately* opposed to one another, this contradictory relationship that occurs in the *formal syllogism* sublates itself, and the *completeness* of the Notion passes over into the unity of the *totality*, the *subjectivity* of the Notion into its *objectivity*.

CHAPTER I

THE NOTION

Understanding is the term usually employed to express the faculty of notions; as so used, it is distinguished from the *faculty of judgement* and the faculty of syllogisms, of the formal *reason.* But it is with *reason* that it is especially contrasted; in that case, however, it does not signify the faculty of the notion in general, but of *determinate* notions, and the idea prevails that the notion is *only* a *determinate* notion. When the understanding in this signification is distinguished from the formal faculty of judgement and from the formal reason, it is to be taken as the faculty of the *single* determinate notion. For the judgement and the syllogism or reason are, as formal, only a *product of the understanding* since they stand under the form of the abstract determinateness of the Notion. Here, however, the Notion emphatically does not rank as something merely abstractly determinate; consequently, the understanding is to be distinguished from reason only in the sense that the former is merely the faculty of the notion in general.

This universal Notion, which we have now to consider here, contains the three moments: *universality*, *particularity* and *individuality*. The difference and the determinations which the Notion gives itself in its distinguishing, constitute the side which was previously called *positedness.* As this is identical in the Notion with being-in-and-for-self, each of these moments is no less the *whole* Notion than it is a *determinate* Notion and *a determination* of the Notion.

In the first instance, it is the *pure Notion* or the determination of *universality*. But the pure or universal Notion is also only a *determinate* or *particular* Notion, which takes its place alongside other Notions. Because the Notion is a totality, and therefore in its universality or pure identical self-relation is essentially a determining and a distinguishing, it therefore contains within itself the standard by which this form of its self-identity, in pervading and embracing all the moments, no less immediately determines itself to be only the *universal* over against the distinguishedness of the moments.

Secondly, the Notion is thereby posited as this *particular* or *determinate* Notion, distinct from others.

Thirdly, *individuality* is the Notion reflecting itself out of the difference into absolute negativity. This is, at the same time, the moment in which it has passed out of its identity into its *otherness*, and becomes the *judgement*.

A. THE UNIVERSAL NOTION

The pure Notion is the absolutely infinite, unconditioned and free. It is here, at the outset of the discussion which has the Notion for its *content*, that we must look back once more at its genesis. *Essence* is the *outcome* of *being*, and the Notion the *outcome* of essence, therefore also of being. But this becoming has the significance of a self-*repulsion*, so that it is rather the *outcome* which is the *unconditioned* and *original*. *Being*, in its transition into essence, has become an *illusory being* or a *positedness*, and *becoming* or transition into an *other* has become a positing; and conversely, the *positing* or reflection of essence has sublated itself and has restored itself as a being that is *not posited*, that is *original*. The Notion is the interfusion of these moments, namely, qualitative and original being is such only as a positing, only as a return-into-self, and this pure reflection-into-self is a sheer *becoming-other* or *determinateness* which, consequently, is no less an infinite, self-relating *determinateness*.

Thus the Notion is, in the first instance, the *absolute self-identity* that is such only as the negation of negation or as the infinite unity of the negativity with itself. This *pure relation* of the Notion to itself, which is this relation by positing itself through the negativity, is the *universality* of the Notion.

As *universality* is the utterly *simple* determination, it does not seem capable of any explanation; for an explanation must concern itself with definitions and distinctions and must apply predicates to its object, and to do this to what is simple, would alter rather than explain it. But the simplicity which constitutes the very nature of the universal is such that, through absolute negativity, it contains *within itself* difference and determinateness in the highest degree. *Being* is simple as *immediate* being; for that reason it is only something *meant* or *intended* and we cannot say of it what it is; therefore, it is one with its other, with *non-being*. Its

Notion is just this, to be a simplicity that immediately vanishes in its opposite; it is *becoming*. The *universal*, on the contrary, is that *simplicity* which, because it is the Notion, no less possesses *within itself* the *richest content*.

First, therefore, it is the simple relation to itself; it is only *within itself*. *Secondly*, however, this identity is *within itself* absolute *mediation*, but it is not something *mediated*. The universal that is *mediated*, namely, the *abstract* universal that is opposed to the particular and the individual, this will be discussed later when we are dealing with the specific notion. Yet even the *abstract* universal involves this, that in order to obtain it we are required to *leave out* other determinations of the concrete. These determinations, simply as such, are *negations*; equally, too, the *omitting* of them is a *negating*. So that even with the abstraction, we have the negation of the negation. But this double negation is conceived of as though it were *external* to the abstraction, as though not only were the other omitted properties of the concrete distinct from the one retained, which is the content of the abstract universal, but also as though this operation of omitting the other properties and retaining the one were a process outside the properties themselves. To such an *externality* in face of that movement, the universal has not yet determined itself; it is still within itself that absolute mediation which is, precisely, the negation of the negation or absolute negativity.

By virtue of this original unity it follows, in the first place, that the first negative, or the *determination*, is not a limitation for the universal which, on the contrary, *maintains itself therein* and is positively identical with itself. The categories of being were, as Notions, essentially these identities of the determinations with themselves in their limitation or otherness; but this identity was only *in itself* the Notion; it was not yet manifested. Consequently, the qualitative determination as such was lost in its other and had for its truth a determination *distinct* from itself. The universal, on the contrary, even when it posits itself in a determination, *remains* therein what it is. It is the soul [*Seele*] of the concrete which it indwells, unimpeded and equal to itself in the manifoldness and diversity of the concrete. It is not dragged into the process of becoming, but *continues* itself through that process undisturbed and possesses the power of unalterable, undying self-preservation.

But even so, it does not merely *show*, or have an *illusory being*,

in its other, like the determination of reflection; this, as a *correlate*, is not merely self-related but is a *positive relating* of itself to its other in which it *manifests itself*; but, in the first instance, it only *shows* in it, and this illusory being of each in the other, or their reciprocal determining, along with their self-dependence, has the form of an external act. The *universal*, on the contrary, is posited as the *essential being* of its determination, as the latter's *own positive nature*. For the determination that constitutes its negative is, in the Notion, simply and solely a *positedness*; in other words, it is, at the same time, essentially only the negative of the negative, and is only as this identity of the negative with itself, which is the universal. Thus the universal is also the *substance* of its determinations; but in such wise that what was a *contingency* for substance, is the Notion's own self-*mediation*, its own *immanent reflection*. But this mediation which, in the first instance, raises contingency to *necessity*, is the *manifested* relation; the Notion is not the abyss of formless substance, or necessity as the *inner* identity of things or states distinct from, and limiting, one another; on the contrary, as absolute negativity, it is the shaper and creator, and because the determination is not a limitation but is just as much utterly sublated, or posited, the illusory being is now manifestation, the manifestation *of the identical*.

The universal is therefore *free* power; it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without *doing violence* to it; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful communion with itself. We have called it free power, but it could also be called *free love* and *boundless blessedness*, for it bears itself towards its other as towards *its own self*; in it, it has returned to itself.

We have just mentioned *determinateness*, although the Notion, being as yet only the universal and only self-*identical*, has not yet advanced to that stage. However, we cannot speak of the universal apart from determinateness which to be more precise is particularity and individuality, for the universal, in its absolute negativity, contains determinateness in and for itself. The determinateness, therefore, is not introduced from outside when we speak of it in connexion with the universal. As negativity in general or in accordance with the *first*, *immediate* negation, the universal contains determinateness generally as *particularity*; as the *second* negation, that is, as negation of the negation, it is *absolute determinateness* or *individuality* and *concreteness*. The universal is thus the totality of

the Notion; it is a concrete, and far from being empty, it has through its Notion a *content*, and a content in which it not only maintains itself but one which is its own and immanent in it. We can, indeed, abstract from the content: but in that case we do not obtain the universal of the Notion but only the *abstract* universal, which is an isolated, imperfect moment of the Notion and has no truth.

More precisely, the universal shows itself as this totality as follows. In so far as it contains determinateness, it is not merely the *first* negation, but also the reflection of this negation into itself. Taken expressly with this first negation, it is a *particular*, and it is as such that we are soon to consider it; but in this determinateness it is essentially still a universal; this side we have here still to consider. For determinateness, being in the Notion, is the total reflection, the *twofold illusory being* which on the one hand has an illusory reference *outwards*, the reflection-into-other, and on the other hand has an illusory reference *inwards*, the reflection-into-self. The former reflection involves distinction from an *other*; from this standpoint, the universal possesses a *particularity* which has its resolution in a higher universal. Now even though it is merely a relative universal, it does not lose its character of universal; it preserves itself in its determinateness, not merely as though in its connexion with the determinateness it remained indifferent to it—for then it would be merely *compounded* with it—but so that it is what we have just called the *illusory reference inwards*. The determinateness, as determinate *Notion*, is *bent back into itself* out of the externality; it is the Notion's own immanent *character*, which is an essential character by virtue of the fact that, in being taken up into the universality and pervaded by it, it equally pervades the universality, being of like compass and identical with it; it is the character that belongs to the *genus* as the determinateness that is not separated from the universal. Accordingly, the *limitation* is not outward-going but *positive*, for the Notion, through its universality, stands in free relation to itself. Thus even the determinate Notion remains within itself infinitely free Notion.

But in regard to the other side, in which the genus is limited by its specific character, it has been observed that this, as a lower genus, has its resolution in a higher universal. The latter, in its turn, can also be grasped as genus but as a more abstract one; but

it always pertains only to that side of the determinate Notion which has a reference outwards. The truly higher universal is that in which this outward-going side is taken back into the universal, the second negation, in which the determinateness is present simply *as* posited or *as* illusory being. Life, ego, spirit, absolute Notion, are not universals merely in the sense of higher genera, but are concretes whose determinatenesses, too, are not species or lower genera but genera which, in their reality, are absolutely self-contained and self-fulfilled. In so far as life, ego, finite spirit are, as they certainly are, also only determinate Notions, their absolute resolution is in that universal which as truly absolute Notion is to be grasped as the Idea of infinite spirit, whose *posited* being is infinite, transparent reality wherein it contemplates its *creation*, and in this creation its own self.

The true, infinite universal which, in itself, is as much particularity as individuality, we have next to consider as *particularity*. It *determines* itself freely; the process by which it makes itself finite is not a transition, for this occurs only in the sphere of being; *it is creative power* as the absolute negativity which relates itself to its own self. As such, it differentiates itself internally, and this is a *determining*, because the differentiation is one with the universality. Accordingly, the universal is a process in which it posits the differences themselves as universal and self-related. They thereby become *fixed*, isolated differences. The isolated *subsistence* of the finite which earlier was determined as its being-for-self, and also as thinghood, as substance, is, in its truth universality, the form which which the infinite Notion clothes its differences—a form that is, in fact, one of its own differences. Herein consists the *creative power* of the Notion, a power which is to be comprehended only in this, the Notion's innermost core.

B. THE PARTICULAR NOTION

Determinateness as such belongs to being and the qualitative sphere; as determinateness of the Notion it is particularity. It is not a *limit*, as though it were related to an other *beyond* it; on the contrary, as we have just seen, it is the native, immanent moment of the universal; in particularity, therefore, the universal is not in the presence of an other, but simply of itself.

The particular contains universality, which constitutes its

substance; the genus is *unaltered* in its species, and the species are not different from the universal but only *from one another*. The particular has one and the same universality as the *other* particulars to which it is related. At the same time, by virtue of the identity of the particulars with the universal, their diversity is, *as such*, universal; it is *totality*. The particular, therefore, not only *contains* the universal but *through its determinateness* also exhibits it; consequently, the universal constitutes a *sphere* that must exhaust the particular. This totality appears, in so far as the determinateness of the particular is taken as mere *diversity*, as *completeness*. In this respect, species are complete simply because *there are* no more of them. There is no inner standard or *principle* that could apply to them, simply because *diversity* is the difference without unity in which the universality, which in its own self is absolute unity, is a merely external reflection and an unrestricted, contingent completeness. But diversity passes over into *opposition*, into an *immanent relation* of the diverse moments. Particularity, however, because it is universality, is this immanent relation, not through a transition, but in and for itself; it is in its own self totality and *simple* determinateness, essentially a *principle*. It has no *other* determinateness than that posited by the universal itself and resulting from the universal in the following manner.

The particular is the universal itself, but it is its difference or relation to an other, its *illusory reference outwards* [*sein Scheinen nach aussen*]; but there is no other present from which the particular could be distinguished, except the universal itself. The universal determines *itself*, and so is itself the particular; the determinateness is *its* difference; it is distinguished only from its own self. Therefore its species are only (*a*) the universal itself, and (*b*) the particular. The universal as the Notion is itself and its opposite, and this again is the universal itself as its posited determinateness; it embraces its opposite and in it is in union with itself. Thus it is the totality and principle of its diversity, which is determined wholly and solely by the universal itself.

Therefore there is no other true logical classification than this, that the Notion sets itself on one side as *immediate* indeterminate universality; this very indeterminateness constitutes its determinateness or makes it a particular. *Each* of them is the particular and is therefore *co-ordinate* with the other. Each of them as a particular is also *determinate as against* the universal, and in so far can be said

to be *subordinate* to it. But even this universal, *as against* which the particular is determined, is for that reason itself *merely one* of the opposed sides. For if we speak of *two opposed sides*, we must supplement this by saying that it is not merely *together* that they constitute the particular—as if they were *alike* in being particulars only for external reflection—but rather that their determinateness *over against one another* is at the same time essentially only *one* determinateness, the negativity, which in the universal is *simple*.

Difference, as it shows itself here, is in its Notion and therefore in its truth. All previous difference has this unity in principle (*im Begriffe*). As immediate difference in the sphere of being, it is *limit* of an *other*; in reflection it is relative and posited as essentially relating itself to its other; here therefore the unity of the Notion begins to be *posited*, but at first it is only *illusory being* in an other. The true meaning and resolution of these determinations is just this, that they attain to their Notion, their truth; being, determinate being, something, or whole and parts, etc. substance and accidents, cause and effect, are by themselves [merely] thought-determinations; but they are grasped as determinate *Notions* when each is cognized in unity with its other or opposite determination. Whole and parts, cause and effect, for example, are not as yet different terms determined as *particulars* relatively to each other, because although *in themselves* they constitute *one* Notion, their *unity* has not yet reached the form of *universality*; thus the *difference*, too, which is in these relationships, has not as yet the form of being *one* determinateness. Cause and effect, for example, are not two different Notions, but only *one determinate* Notion, and causality, like every Notion, is a *simple* Notion.

With respect to completeness, we have seen that the determinate side of particularity is *complete* in the difference of the *universal* and the *particular*, and that these two alone constitute the particular species. In *nature*, of course, there are to be found more than two species in a genus, just as between these many species there cannot exist the relationship we have just indicated. This is the impotence of nature, that it cannot adhere to and exhibit the strictness of the Notion and runs wild in this blind irrational [*begrifflos*] multiplicity. We can *wonder* at nature's manifold genera and species and the endless diversity of her formations, for *wonderment* is *unreasoning* and its object the irrational. Nature, because it is

the self-externality of the Notion, is free to indulge itself in this variety, just as spirit, too, even though it possesses the Notion in the shape of the Notion, engages in pictorial thinking and runs riot in its endless variety. The manifold natural genera or species must not be esteemed as anything more than the capricious fancies of spirit in its representations. Both indeed show traces and inklings of the Notion on all sides, but do not present a faithful copy of it because they are the side of its free self-externality. The Notion is absolute power just because it can freely abandon its difference to the shape of self-subsistent diversity, outer necessity, contingency, caprice, opinion, which however must not be taken for more than the abstract aspect of *nothingness*.

We have seen that the *determinateness* of the particular is *simple* as *principle*, but it is also simple as moment of the totality, as a determinateness opposed to the *other* determinateness. The Notion, in determining or differentiating itself, is *negatively* directed against its unity and gives itself the form of one of its ideal moments, that of *being*; as a *determinate* Notion, it has a *determinate* being in general. This being, however, no longer has the meaning of mere *immediacy*, but of universality, of an immediacy that is identical with itself through absolute mediation, an immediacy that equally contains within itself the other moment, namely, essential being or reflection. This universality with which the determinate moment is clothed is *abstract* universality. The particular has universality within it as its essential being; but in so far as the determinateness of the difference is posited and thereby has being, universality is a *form* assumed by the difference, and the determinateness as such is the *content*. The universality becomes form in so far as the difference is present as the essential moment, just as, on the contrary, in the pure universal it is present only as absolute negativity and *not as* difference *posited* as such.

Now determinateness, it is true, is the *abstract*, as against the *other*, determinateness; but this other is only universality itself which is, therefore, also *abstract*, and the determinateness of the Notion, or particularity, is again nothing more than a determinate universality. In this, the Notion is *outside itself*; since it is the *Notion* that is here outside itself, the abstract universal contains all the moments of the Notion. It is (*a*) universality, (*b*) determinateness, (*c*) the *simple* unity of both; but this unity is *immediate*, and therefore particularity is not present as totality. *In itself* it is

also this *totality* and *mediation*; it is essentially an *exclusive* relation to an *other*, or sublation of the negation, namely, of the *other* determinateness—an *other*, however, that exists only in imagination, for it vanishes immediately and shows itself to be the same as its supposed *other*. Therefore, what makes this universality abstract is that the mediation is only a *condition* or is not *posited in the universality* itself. Because it is not *posited*, the unity of the *abstract* universality has the form of immediacy, and the content has the form of indifference to its universality, for the content is not present as the totality which is the universality of absolute negativity. Hence the abstract universal is, indeed, the Notion, yet it is without the Notion; it is the Notion that is not posited as such.

When people talk of the *determinate Notion*, what is usually meant is merely such an *abstract universal*. Even by *notion* as such, what is generally understood is only this notion that is no Notion, and the understanding denotes the faculty of such notions. *Demonstration* appertains to this understanding in so far as it *progresses* by *notions*, that is to say, merely by *determinations*. Such a progression by notions, therefore, does not get beyond finitude and necessity; for it, the highest is the negative infinite, the abstraction of the supreme being [*des höchsten Wesen*], which is itself the determinateness of *indeterminateness*. Absolute substance, too, though it is not this empty abstraction—from the point of view of its content it is rather the totality—is nevertheless abstract because it lacks the absolute form; its inmost truth is not constituted by the Notion; true, it is the identity of universality and particularity, or of thought and asunderness, yet this identity is not the *determinateness* of the Notion; on the contrary, *outside* substance there is an understanding—and just because it is outside it, a contingent understanding—in which and for which substance is present in various attributes and modes.

Moreover, abstraction is not *empty* as it is usually said to be; it is the *determinate* Notion and has some determinateness or other for its content. Even the supreme being, the pure abstraction, has, as already remarked, the determinateness of indeterminateness; but indeterminateness is a determinateness, because it is supposed to stand *opposed* to the determinate. But the enunciation of what it is, itself sublates what it is supposed to be; it is enunciated as one with determinateness, and in this way, out of the abstraction is established its truth and the Notion. But every determinate Notion

is, of course, *empty* in so far as it does not contain the totality, but only a one-sided determinateness. Even when it has some other concrete content, for example man, the state, animal, etc., it still remains an empty Notion, since its determinateness is not the *principle* of its differences; a principle contains the beginning and the essential nature of its development and realization; any other determinateness of the notion, however, is sterile. To reproach the Notion generally with being empty, is to misjudge that absolute determinateness of the Notion which is the difference of the Notion and the only true content in the element of the Notion.

Connected with the above is the reason why latterly the understanding has been so lightly esteemed and ranked as inferior to reason; it is the *fixity* which it imparts to determinatenesses and consequently to finite determinations. This fixity consists in the form of abstract universality which we have just considered; through it they become *unalterable*. For qualitative determinateness and also the determinations of reflection are essentially *limited*, and through their limitation have a relation to their *other*; hence the *necessity* of transition and passing away. But the universality which they possess in the understanding gives them the form of reflection-into-self by which they are freed from the relation-to-other and have become *imperishable*. Now though in the pure Notion this eternity belongs to its nature, yet its abstract determinations are eternal essentialities only in respect of *their form*; but their content is at variance with this form; therefore they are not truth, or imperishable. Their content is at variance with the form because it is not the determinateness itself as universal, that is, is not totality of the Notion's difference, or is not itself the whole form; but the form of the limited understanding is itself the imperfect form, namely, *abstract* universality. But further, we must recognize the infinite force of the understanding in splitting the concrete into abstract determinatenesses and plumbing the depth of the difference, the force that at the same time is alone the power that effects their transition. The concrete of *intuition* is a *totality*, but a sensuous one—a real material which has an indifferent, *sundered* existence in space and time; but surely this absence of unity in the manifold, where it is the content of intuition, ought not to be counted to it for merit and superiority over intellectual existence. The mutability that it exhibits in intuition already points to the universal; yet all that it brings to view is merely

another, equally mutable, material; therefore, only the same thing again, not the universal which should appear and take its place. But least of all in sciences such as geometry and arithmetic, should we count it as a merit that their material involves an *intuitive* element, or imagine that their propositions are established on it. On the contrary, it is on account of that element that the material of such sciences is of an inferior nature; the intuition of figures or numbers does not procure a *scientific* knowledge of them; only *thinking* about them can do this. But if by intuition we are to understand not merely the element of sense but the *objective totality*, then it is an *intellectual* intuition; that is to say, intuition has for its object not the external side of existence, but what existence holds of imperishable reality and truth—reality, only in so far as it is essentially in the Notion and *determined* by it, the Idea, whose more precise nature has to reveal itself at a later stage. The advantage which intuition as such is supposed to have over the Notion is external reality, the Notionless element, which first receives a value through the Notion.

Since, therefore, understanding exhibits the infinite force which determines the universal, or conversely, imparts through the form of universality a fixity and subsistence to the determinateness that is in and for itself transitory, then it is not the fault of the understanding if no progress is made beyond this point. It is a subjective *impotence of reason* which adopts these determinatenesses in their fixity, and which is unable to bring them back to their unity through the dialectical force opposed to this abstract universality, in other words, through their own peculiar nature or through their Notion. The understanding does indeed give them, so to speak, a rigidity of *being* such as they do not possess in the qualitative sphere and in the sphere of reflection; but at the same time it *spiritually impregnates* them and so sharpens them, that just at this extreme point alone they acquire the capability to dissolve themselves and to pass over into their opposite. The highest maturity, the highest stage, which anything can attain is that in which its downfall begins. The fixity of the determinateness into which the understanding seems to run, the form of the imperishable, is that of self-relating universality. But this belongs properly to the Notion; and consequently in this universality is to be found expressed, and infinitely close at hand, the *dissolution* of the finite. This universality directly refutes [*arguiert*] the determinateness of

the finite and *expresses* its incongruity with the universality. Or rather we can say that the adequacy of the finite is already to hand; the abstract determinate is posited as one with the universality, and for that very reason is posited as not for itself—for then it would be only a determinate—but only as unity of itself and the universal, that is, as Notion.

Therefore the usual practice of separating understanding and reason is, from every point of view, to be rejected. When the Notion is regarded as irrational, this should be interpreted rather as an incapacity of reason to recognize itself in the Notion. The determinate and abstract Notion is the *condition*, or rather an *essential moment of reason*; it is form spiritually impregnated, in which the finite, through the universality in which it relates itself to itself, spontaneously catches fire, posits itself as dialectical and thereby is the *beginning* of the manifestation of reason.

In the foregoing, the determinate Notion has been presented in its truth, and therefore it only remains to indicate what it is as already posited therein. Difference, which is an essential moment of the Notion though not yet posited as such in the pure universal, receives its due in the determinate Notion. Determinateness in the form of universality is linked with the universal to form a simple determination; this determinate universal is the self-related determinateness; it is the determinate determinateness or absolute negativity posited *for itself*. But the self-related determinateness is *individuality*. Just as universality is immediately in and for itself already particularity, so too particularity is immediately in and for itself also *individuality*; this individuality is, in the first instance, to be regarded as the third moment of the Notion, in so far as we hold on to its *opposition* to the two other moments, but it is also to be considered as the absolute return of the Notion into itself, and at the same time as the posited loss of itself.

Remark. Universality, *particularity*, and *individuality* are, according to the foregoing exposition, the *three* determinate Notions, that is, if one insists on *counting* them. We have already shown that number is an unsuitable form in which to hold Notional determinations; but for the determinations of the Notion itself it is unsuitable in the highest degree; number, since it has the unit [*das Eins*] for its principle, converts them as *counted* into completely isolated and

mutually indifferent determinations. We have seen from the foregoing that the truth is that the different determinate Notions, far from falling apart into number, are simply only *one* and the same Notion.

In the customary treatment of logic hitherto, various *classifications* and *species* of notions occur. We are at once struck by the inconsequential way in which the species of notions are introduced: *there are*, in respect of quantity, quality, etc., the following notions. *There are*, expresses no other justification than that we *find* such species *already to hand* and they present themselves *empirically*. In this way, we obtain an *empirical logic*—an odd science this, an *irrational* cognition of the *rational*. In proceeding thus, logic sets a very bad example of obedience to its own precepts; it permits itself for its own purpose to do the opposite of what it prescribes as a rule, namely that notions should be deduced, and scientific propositions (therefore also the proposition: there are such and such species of notions) should be proved. In this matter, the Kantian philosophy commits a further inconsequence: it *borrows* the categories, as so-called root notions, for the *transcendental logic*, from the subjective logic in which they were adopted empirically. Since it admits the latter fact, it is hard to see why transcendental logic resolves to borrow from such a science instead of directly resorting to experience.

To cite some details of this, notions are mainly classified according to their *clearness*, into *clear* and *obscure*, *distinct* and *indistinct*, *adequate* and *inadequate*. To these we can also add *complete*, *profuse*, [*überfliessend*] notions and suchlike superfluities. As regards the classification by *clearness*, it is readily seen that this standpoint and its related distinctions are taken from *psychological*, not from *logical*, determinations. The so-called *clear* notion is supposed to suffice for distinguishing one object from another; but this is not yet a notion, it is nothing more than a *subjective representation*. What an *obscure* notion is must be left to itself, for otherwise it would not be an obscure but a distinct notion. The *distinct* notion is supposed to be one whose *marks* can be indicated. As such it is, strictly speaking, the *determinate* notion. The *mark*, if it is taken in its correct meaning, is none other than the *determinateness* or the simple *content* of the notion, in so far as it is distinguished from the form of universality. But the *mark*, in the first instance, does not have quite this preciser meaning but is in

general merely a determination whereby a *third* something takes note of an object, or the notion; it can therefore be a very contingent circumstance. In general it expresses not so much the immanence and essential nature of the determination as its relation to an understanding *external* to it. If this is really an understanding, it has the notion before it and distinguishes this only and solely by *what is in the notion*. But if the mark is supposed to be distinct from the notion, then it is a *sign* or some other determination which belongs to the *representation* of the thing, not to its notion. What the *indistinct* notion may be, can be passed over as superfluous.

But the *adequate* notion is something higher; what it really implies is the agreement of the Notion with reality, which is not the Notion as such but the *Idea*.

If the *mark* of the distinct notion were really supposed to be the determination of the notion itself, logic would find itself in difficulty over the *simple* notions which, according to another classification, are opposed to *compound*. For if a true, that is an immanent, mark of the simple notion were to be indicated, we should not be regarding it as simple; but in so far as no mark was given, it would not be a distinct notion. But here, now, the *clear* notion helps out. Unity, reality, and suchlike determinations are supposed to be *simple* notions, probably only because logicians were unable to discover their specific nature and contented themselves with having merely a *clear* notion of them, that is, no notion at all. *Definition*, that is, the statement of the notion, in general demands the statement of the genus and the specific difference. Therefore it presents the notion, not as something simple, but in *two* countable *components*. Yet surely no one will for that reason suppose such notion to be a *compound*. The simple notion seems to suggest *abstract simplicity*, a unity which does not contain within itself difference and determinateness and which therefore, too, is not the unity that belongs to the Notion. In so far as an object is present in ordinary thinking, especially in memory, or even as an abstract thought determination, it can be quite simple. Even the object that is richest in content, such as, for example, spirit, nature, the world, even God, when uncomprehendingly taken up into the simple representation of the equally simple expression: spirit, nature, the world, God, is doubtless something simple at which consciousness can stop short without going on to pick out its peculiar determination or its mark. But the objects of conscious-

ness should not remain simple, should not remain such representations or abstract thought determinations; on the contrary, they should be *comprehended*, that is to say, their simplicity should be determined with their inner difference. The *compound* notion, however, is a contradiction in terms. We can, of course, have a notion of something composite; but a compound notion would be something worse than *materialism*, which assumes only the *substance* of the *soul* to be composite, yet none the less takes *thought* to be *simple*. Uneducated reflection first stumbles on the idea of composition, because it is the completely *external* relation, the worst form in which anything can be considered; even the lowest natures must be an *inner* unity. That the form of the untruest existence should be assigned, above all, to the ego, to the Notion, that is something we should not have expected and that can only be described as inept and barbarous.

Further, notions are divided mainly into *contrary* and *contradictory*. If, in our treatment of the notion, we are supposed to state what *determinate* notions there are, then we must adduce all possible determinations—for *all* determinations are notions, consequently determinate notions—and all the categories of *being* as well as all determinations of *essence*, would have to be adduced under the species of notions. Just as in the text-books of logic—to a greater or lesser degree, according to the whim of the author—it is related that there are *affirmative*, *negative*, *identical*, *conditional*, *necessary* notions, and so on. As the *nature of the Notion itself* has progressed beyond all such determinations and therefore these, if adduced in connexion with the *Notion*, occur out of their proper place, they only admit of superficial definitions and appear at this stage devoid of all interest. At the basis of *contrary* and *contradictory* notions—a distinction to which particular attention is paid here—lies the reflective determination of *diversity* and *opposition*. They are regarded as two particular *species*, that is, each as firmly fixed on its own account and indifferent to the other, without any thought of the dialectic and the inner nullity of these differences—as though what is *contrary* must not equally be determined as *contradictory*. The nature and the essential transition of the forms of reflection which they express have been considered in their proper place. In the Notion, identity has developed into universality, difference into particularity, opposition, which withdraws into the ground, into in-

dividuality. In these forms, those categories of reflection are present as they are in their Notion. The universal has proved itself to be not only the identical, but at the same time the different or *contrary* as against the particular and individual, and in addition, also to be opposed to them or *contradictory*; in this opposition, however, it is identical with them and is their true ground in which they are sublated. The same holds good of particularity and individuality which are likewise the totality of the determinations of reflection.

A further classification of notions is into *subordinate* and *co-ordinate*—a distinction which approaches more closely to the determination of the Notion, namely, the relationship of universality and particularity, where these terms, too, have been mentioned in passing. Only it is customary to regard them likewise as completely rigid relationships and from this point of view to put forward a number of sterile propositions about them. The most prolix discussion on this point concerns again the relation of contrariety and contradiction to subordination and co-ordination. Since *the judgement is the relation of determinate Notions*, it is only at that stage that the true relationship will come to view. That fashion of *comparing* these determinations without a thought for their dialectic or for the progressive alteration of their determination, or rather for the conjunction of opposed determinations present in them, makes the whole consideration of what is *concordant* or not concordant in them—as though the concord or discord were something *separate* and *permanent*—into something merely sterile and meaningless.

The great *Euler*, who displayed an infinitely fertile and acute mind in seizing and combining the deeper relations of algebraic magnitudes, the dry, prosaic Lambert in particular, and others, have attempted to construct a *notation* for this class of relation between determinations of the Notion by lines, figures and the like, the general intention being to *elevate*, or rather in fact *to degrade*, the logical modes of relation to a *calculus*. The utter futility of even attempting a notation is at once apparent when one compares the nature of the sign and what it is supposed to signify. The determinations of the Notion, universality, particularity and individuality, are certainly *diverse*, as are lines, or the letters of algebra; further, they are also *opposed*, and to this extent would also admit of the signs *plus* and *minus*. But they themselves, and

above all their relations—even if one stops at *subsumption* and *inherence*—are in their essential nature entirely different from letters and lines and their relationships, the equality or difference of magnitude, the *plus* and *minus*, or a superimposition of lines, or their joining to form angles and the dispositions of spaces enclosed by them. It is characteristic of such objects that, in contrast to determinations of the Notion, they are mutually *external*, and have a *fixed* character. Now when Notions are so taken that they correspond to such signs, they cease to be Notions. Their determinations are not inert entities like numbers and lines whose relation does not itself belong to them; they are living movements; the distinguished determinateness of the one side is immediately internal to the other side too. What would be a complete contradiction in the case of numbers and lines is essential to the nature of the Notion. Higher mathematics, which also goes on to the infinite and allows itself contradictions, can no longer employ its usual signs for representing such determinations. To denote the conception—which is still very far from being a Notion —of the *infinite approximation* of two ordinates, or in equating a curve with an infinite number of infinitesimal straight lines, all it does is to draw two straight lines *apart from each other* and to make the straight lines approach the curve but remain *distinct* from it; for the infinite, which is here the point of interest, it refers us to *pictorial thinking*.

What has misled logicians into this attempt is primarily the *quantitative* relationship in which *universality*, *particularity* and *individuality* are supposed to stand to one another; the universal means, *more extensive* than the particular and the individual, and the particular means, *more extensive* than the individual. The Notion is the most concrete and richest determination because it is the ground and the *totality* of the preceding determinations, of the categories of being and of the determinations of reflection; these, therefore, are certainly also present in it. But its nature is completely misunderstood when they are retained in it in their former abstraction, when the *wider extent* of the universal is taken to mean that it is something *more* or a greater *quantum* than the particular and the individual. As absolute ground, it is the *possibility* of *quantity*, but equally so of *quality*, that is, its determinations are just as much qualitatively distinct; therefore they are taken in direct opposition to their truth when they are posited

under the form of quantity alone. Thus, too, the determination of reflection is a *correlate* in which its opposite has an illusory being [*scheint*]; it is not in an external relationship like a quantum. But the Notion is more than all this; its determinations are determinate *Notions*, are themselves essentially the *totality* of all determinations. It is therefore quite inappropriate for the purpose of grasping such an inner totality, to seek to apply numerical and spatial relationships in which all determinations fall asunder; on the contrary, they are the last and worst medium which could be employed. Natural relationships such as magnetism, or colour relations, would be infinitely higher and truer symbols for the purpose. Since man has in language a means of designation peculiar to Reason, it is an idle fancy to search for a less perfect mode of representation to plague oneself with. It is essentially only spirit that can comprehend the Notion as Notion; for this is not merely the property of spirit but spirit's pure self. It is futile to seek to fix it by spatial figures and algebraic signs for the purpose of the *outer eye* and an *uncomprehending, mechanical mode of treatment* such as a *calculus*. In fact, anything else which might be supposed to serve as a symbol can at most, like symbols for the nature of God, evoke intimations and echoes of the Notion; if, however, one should seriously propose to employ them for expressing and cognizing the Notion, then the *external nature* of all symbols is inadequate to the task; the truth about the relationship is rather the converse, namely, that what in symbols is an echo of a higher determination, is only truly known through the Notion and can be approximated to the Notion only by *separating off* the sensuous, unessential part that was meant to express it.

C. THE INDIVIDUAL

Individuality, as we have seen, is already posited by particularity; this is *determinate universality* and therefore self-related determinateness, the determinate determinate.

1. In the first instance, therefore, individuality appears as the *reflection* of the Notion out of its determinateness *into itself*. It is the self-*mediation* of the Notion in so far as its *otherness* has made itself into an *other* again, whereby the Notion has reinstated itself as self-identical, but in the determination of *absolute negativity*. The negative in the universal whereby this is a *particular*, was

defined above as a twofold illusory being; in so far as the negative is an illusory being *within* the universal, the particular remains a universal; through the reference of the illusory being outwards it is a *determinate*; the return of this side into the universal is twofold: *either* through *abstraction* which lets drop the particular and rises to the *higher* and the *highest genus, or else* through the *individuality* to which the universal in the determinateness itself descends. Here is where the false path branches off and abstraction strays from the highway of the Notion and forsakes the truth. Its higher and highest universal to which it raises itself is only the surface, which becomes ever more destitute of content; the individuality it despises is the profundity in which the Notion seizes itself and is posited as Notion.

Universality and *particularity* appeared, on the one hand, as moments of the *becoming* of individuality. But it has already been shown that they are in themselves the total Notion, and consequently in *individuality* do not pass over into an *other*, but that in individuality there is only posited what they are in and for themselves. The *universal is for itself* because it is in its own self absolute mediation, self-reference only as absolute negativity. It is an *abstract* universal in so far as this sublating is an *external* act and so a *dropping* of the determinateness. This negativity, therefore, certainly attaches to the abstract universal, but remains *outside* as a mere *condition* of it; it is the abstractive activity itself, which holds its universal *away* and *opposite* it and which therefore does not have individuality within itself, and remains destitute of the Notion. Life, spirit, God—the pure Notion itself, are beyond the grasp of abstraction, because it deprives its products of singularity, of the principle of individuality and personality, and so arrives at nothing else but universalities devoid of life, spirit, colour and filling.

Yet the unity of the Notion is so indissoluble that even these products of abstraction, though they are supposed to drop individuality are, on the contrary, *individuals* themselves. Abstraction raises the concrete into universality in which, however, the universal is grasped only as a determinate universality; and this is precisely the individuality that has shown itself to be self-related determinateness. Abstraction, therefore, is a *sundering* of the concrete and an *isolating* of its determinations; through it only *single* properties and moments are seized; for its product must contain what it is itself. But the difference between this individu-

ality of its products and the Notion's individuality is that in the former the individual as *content* and the universal as *form*, are distinct from one another—just because the former is not present as absolute form, as the Notion itself, or the latter is not present as the totality of form. However, this more detailed consideration shows that the abstract product itself is a unity of the individual content and the abstract universality, and is therefore a *concrete* and the opposite of what it aims to be.

For the same reason the *particular*, because it is only the determinate universal, is also an individual, and conversely the individual, because it is the determinate universal, is just as much a particular. If we stick to this abstract determinateness, then the Notion has the three particular determinations, the universal, the particular, and the individual; whereas previously we had given only the universal and the particular as the species of the particular. Since individuality is the return of the Notion, as negative, into itself, this very return from the abstraction which, strictly speaking, is sublated in the return, can be placed *along with* the others as an indifferent moment and counted with them.

If individuality is reckoned as one of the *particular* determinations of the Notion, then particularity is the *totality* which embraces them all; precisely in being this totality it is the concretion of them or individuality itself. But it is also the concrete in accordance with its aspect, noted above, of *determinate universality*; as such it is the *immediate* unity in which none of these moments is posited as distinct or as the determinant, and in this form it will constitute the *middle term of the formal syllogism.*

It is self-evident that each determination made in the preceding exposition of the Notion has immediately dissolved itself and lost itself in its other. Each distinction is confounded in the very attempt to isolate and fix it. Only *mere representational thinking*, for which abstraction has isolated them, is capable of holding the universal, particular and individual rigidly apart; in this way they can be counted, and for a further distinction such thinking holds to the *completely external* one of *being*, namely, *quantity*, which is nowhere less appropriate than here. In individuality, the true relationship mentioned above, the *inseparability* of the Notion's determinations is *posited*; for as negation of the negation it contains their opposition and at the same time contains it in its ground or unity, the effected coincidence of each with its other. As this

reflection is in its very own nature universality, it is essentially the negativity of the Notion's determinations, but not merely as if it were a third something distinct from them; on the contrary, it is now posited that *posited being* [*Gesetztsein*] is *being-in-and-for-itself*; that is, that each of the determinations pertaining to the difference is itself the *totality*. The return of the determinate Notion into itself means that it has the determination of being, *in its determinateness*, the *whole Notion*.

2. But individuality is not only the return of the Notion into itself, but immediately its loss. Through individuality, where the Notion is *internal to itself*, it becomes *external to itself* and enters into actuality. *Abstraction* which, as the *soul* of individuality is the relation of the negative to the negative, is as we have shown not something external to the universal and the particular but immanent in them, and through it they are a concrete, a content, an individual. But as this negativity, individuality is the determinate determinateness, is *differentiation* as such; through this reflection of the difference into itself, the difference becomes fixed; it is only through individuality that the determining of the particular is effected, for *individuality* is that abstraction which, simply as individuality, is now *posited abstraction*.

The individual, therefore, as self-related negativity is the immediate identity of the negative with itself; it is *a being-for-self*. Or it is the abstraction that determines the Notion according to its ideal moment of *being* as an *immediate*. In this way, the individual is a qualitative *one* or a *this*. With this quality it is first, repulsion of itself from *itself*, whereby the many *other* ones are presupposed; *secondly*, it is now a negative relation towards these presupposed *others*, and the individual is in so far *exclusive*. Universality, when related to these individuals as indifferent ones—and related to them it must be because it is a moment of the Notion of individuality—is merely their *common element*. When one understands by the universal, what is *common* to several individuals, one is starting from the *indifferent* subsistence of these individuals and confounding the immediacy of *being* with the determination of the Notion. The lowest conception one can have of the universal in its connexion with the individual is this external relation of it as merely a *common element*.

The individual, which in the sphere of reflection exists as a *this*, does not have the exclusive relation to another one which belongs

to qualitative being-for-self. *This*, as the one reflected into itself, is for itself and without repulsion; or repulsion in this reflection is one with abstraction and is the reflecting *mediation* which attaches to the this in such wise that the this is a *posited* immediacy *pointed out* by someone external to it. The *this is*; it is *immediate*; but it is only this in so far as it is *pointed out*. The 'pointing out' is the reflecting movement which collects itself inwardly and posits immediacy, but as a self-external immediacy. Now the individual is certainly a this, as the immediate restored out of mediation; but it does not have the mediation outside it—it is itself a repelling separation, *posited abstraction*, yet in its very act of separating, it is a positive relation.

This act of abstraction by the individual, being the reflection of the difference into itself, is first a positing of the differentiated moments as *self-subsistent* and reflected-into-self. They immediately *are*; but further, this sundering is reflection as such, the *illusory being of the one in the other*; thus they stand in essential relation. Further, the individuals are not merely *inertly* present in relation to one another; such plurality belongs to being; the *individuality*, in positing itself as determinate, posits itself not in an external difference but in the difference of the Notion. It therefore excludes the *universal* from itself; yet since this is a moment of individuality, the universal is equally essentially related to it.

The Notion, as this relation of its *self-subsistent* determinations, has lost itself; for as such it is no longer their *posited unity*, and they are no longer present as *moments*, as the *illusory being*, of the Notion, but as subsistent in and for themselves. As individuality, the Notion in its determinateness returns into itself, and therewith the determinate moment has itself become a totality. Its return into itself is therefore the absolute, original *partition of itself*, or, in other words, it is posited as *judgement*.

CHAPTER 2

THE JUDGEMENT

The judgement is the *determinateness* of the Notion *posited* in the *Notion* itself. The Notion's determinations, or what we have seen to be the same thing, the determinate Notions, have already been considered on their own; but this consideration was more a subjective reflection or subjective abstraction. But the Notion is itself this abstractive process, the opposing of its determinations is its own determining activity. The judgement is this positing of the determinate Notions by the Notion itself. Judging is thus *another* function than comprehension, or rather it is *the other* function of the Notion as the *determining* of the Notion by itself, and the further progress of the judgement into the diversity of judgements is the progressive determination of the Notion. What kinds of determinate Notions *there are*, and how these determinations of the Notion are arrived at, has to reveal itself in the judgement.

The judgement can therefore be called the proximate *realization* of the Notion, inasmuch as reality denotes in general entry into *existence* as a *determinate being*. More precisely, the nature of this realization has presented itself in such a manner that, on the one hand, the moments of the Notion through its reflection-into-self or its individuality are self-subsistent totalities, while on the other hand the unity of the Notion is *their relation*. The determinations reflected into themselves are *determinate totalities*, no less essentially in their indifferent and disconnected subsistence as through their reciprocal mediation with one another. The determining itself is only totality in that it contains these totalities and their connexion. This totality is the judgement. It contains, therefore, first, the two self-subsistents which are called subject and predicate. What each is cannot yet really be said; they are still indeterminate, for it is only through the judgement that they are to be determined. The judgement, being the Notion as determinate, the only distinction present is the general one that the judgement contains the *determinate* Notion over against the still *indeterminate* Notion. The subject can therefore, in the first

instance, be taken in relation to the predicate as the individual over against the universal, or even as the particular over against the universal, or as the individual over against the particular; so far, they confront each other only in general, as the more determinate and the more universal.

It is therefore appropriate and necessary to have these *names*, subject and predicate for the determinations of the judgement; as names, they are something indeterminate that still awaits its determination, and are, therefore, no more than names. It is partly for this reason that the Notion determinations themselves could not be used for the two sides of the judgement; but a stronger reason is because the nature of the Notion determination is emphatically to be, not something abstract and fixed, but to have and to posit its opposite within it; since the sides of the judgement are themselves Notions and therefore the totality of its determinations, each side must run through all these determinations and exhibit them within itself, whether in abstract or concrete form. Now in order to fix the sides of the judgement in a general way when their determination is altered, those names are most serviceable which remain the same throughout the alteration. The name however stands over against the matter in hand or the Notion; this distinction presents itself in the judgement as such; now the subject is in general the determinate, and is therefore more that which *immediately is*, whereas the predicate expresses the *universal*, the essential nature [*Wesen*] or the Notion; therefore the subject as such is, in the first instance, only a kind of *name*; for *what it is* is first enunciated by the predicate which contains *being* in the sense of the Notion. In the question: what *is* this? or: what kind of a plant *is* this? *what* is often understood by the *being* enquired after, is merely the *name*, and when this is learned one is satisfied and now knows what the thing *is*. This is being in the sense of the subject. But the *Notion*, or at least the essence and the universal in general, is first given by the predicate, and it is this that is asked for in the sense of the judgement. Consequently, God, spirit, nature, or whatever it may be, is as the subject of a judgement at first only the name; what such a subject *is* as regards its Notion is first enunciated in the predicate. When enquiry is made as to the kind of predicate belonging to such subject, the act of judgement necessarily implies an underlying Notion. But this Notion is first enunciated by the predicate itself.

Properly speaking, therefore, it is the mere *general idea* [*Vorstellung*] that constitutes the presupposed meaning of the subject and that leads to the naming of it; and in doing this it is contingent and a historical fact, what is, or is not, to be understood by a name. So many disputes about whether a predicate does or does not belong to a certain subject are therefore nothing more than verbal disputes, because they start from the form above mentioned; what lies at the base (*subjectum*, ὑποκείμενον) is so far nothing more than the name.

We have now to examine, secondly, how the *relation* of subject and predicate in the judgement is determined and how subject and predicate themselves are at first determined through this very relation. The judgement has in general for its sides totalities which to begin with are essentially self-subsistent. The unity of the Notion is, therefore, at first only a *relation* of self-subsistents; not as yet the *concrete* and *pregnant* unity that has returned into itself from this reality, but only a unity *outside* which the self-subsistent sides persist as *extremes that are not sublated in it*. Now consideration of the judgement can begin from the original unity of the Notion, or from the self-subsistence of the extremes. The judgement is the self-diremption of the Notion; *this unity* is, therefore, the ground from which the consideration of the judgement in accordance with its true *objectivity* begins. It is thus the *original division* [*Teilung*] of what is originally one; thus the word *Urteil* refers to what judgement is in and for itself. But regarded from the side of externality, the Notion is present in the judgement as *Appearance*, since its moments therein attain self-subsistence, and it is on this *external* side that ordinary thinking tends to fasten.

From this *subjective* standpoint, then, subject and predicate are considered to be complete, each on its own account, apart from the other: the subject as an object that would exist even if it did not possess this predicate; the predicate as a universal determination that would exist even if it did not belong to this subject. From this standpoint, the act of judgement involves the reflection, whether this or that predicate which is in someone's *head* can and should be *attached* to the *object* which exists on its own account *outside*; the very act of judging consists in this, that only through it is a predicate *combined* with a subject, so that, if this combination did not take place, each on its own would still remain what it is, the

latter an existent object, the former an idea in someone's head. The predicate which is attached to the subject should, however, also *belong* to it, that is, be in and for itself identical with it. Through this significance of *attachment*, the *subjective* meaning of judgement and the indifferent, outer subsistence of subject and predicate are sublated again: this action *is* good; the *copula* indicates that the predicate belongs to the *being* of the subject and is not merely externally combined with it. In the *grammatical* sense, that subjective relationship in which one starts from the indifferent externality of the subject and predicate has its complete validity; for it is *words* that are here externally combined. We may take this opportunity of remarking, too, that though a *proposition* has a subject and predicate in the grammatical sense, this does not make it a *judgement*. The latter requires that the predicate be related to the subject as one Notion determination to another, and therefore as a universal to a particular or individual. If a statement about a particular subject only enunciates something individual, then this is a mere proposition, For example, 'Aristotle died at the age of 73, in the fourth year of the 115th Olympiad,' is a mere proposition, not a judgement. It would partake of the nature of a judgement only if doubt had been thrown on one of the circumstances, the date of the death, or the age of that philosopher, and the given figures had been asserted on the strength of some reason or other. In that case, these figures would be taken as something universal, as time that still subsists apart from this particular content of the death of Aristotle, whether as time filled with some other content, or even as empty time. Similarly, the news that my friend N. has died is a proposition; and it would be a judgement only if there were a question whether he was really dead or only in a state of catalepsy.

In the usual way of defining the judgement we may indeed accept the indeterminate expression *connexion* for the external *copula*, as also that the connected terms are at least *supposed* to be notions. But in other respects this definition is superficial in the extreme: not only, for example, that in the disjunctive judgement more than *two* so-called notions are connected, but rather that the definition is far better than its subject matter; for it is not notions at all that are meant, hardly determinations of the Notion, but really only determinations of representational thought; it was remarked in connexion with the Notion in general and the deter-

minate Notion, that what is usually so named by no means deserves the name of Notion; where then should Notions come from in the case of the judgement? Above all, in this definition the essential feature of the judgement, namely, the difference of its determinations, is passed over; still less does it take into account the relationship of the judgement to the Notion.

As regards the further determination of the subject and predicate, we have remarked that it is really in the judgement first that they have to receive their determination. Since the judgement is the posited determinateness of the Notion, this determinateness possesses the said differences *immediately* and *abstractly* as *individuality* and *universality*. But in so far as the judgement is in general the *determinate being* or *otherness* of the Notion which has not yet restored itself to the unity whereby it is *as Notion*, there emerges also the determinateness which is notionless, the opposition of *being* and *reflection* or the *in-itself*. But since the Notion constitutes the essential *ground* of the judgement, these determinations are at least indifferent to the extent that when one belongs to the subject and the other to the predicate, the converse relationship equally holds good. The *subject* as the *individual* appears, in the first instance, as that which *simply is* or *is for itself* in accordance with the specific determinateness of the individual—as an actual object, even though it be only an object in representational thought—as for example bravery, right, agreement, etc.—on which judgement is being made. The *predicate*, on the other hand, as the *universal*, appears as this *reflection* on the object, or rather as the object's reflection into itself, which goes beyond that immediacy and sublates the determinatenesses in their form of mere being; that is, it is the *object's in-itself*. In this way, one starts from the individual as the first, the immediate, and it is *raised* by the judgement into *universality*, just as, conversely, the universal that is only *in itself* descends in the individual into determinate being or becomes a being that is *for itself*.

This signification of the judgement is to be taken as its *objective* meaning, and at the same time as the *truth* of the earlier forms of the transition. In the sphere of being, the object *becomes* and *others itself* [*verändert sich*], the finite *perishes* or *goes under* [*geht unter*] in the infinite; in the sphere of Existence, the object *issues from* its *ground* into Appearance and *falls to the ground* [*geht zugrunde*], the accident *manifests* the *wealth* of substance as

well as its *power*; in being, there is *transition* into an *other*, in essence, reflected being in an *other* by which the *necessary* relation is revealed. This movement of transition and reflection [*Scheinen*] has now passed over into the *original partition* [*Teilen*] of the *Notion* which, while bringing back the individual to the *in-itself* of its universality, equally determines the universal as something *actual*. These two acts are one and the same process in which individuality is posited in its reflection-into-self, and the universal as determinate.

But now this objective signification equally implies that the said differences, in reappearing in the determinateness of the Notion, are at the same time posited only as *Appearances*, that is, that they are not anything fixed, but apply just as much to the one Notion determination as to the other. The subject is, therefore, just as much to be taken as the *in-itself*, and the predicate, on the other hand, as *determinate being*. The *subject without predicate* is what the *thing without qualities*, the *thing-in-itself* is in the sphere of Appearance—an empty, indeterminate ground; as such, it is the Notion enclosed within itself, which only receives a differentiation and determinateness in the predicate; the predicate therefore constitutes the side of the *determinate being* of the subject. Through this determinate universality the subject stands in relation to an externality, is open to the influence of other things and thereby becomes actively opposed to them. *What is there* comes forth from its *being-within-self* and enters into the *universal* element of connexion and relationship, into the negative connexions and the interplay of actuality, which is a *continuation* of the individual into other individuals and therefore universality.

The identity just demonstrated, namely, that the determination of the subject equally applies to the predicate and vice versa, is not, however, something only *for us*; it is not merely *in itself*, but is also posited in the judgement; for the judgement is the connexion of the two; the copula expresses that *the subject is the predicate*. The subject is the specific determinateness, and the predicate is this *posited* determinateness of the subject; the subject is determined only in its predicate, or, only in the predicate is it a subject; in the predicate it has returned into itself and is therein the universal. Now in so far as the subject is the self-subsistent, this identity has the relationship that the predicate does not possess a self-subsistence of its own, but has its subsistence only in the subject; it

inheres in the subject. Since the predicate is thus distinct from the subject, it is only an *isolated* determinateness of the latter, only *one* of its properties; while the subject itself is the *concrete*, the totality of manifold determinatenesses, just as the predicate contains *one*; it is the universal. But on the other hand the predicate, too, is a self-subsistent universality and the subject, conversely, only a determination of it. Looked at this way, the predicate *subsumes* the subject; individuality and particularity are not for themselves, but have their essence and substance in the universal. The predicate expresses the subject in its Notion; the individual and the particular are contingent determinations in the subject; it is their absolute possibility. When in the case of *subsumption* one thinks of an external connexion of subject and predicate and the subject is conceived of as a self-subsistent something, the subsumption refers to the subjective act of judgement above-mentioned in which one starts from the self-subsistence of both subject and predicate. From this standpoint subsumption is only the *application* of the universal to a particular or an individual, which is placed *under* the universal in accordance with a vague idea that it is of inferior quality.

When the identity of subject and predicate are so taken that *at one time* one Notion determination applies to the former and the other to the latter, and *at another time* the converse equally holds good, then the identity is as yet still only an *implicit* one; on account of the self-subsistent diversity of the two sides of the judgement, their *posited* unity also has these two sides, in the first instance as different. But *differenceless identity* really constitutes the *true* relation of the subject to the predicate. The Notion determination is itself essentially *relation* for it is a *universal*; therefore the same determinations possessed by the subject and predicate are also possessed by their relation itself. The relation is universal, for it is the positive identity of the two, of subject and predicate; but it is also *determinate*, for the determinateness of the predicate is that of the subject; further, it is also *individual*, for in it the self-subsistent extremes are sublated as in their negative unity. However, in the judgement this identity is not as yet posited; the copula is present as the still indeterminate relation of *being* as such: A is B; for in the judgement, the self-subsistence of the Notion determinatenesses or the extremes, is the *reality* which the Notion has within it. If the *is* of the copula were already

posited as the above determinate and pregnant *unity* of subject and predicate, as their *Notion*, it would already be *the syllogism.*

To restore this *identity* of the Notion, or rather to *posit* it, is the goal of the *movement* of the judgement. What is already *present* in the judgement is, on the one hand, the self-subsistence of subject and predicate, but also their mutually opposed determinateness, and on the other hand their none the less *abstract* relation. What the judgement enunciates to start with is that *the subject is the predicate*; but since the predicate is supposed *not* to be what the subject is, we are faced with a *contradiction* which must *resolve* itself, *pass over* into a result. Or rather, since subject and predicate are *in and for themselves* the totality of the Notion, and the judgement is the reality of the Notion, its forward movement is only a *development*; there is already present in it what comes forth from it, so that *proof* is merely an *exposition*, a reflection as a *positing* of that which is already *present* in the extremes of the judgement; but even this positing itself is already present; it is the *relation* of the extremes.

The judgement *in its immediacy* is in the first instance the judgement of *existence*; its subject is immediately an *abstract individual* which *simply is*, and the predicate is an *immediate determinateness* or property of the subject, an abstract universal.

This qualitative character of subject and predicate being sublated, the determination of the one is *reflected*, to begin with, in the other; the judgement is now, secondly, the judgement of *reflection.*

But this more external conjunction passes over into the *essential identity* of a substantial, *necessary connexion*; as such it is, thirdly, the judgement of *necessity.*

Fourthly, since in this essential identity the difference of subject and predicate has become a *form*, the judgement becomes *subjective*; it contains the opposition of the *Notion* and its *reality* and the *equation* of the two; it is the *judgement of the Notion.*

This emergence of the Notion establishes the *transition of the judgement into the syllogism.*

A. THE JUDGEMENT OF EXISTENCE

In the subjective judgement we want to see *one and the same* object *double*, first in its individual actuality, and then in its essen-

tial identity or in its Notion: the individual raised into its universality, or, what is the same thing, the universal individualized into its actuality. In this way the judgement is *truth*: for it is the agreement of the Notion and reality. But this is not the nature of the judgement *at first*; for *at first* it is immediate, since as yet no reflection and movement of the determinations has appeared in it. This *immediacy* makes the first judgement a *judgement of existence*; it can also be called the *qualitative* judgement, but only in so far as *quality* does not apply only to the determinateness of *being* but also includes the abstract universality which, on account of its simplicity, likewise has the form of *immediacy*.

The judgement of existence is also the judgement of *inherence*; because it is in the form of immediacy, and because the subject as distinguished from the predicate is the immediate, and consequently the primary and essential feature in a judgement of this kind, the predicate has the form of a non-self-subsistent determination that has its foundation in the subject.

(*a*) *The Positive Judgement*

1. The subject and predicate as we have remarked, are in the first instance names, which only receive their actual determination through the course of the judgement. However, as sides of the judgement, which is the *posited* determinate Notion, they have the determination of *moments* of the Notion, but by virtue of their immediacy, the determination is still quite *simple*: for it is not enriched by mediation, and also, in accordance with the abstract opposition, it is determined as *abstract individuality* and *universality*. The predicate, to speak of this first, is the *abstract* universal; since this abstract is conditioned by the mediation in which the individual or particular is sublated, this mediation is so far only *presupposition*. In the sphere of the Notion there can be no other *immediacy* than one in which mediation is *essentially* and *explicitly* a moment and which has come to be only through the sublating of that mediation, that is, the immediacy of the *universal*. Thus even *qualitative being*, too, is *in its Notion* a universal; but as *being*, the immediacy is not yet so *posited*; it is only as *universality* that it is the Notion determination in which is *posited* the fact that negativity essentially belongs to it. This relation is given in the judgement in which it is the predicate of a subject. Similarly, the subject is an *abstract* individual, or the *immediate* that is supposed

to be *as such*, and therefore the individual as a *something* in general. Thus the subject constitutes the abstract side of the judgement according to which the Notion has in it passed over into *externality*. As the two Notion determinations are determined, so also is their relation, the *is* or *copula*; it too can only have the significance of an immediate, abstract *being*. On account of the relation which as yet contains no mediation or negation, this judgement is called the *positive*.

2. The immediate pure enunciation of the positive judgement is, therefore, the proposition: *the individual is universal.*

This enunciation must not be put in the form: *A* is *B*; for *A* and *B* are entirely formless and consequently meaningless names; the judgement as such, however, and therefore even the judgement of existence, has Notion determinations for its extremes. *A is B* can represent any mere *proposition* just as well as a *judgement*. But in every judgement, even in those with a more richly determined form, there is asserted the proposition having this specific content: *the individual is universal*; inasmuch, namely, as every judgement is also in general an abstract judgement. With the negative judgement, how far it likewise comes under this expression, we shall deal presently. If no heed is given to the fact that in every judgement—at least, to begin with, every positive judgement, the assertion is made that the individual is a universal, this is partly because the *determinate form* whereby subject and predicate are distinguished is overlooked—the judgement being supposed to be nothing but the relation of *two* notions—and partly, probably, because the rest of the *content* of the judgement, *Gaius is learned*, or *the rose is red*, floats before the mind which is busy with the representation of *Gaius*, etc., and does not reflect on the form—although such content at least as the *logical Gaius* who has usually to be dragged in as an example, is a much less interesting content and, indeed, is expressly chosen as uninteresting in order not to divert attention from the form to itself.

In its objective signification, the proposition that the *individual is universal* connotes, as we previously had occasion to remark, on the one hand the perishableness of individual things, and on the other hand their positive subsistence in the Notion as such. The Notion itself is imperishable, but that which comes forth from it in its partition is subject to alteration and to return into its *universal* nature. But conversely, the universal gives itself a

determinate being. Just as essence issues into a *reflected being* [*Schein*] in its determinations, ground into the *manifestation* of Existence, and substance into the revelation of itself, into its accidents, so the universal *resolves* itself into the individual; and the judgement is this *explication* of the universal, the *development* of the negativity which it already is in itself. The latter fact is enunciated by the converse proposition, the *universal is individual*, which is equally enunciated in the positive judgement. The subject, which in the first instance is the *immediate individual*, is related in the judgement itself to its *other*, namely, the universal; consequently it is posited as the *concrete*; in the sphere of being as a something *of many qualities*, or as the concrete of reflection, *a thing of manifold properties*, an *actuality of manifold possibilities*, a *substance* of such and such *accidents*. Since these manifold determinations here belong to the subject, the something or the thing, etc., is reflected into itself in its qualities, properties or accidents; or it *continues* itself through them, maintaining itself in them and equally them in itself. The positedness or determinateness belongs to the being-in-and-for-self. The subject is, therefore, in its own self the *universal*. The predicate, on the other hand, as this *universality* which is not real or concrete but *abstract*, is, in contrast to the subject, the *determinateness* and contains only *one moment* of the subject's totality to the exclusion of the others. By virtue of this negativity which, as an extreme of the judgement, is at the same time self-related, the predicate is an *abstract individual*. For example, in the proposition: *the rose is fragrant*, the predicate enunciates only *one* of the *many* properties of the rose; it singles out this particular one which, in the subject, is a concrescence with the others; just as in the dissolution of the thing, the manifold properties which inhere in it, in acquiring self-subsistence as *matters*, become *individualized*. From this side, then, the proposition of the judgement runs thus: *the universal is individual*.

In bringing together this *reciprocal determination* of subject and predicate in the judgement, we get a twofold result. *First* that immediately the subject is, indeed, something that *simply is*, an individual, while the predicate is the universal. But because the judgement is the *relation* of the two, and the subject is determined by the predicate as a universal, the subject is the universal. *Secondly*, the predicate is determined in the subject; for it is not a

determination *in general*, but *of the subject*; in the proposition: *the rose is fragrant*, this fragrance is not any indeterminate fragrance, but that of the rose; the predicate is therefore *an individual*. Now since subject and predicate stand in the relationship of the judgement, they have to remain mutually opposed as determinations of the Notion; just as in the *reciprocity* of causality, before it attains its truth, the two sides have to retain their self-subsistence and mutual opposition in face of the sameness of their determination. When, therefore, the subject is determined as a universal, we must not take the predicate also in its determination of universality—else we should not have a judgement—but only in its determination of individuality; similarly, when the subject is determined as an individual, the predicate is to be taken as a universal. Reflection on the above mere identity yields the two identical propositions:

The individual is individual,
The universal is universal,

in which the sides of the judgement would have fallen completely asunder and only their self-relation would be expressed, while their relation to one another would be dissolved and the judgement consequently sublated. Of the two original propositions, one, *the universal is individual*, enunciates the judgement in respect of its *content*, which in the predicate is a singled out determination, while in the subject it is the totality of them; the other, *the individual is universal*, enunciates the *form* which is stated immediately by the proposition itself. In the immediate positive judgement the extremes are still simple: form and content are, therefore, still united. In other words, it does not consist of two propositions; the twofold relation which we found in it directly constitutes the *one* positive judgement. For its extremes appear as (*a*) self-subsistent, abstract sides of the judgement, and (*b*) each side is determined by the other, by virtue of the copula connecting them. But for that very reason, the difference of form and content is *implicit* in it, as we have seen; to wit, what is implied in the first proposition: *the individual is universal*, pertains to the form, because it expresses the *immediate determinateness* of the judgement. On the other hand, the relationship expressed by the other proposition: *the universal is individual*, that is to say, that the subject is determined as universal, but the predicate as particular

or individual concerns the *content*; for the sides of the judgement arise only through the reflection-into-self whereby the immediate determinatenesses are sublated, with the result that the form converts itself into an identity that has withdrawn into itself and persists in opposition to the distinction of form: that is, it converts itself into content.

3. Now if the two propositions, the one of form and the other of content:

Subject	*Predicate*
The individual	is universal
The universal	is individual,

were, because they are contained in the *one* positive judgement, to be united, so that both subject and predicate alike were determined as unity of individuality and universality, then both subject and predicate would be the *particular*; and this must be recognized as *implictly* their inner determination. Only, on the one hand, this combination would only have been effected by an external reflection, and, on the other hand, the resultant proposition, *the particular is the particular*, would no longer be a judgement, but an empty identical proposition like those already derived from the positive judgement, namely, *the individual is individual*, and *the universal is universal*. Individuality and universality cannot yet be united into particularity, because in the positive judgement they are still posited as *immediate*. In other words, the judgement must still be distinguished in respect of its form and content, just because subject and predicate are still distinguished as immediacy and something mediated, or because the judgement, according to its relation, is both self-subsistence of the related sides and also their reciprocal determination or mediation.

First, then, the judgement considered in respect of its *form* asserts that *the individual is universal*. But the truth is that such an *immediate* individual is *not* universal; its predicate is of wider scope and therefore does not correspond to it. The subject is an *immediate* being-for-self and therefore the *opposite* of that abstraction, of that universality posited through mediation, which was supposed to be predicated of it.

Secondly, when the judgement is considered in respect of its *content*, or as the proposition, *the universal is individual*, the subject is a universal of qualities, a concrete that is infinitely determined;

and since its determinatenesses are as yet only qualities, properties or accidents, its totality is the *spuriously infinite plurality* of them. Such a subject therefore is, on the contrary, *not* a *single* property such as its predicate enunciates. Both propositions, therefore, must be *denied* and the positive judgement must be posited rather as *negative.*

(*b*) *The Negative Judgement*

1. We have already referred above to the prevalent idea that it depends merely on the content of the judgement whether it be true or not, since logical truth concerns only the form and demands only that the said content shall not contradict itself. The form of the judgement is taken to be nothing more than the relation of *two* notions. But we have seen that these two notions do not have merely the relationless character of a *sum*, but are related to one another as *individual* and *universal.* These determinations constitute the truly logical *content*, and, be it noted, constitute in this abstraction the content of the positive judgement; all *other content* that appears in a judgement (the *sun* is *round*, *Cicero was a great orator in Rome*, it is *day now*, etc.) does not concern the judgement as such; the judgement merely enunciates that the *subject* is *predicate*, or, more definitely, since these are only names, that *the individual is universal and vice versa.* By virtue of this *purely logical content*, the positive judgement is *not true*, but has its truth in the negative judgement. All that is demanded of the content is that it shall not contradict itself in the judgement; but as has been shown it does contradict itself in the above judgement. It is, however, a matter of complete indifference if the above logical content is also called form, and by content is understood merely the remaining empirical filling; in that case, the form does not imply merely an empty identity, the determinate content lying outside it. The positive judgement has, then, through its *form* as positive judgement no truth; whoever gives the name of *truth* to the *correctness* of an *intuition* or *perception*, or to the agreement of the *picture-thought* with the object, at any rate has no expression left for that which is the subject matter and aim of philosophy. We should at least have to call the latter the truth of reason; and it will surely be granted that judgements such as: Cicero was a great orator, and: it is day now, and so on, are not truths of reason. But they are not such not because they have, as it were contingently,

an empirical content, but because they are merely positive judgements that can have and are supposed to have no other content than an immediate individual and an abstract determination.

The positive judgement has its proximate truth in the negative: the *individual is not* abstractly *universal—but on the contrary*, the predicate of the individual, because it is such a predicate or—taking it by itself apart from its relation to the subject—because it is an *abstract* universal, is itself determinate; the *individual* is, therefore, *in the first instance* a *particular*. Further, in accordance with the other proposition contained in the positive judgement, the negative judgement asserts that the *universal* is not abstractly *individual, but on the contrary*, this predicate, just because it is a predicate, or because it stands in relation to a universal subject, is something wider than a mere individuality, and the *universal* is therefore likewise *in the first instance* a *particular*. Since this universal, as subject, is itself in the judgement determination of individuality, the two propositions reduce to one: *the individual is a particular*.

We may remark (*a*) that here the predicate proves to be in the determination of *particularity* of which we have already made mention; but here it is not posited by external reflection, but has arisen by means of the negative relation exhibited by the judgement. (*b*) This determination here results only for the predicate. In the *immediate* judgement, the judgement of existence, the subject is the underlying basis; the *determination* seems therefore *to run its course* at first in the *predicate*. But as a matter of fact this first negation cannot as yet be a determination, or strictly speaking a *positing of the individual*, for the individual is the *second* negation, the negative of the negative.

The individual is a particular, is the *positive* expression of the negative judgement. This expression is not itself a positive judgement, for the latter, by reason of its immediacy, has only abstractions for its extremes, while the particular, precisely through the positing of the relation of the judgement presents itself as the first *mediated* determination. But this determination is not to be taken only as moment of the extreme, but also—as it really is in the first instance—as *determination* of the *relation*; in other words, the judgement is to be regarded also as *negative*.

This transition is based on the relationship of the extremes and their connexion generally in the judgement. The positive judgement

is the relation of the *immediately* individual and universal, therefore the relation of things, one of which at the same time is *not* what the other is; the relation is, therefore, no less essentially *separation* or *negative*; that is why the positive judgement had to be posited as negative. It was, therefore, unnecessary for logicians to make such a fuss over the *not* of the negative judgement being attached to the *copula*. In the judgement, what is *determination* of the extreme is no less a *determinate relation*. The judgement's determination, or the extreme, is not the purely qualitative determination of *immediate* being which is supposed to confront only an *other outside it*. Nor is it determination of reflection, which, in accordance with its general form, has a positive and negative bearing, each being posited as exclusive, and only *implicitly* identical with the other. The judgement's determination, as determination of the Notion, is in its own self a universal, posited as *continuing* itself into its other determinations. Conversely, the *relation* of the judgement is the same determination as that possessed by the extremes; for it is just this universality and continuation of them into one another; in so far as these are distinguished, the relation also has negativity in it.

The above-stated transition from the form of the *relation* to the form of the *determination* has for its *immediate consequence* that the *not* of the *copula* must no less be attached to the predicate and the predicate determined as the *not-universal*. But by an equally immediate consequence the not-universal is the *particular*. If we stick to the *negative* in the completely abstract determination of immediate *not-being*, then the predicate is only the *completely indeterminate* not-universal. This determination is commonly treated in logic in connexion with *contradictory* notions and it is inculcated as a matter of importance that in the *negative* of a notion one is to stick to the negative only and it is to be regarded as the merely *indeterminate* extent of the *other* of the positive notion. Thus the mere *not-white* would be just as much red, yellow, blue, etc., as black. But *white* as such is a *notionless* determination of intuition; the *not* of white is then equally notionless *not-being*, an abstraction that has been considered at the very beginning of the logic, where we learned that its proximate truth is *becoming*. To employ as examples, when treating of the terms of the judgement, such notionless contents drawn from intuition and pictorial thinking, and to take determinations of *being* and *reflection* for

terms of the judgement, is the same *uncritical* procedure as the Kantian application of the notions of the understanding to the infinite Idea of reason or the so-called *thing-in-itself*; the *Notion*, which also includes the *judgement* that proceeds from it, is the veritable *thing-in-itself* or the *rational*; those other determinations, however, are proper to *being* or *essence* and have not yet been developed into forms which exhibit them as they are in their truth, in the *Notion*. If we stop at white and red as *sensuous* images, we are giving, as is commonly done, the name of Notion to what is only a determination of pictorial thinking; in that case the not-white and not-red are of course not positive predicates, just as also the not-triangular is something completely indeterminate, for a determination based on number and quantum is essentially *indifferent* and *notionless*. But this kind of sensuous content, like *not-being* itself, must be *conceptually grasped* and must lose that indifference and abstract immediacy which it has in blind, static, pictorial thinking. Already in determinate being, the meaningless *nothing* becomes the *limit*, through which *something* does, after all, *relate* to an *other* outside it. But in reflection, it is the *negative* that *essentially relates* to a *positive* and hence is *determinate*; a negative is already no longer that *indeterminate not-being*; it is posited as existing only in so far as the positive is its counterpart, the third member of the triad being their *ground*; the negative is thus confined within an enclosed sphere in which, what the one is *not*, is something *determinate*. But more than this, in the absolutely fluid continuity of the Notion and its determinations the *not* is immediately a positive, and the *negation* is not merely a determinateness but is taken up into the universality and posited as identical with it. The not-universal is therefore immediately the *particular*.

2. Since the negation affects the relation of the judgement, and we are dealing with the *negative judgement* still as such, it is *in the first place still a judgement*; consequently we have here the relationship of subject and predicate, or of individuality and universality, and their relation, *the form of the judgement*. The subject as the immediate which forms the basis remains unaffected by the negation; it therefore retains its determination of having a predicate, or its relation to the universality. What is negated, therefore, is not the universality as such in the predicate, but the abstraction or determinateness of the latter which appeared as *content* in contrast to that universality. Thus the negative judge-

ment is not total negation; the universal sphere which contains the predicate still subsists, and therefore the relation of the subject to the predicate is essentially still *positive*; the still remaining *determination* of the predicate is just as much a *relation*. If, for example, it is said that the rose is *not* red, it is only the *determinateness* of the predicate that is negated and separated from the universality which likewise belongs to it; the universal sphere, *colour*, is preserved; in saying that the rose is not red, it is assumed that it *has* a colour, but a different one. In respect of this universal sphere the judgement is still positive.

The individual is a *particular*—this positive form of the negative judgement enunciates immediately that the particular contains universality. But in addition it also expresses that the predicate is not merely a universal but also a determinate universal. The negative form implies the same; for though for example the rose is not red, it must not merely retain the universal sphere of colour for predicate but must also have *some other specific colour*; thus it is only the *single* determinateness of red that is negated; and not only is the universal sphere left but determinateness, too, is preserved, though converted into an *indeterminate* or general determinateness, that is, into particularity.

3. The *particularity* which we have found to be the positive determination of the negative judgement is the mediating term between individuality and universality; thus the negative judgement is now, in general, the mediating term leading to the third step, to the *reflection of the judgement of existence into itself*. It is, in its objective significance, merely the moment of alteration of the accidents—or, in the sphere of existence, of the isolated properties of the concrete. Through this alteration the complete determinateness of the predicate, or the *concrete*, emerges as posited.

The individual is particular, according to the positive enunciation of the negative judgement. But the individual is also *not* a particular, for particularity is of wider extent than individuality; it is therefore a predicate that does not correspond to the subject, and in which, therefore, it does not yet possess its truth. *The individual is only an individual*, the negativity that relates not to an *other* whether positive or negative, but only to itself. The rose is not a thing of *some* colour or *other*, but has only the specific colour that is rose-colour. The individual is not an undetermined determinate, but the determined determinate.

Starting from this positive form of the negative judgement, this negation of it appears again as only a *first* negation. But it is not so. On the contrary, the negative judgement is already in and for itself the second negation or the negation of the negation, and what it is in and for itself must be posited. That is to say, it *negates* the *determinateness* of the predicate of the positive judgement, the predicate's *abstract* universality, or, regarded as content, the single quality which the predicate contains of the subject. But the negation of the determinateness is already the second negation, and therefore the infinite return of individuality into itself. With this, therefore, the *restoration* of the concrete totality has been achieved, or rather, the subject is now for the first time *posited* as an individual, for through negation and the sublating of the negation it is mediated with itself. The predicate, too, on its side, has herewith passed over from the first universality to absolute determinateness and has equated itself with the subject. Thus the judgement runs: the individual is individual. From the other side, inasmuch as the subject was equally to be taken as *universal*, and as the predicate (which in contrast to that determination of the subject is the individual) *widened* itself in the negative judgement into *particularity*, and as now, further, the negation of this *determinateness* is no less the *purification* of the universality contained in the predicate, this judgement also runs: the universal is the universal.

In these two judgements, which we had previously reached by external reflection, the predicate is already expressed in its positivity. But first, the negation of the negative judgement must itself appear in the form of a negative judgement. We saw that in it there still remained a *positive relation* of the subject to the predicate, and the *universal sphere* of the latter. From this side, therefore, the negative contained a universality more purged of limitation than the positive judgement, and for that reason must be all the more negated of the subject as an individual. In this manner, the *whole extent* of the predicate is negated and there is no longer any positive relation between it and the subject. This is the *infinite judgement*.

(*c*) *The Infinite Judgement*

The negative judgement is as little a true judgement as the positive. But the infinite judgement which is supposed to be its truth is,

according to its negative expression, *negatively infinite*, a judgement in which even the form of judgement is set aside. But this is a *nonsensical judgement*. It is supposed to be a *judgement*, and consequently to contain a relation of subject and predicate; yet *at the same time* such a relation is supposed *not* to be in it. Though the name of the infinite judgement usually appears in the ordinary logics, it is not altogether clear what its nature really is. Examples of negatively infinite judgements are easily obtained: determinations are negatively connected as subject and predicate, one of which not only does not include the determinateness of the other but does not even contain its universal sphere; thus for example spirit is not red, yellow, etc., is not acid, not alkaline, etc., the rose is not an elephant, the understanding is not a table, and the like. These judgements are *correct* or *true*, as the expression goes, but in spite of such truth they are nonsensical and absurd. Or rather, they are *not judgements at all*. A more realistic example of the infinite judgement is the *evil* action. In *civil litigation*, something is negated only as the property of the other party, it being conceded that it should be theirs if they had the right to it; and it is only the title of right that is in dispute; the universal sphere of right is therefore recognized and maintained in that negative judgement. But *crime* is the *infinite judgement* which negates not merely the particular right, but the universal sphere as well, negates *right as right*. This infinite judgement does indeed possess *correctness*, since it is an actual deed, but it is nonsensical because it is related purely negatively to morality which constitutes its universal sphere.

The *positive* moment of the infinite judgement, of the negation of the negation, is the *reflection of individuality* into itself, whereby it is posited for the first time as a *determinate determinateness*. According to that reflection, the expression of the judgement was: *the individual is individual*. In the judgement of existence, the subject appears as an *immediate* individual and consequently rather as a mere *something* in general. It is through the mediation of the negative and infinite judgements that it is for the first time *posited* as an individual.

The individual is hereby *posited* as continuing itself *into its predicate*, which is identical with it; consequently, too, the universality no longer appears as *immediate* but as a *comprehension* of distinct terms. The positively infinite judgement equally runs:

the universal is universal, and as such is equally posited as the return into itself.

Now through this reflection of the terms of the judgement into themselves the judgement has sublated itself; in the negatively infinite judgement the difference is, so to speak, *too great* for it to remain a judgement; the subject and predicate have no positive relation whatever to each other; in the positively infinite judgement, on the contrary, only identity is present and owing to the complete lack of difference it is no longer a judgement.

More precisely, it is the *judgement of existence* that has sublated itself; hereby there is *posited* what the *copula* of the judgement contains, namely, that the qualitative extremes are sublated in this their identity. Since however this unity is the Notion, it is immediately sundered again into its extremes and appears as a judgement, whose terms however are no longer immediate but reflected into themselves. The *judgement of existence* has passed over into the *judgement of reflection.*

B. THE JUDGEMENT OF REFLECTION

In the judgement that has now arisen, the subject is an individual as such; and similarly the universal is no longer an *abstract* universality or a *single property*, but is posited as a universal that has gathered itself together into a unity through the relation of distinct terms; or, regarding it from the point of view of the content of various determinations in general, as the *taking together* of various properties and existences. If examples are to be given of predicates of judgements of reflection, they must be of another kind than for judgements of existence. It is in the judgement of reflection that we first have, strictly speaking, a *determinate content*, that is, a content as such; for the content is the form determination which is reflected into identity as distinct from the form in so far as this is a distinct determinateness—as it still is in the judgement. In the judgement of existence the content is merely an immediate, or abstract, indeterminate content. The following may therefore serve as examples of judgements of reflection: man is *mortal*, things are *perishable*, this thing is *useful*, *harmful*; *hardness*, *elasticity* of bodies, *happiness*, etc. are predicates of this peculiar kind. They express an essential determination, but one which is in a *relationship* or is a *unifying* universality.

This *universality*, which will further determine itself in the movement of the judgement of reflection, is still distinct from the *universality of the Notion* as such; true, it is no longer the abstract universality of the qualitative judgement, but it still possesses a relation to the immediate from which it proceeds and has the latter as the basis of its negativity. The Notion determines the existent, in the first instance, to *determinations of relation*, to self-continuities in the diverse multiplicity of concrete existence—yet in such a manner that the genuine universal, though it is the inner essence of that multiplicity, is still *in the sphere of Appearance*, and this *relative* nature—or even the *mark*—of this multiplicity is still not the moment of being-in-and-for-self of the latter.

It may suggest itself to define the judgement of reflection as a judgement of *quantity*, just as the judgement of existence was also defined as *qualitative* judgement. But just as *immediacy* in the latter was not merely an immediacy which *simply is*, but one which was essentially also mediated and *abstract*, so here, too, that sublated immediacy is not merely sublated quality, and therefore not merely *quantity*; on the contrary, just as quality is the most external immediacy, so is quantity, in the same way, the *most external determination* belonging to mediation.

Further, as regards the *determination* as it appears in its movement in the judgement of reflection, it should be remarked that in the judgement of existence the *movement* of the determination showed itself in the *predicate*, because this judgement was in the determination of immediacy and the subject consequently appeared as the basis. For a similar reason, in the judgement of reflection, the onward movement of determining runs its course *in the subject*, because this judgement has for its determination the *reflected in-itself*. Here therefore the essential element is the *universal* or the predicate; hence it constitutes the *basis* by which, and in accordance with which, the subject is to be measured and determined. However, the predicate also receives a further determination through the further development of the form of the subject; but this occurs *indirectly*, whereas the development of the subject is, for the reason stated, a *direct* advance.

As regards the objective signification of the judgement, the individual, through its universality, enters into existence, but in an essential determination of relationship, in an essentiality which maintains itself throughout the multiplicity of the world of Appear-

ance; the subject is *supposed* to be determinate in and for itself; this determinateness it possesses in its predicate. The individual, on the other hand, is reflected into this its predicate which is its universal essence; the subject is in so far a concrete existence in the world of Appearance. The predicate in this judgement no longer *inheres* in the subject; it is rather the *implicit being* under which this individual is *subsumed* as an accidental. If the judgements of existence may also be defined as *judgements* of *inherence*, judgements of reflection are, on the contrary, *judgements of subsumption.*

(*a*) *The Singular Judgement*

Now the immediate judgement of reflection is again, *the individual is universal*—but with subject and predicate in the stated signification; it can therefore be more precisely expressed as *this is an essential universal.*

But a 'this' is *not* an essential universal. This judgement which, as regards its general form, is simply *positive*, must be taken negatively. But since the judgement of reflection is not merely a positive one, the negation does not directly affect the predicate, which does not inhere but is the *in itself*. It is the subject rather that is alterable and awaits determination. Here, therefore, the negative judgement must be understood as asserting *not a 'this'* is a universal of reflection—an *in-itself* of this kind has a more universal existence than merely in a 'this'. Accordingly, the singular judgement has its proximate truth in the *particular* judgement.

(*b*) *The Particular Judgement*

The non-individuality of the subject, which must be posited instead of its individuality in the first judgement of reflection, is *particularity*. But individuality is determined in the judgement of reflection as *essential individuality*; particularity cannot therefore be a *simple, abstract* determination, in which the individual would be sublated and the concrete existent destroyed, but must be merely an extension of the individual in external reflection. The subject is, therefore, *these* or a *particular number* of *individuals.*

This judgement, that *some individuals are a universal of reflection*, appears at first as a positive judgement, but it is negative as well; for *some* contains universality. In this respect it may be

regarded as *comprehensive*; but in so far as it is particularity, it is no less inadequate to that universality. The *negative* determination which the subject has received through the transition of the singular judgement is, as we have shown above, also a determination of the relation, of the *copula*. The judgement: *some* men are happy, involves *the immediate consequence* that *some* men are *not* happy. If *some* things are useful, then for this very reason *some* things are *not* useful. The positive and negative judgements no longer fall apart, but the particular judgement immediately contains both at the same time, just because it is a judgement of reflection. But the particular judgement is, for this reason, *indeterminate*.

If, in the example of such a judgement, we examine further the subject, *some men, animals*, etc., we find that it contains besides the particular form-determination *some*, the content-determination *man*, etc. The subject of the singular judgement could be expressed by *this man*, a single individual, which really pertains to an external pointing; it might therefore be better expressed, say, by *Gaius*. But the subject of the particular judgement can no longer be, *some Gaii*; for Gaius is supposed to be an individual as such. To the *some* is therefore added a more universal *content*, say, *men, animals*, etc. This is not merely an empirical content, but one determined by the form of the judgement; that is to say, it is a *universal*, because *some* contains universality and this must at the same time be separated from the individuals, since reflected individuality forms the basis. More precisely, this universality is also the *universal nature* or *genus* man, animal—that universality which is the result of the judgement of reflection, *anticipated*; just as the positive judgement, in having the *individual* for subject, anticipated the determination which is the result of the judgement of existence. Thus the subject that contains the individuals, their relation to particularity and the universal nature, is already posited as the totality of the determinations of the Notion. But this is really an external reflection. What is, in the first instance, already posited in the subject by its form, in respect of the mutual *relation* of these determinations, is the *extension* of the '*this*' to particularity; but this generalization is not adequate to the 'this'; '*this*' is something completely determined, but '*some*' is indeterminate. The extension must be appropriate to the '*this*' and therefore, in conformity with it, be *completely determined*; such an extension is totality, or, in the first instance, *universality*.

This universality has the 'this' as its basis, for the individual here is the individual reflected into itself; its further determinations, therefore, run their course in it *externally*; and just as particularity for this reason determined itself as *some*, so the universality which the subject has attained is *allness*, and the particular judgement has passed over into the *universal.*

(*c*) *The Universal Judgement*

Universality, as it appears in the subject of the universal judgement, is the external universality of reflection, *allness;* '*all*' means all *individuals*, and in it the *individual* remains unchanged. This universality is, therefore, only a *taking together* of independently existing individuals; it is the *community* of a property which only belongs to them in *comparison.* It is this community that is usually the first thing that occurs to subjective, unphilosophical thinking when universality is mentioned. It is given as the obvious reason why a determination is to be regarded as universal that *it belongs to a number of things.* It is mainly this concept of universality, too, that *analysis* has in mind when, for example, it takes the development of a function in a *polynomial* to be *more universal* than its development in a *binomial*, because the *polynomial* presents *more individual terms* than the *binomial.* The demand that the function should be presented in its universality requires, strictly speaking, a *pantonomial*, the exhausted infinity; but here the limitation of this demand becomes apparent, and the representation of the *infinite* number of terms has to content itself with its *ought*, and therefore also with a *polynomial.* But in fact the binomial is already the pantonomial in those cases where the *method* or *rule* affects only the dependence of one term on another, and the dependence of several terms on their predecessors does not particularize itself, but one and the same function remains the base. The *method* or *rule* is to be regarded as the genuine *universal;* in the progress of the development or in the development of a polynomial the rule is merely *repeated*; so that it gains nothing in universality through the increased number of the terms. We have already in an earlier chapter spoken of the spurious infinity and its illusory nature; the universality of the Notion is the *reached beyond*; the spurious infinity remains afflicted with the beyond as an unattainable goal, for it remains the mere *progress* to infinity. When universality is pictured merely as *allness*, a

universality which is supposed to be exhausted in the individuals as individuals, then this is a relapse into that spurious infinity; or else mere *plurality* is taken for allness. Plurality, however, no matter how great, remains unalterably mere plurality, and is not allness. But there is, here, a vague awareness of the true universality of the *Notion*; it is the Notion that forces its way beyond the stubborn individuality to which unphilosophical thinking clings and beyond the externality of its reflection, substituting allness *as totality*, or rather that being which is categorically in and for itself.

This is apparent, too, in allness which is in general the *empirical* universality. Inasmuch as the individual as an immediate is presupposed and therefore *already given* and externally *adopted*, the reflection which gathers it into allness is equally external. But because the individual as 'this', is absolutely indifferent to this reflection, the universality and an individual of this kind cannot combine to form a unity. For this reason, this empirical allness remains a *task*, something which *ought to be done* and which cannot therefore be represented as *being*. Now an empirically universal proposition—for nevertheless such are advanced—rests on the tacit agreement that if only no contrary *instance* can be adduced, the *plurality* of cases shall count as *allness*; or, that *subjective* allness, namely, those cases which *have come to our knowledge*, may be taken for an *objective* allness.

Now a closer examination of the *universal judgement* now before us, reveals that the subject, which, as previously remarked, contains the true universality as *presupposed*, now also contains it as *posited* in it. *All men* expresses first, the *genus* man, secondly this genus as sundered into individuals, but so that the individuals are at the same time extended to the universality of the genus; conversely, the universality through this connexion with individuality is just as completely determined as the individuality; thus the *posited* universality has been equated with the *presupposed*.

Strictly speaking, however, we should not anticipate what is *presupposed*, but should consider the result in the form determination on its own. Individuality, through this extension of itself to allness, is *posited* as negativity, which is identical self-relation. It has not therefore remained that first individuality, that for example of Gaius, but is the determination that is identical with universality, or is the absolutely determined being of the

universal. That *first* individuality of the individual judgement was not the *immediate* one of the positive judgement, but came into being through the dialectical movement of the judgement of existence as such; it was already determined as the *negative identity* of the terms of that judgement. This is the true presupposition in the judgement of reflection; in contrast to the *positing* which runs its course in that judgement, that *first* determinateness of individuality was the latter's *in-itself*; thus, what individuality is *in itself*, is now, through the movement of the judgement of reflection, *posited*, namely, individuality as identical self-relation of the determinate. Therefore this *reflection*, which extends individuality to allness, is not external to it; on the contrary, this reflection merely makes *explicit* what it already is *in itself*. Hence the result is in truth *objective universality*. The subject has thus stripped off the form determination of the judgement of reflection which passed from *this* through *some* to *allness*; instead of *all men* we have now to say *man*.

The universality which has hereby come into being is the *genus* —the universality which is in its own self a concrete. The genus does not *inhere* in the subject; it is not a *single* property, or a property at all, of the subject; it contains all the single determinatenesses dissolved in its substantial solidity. In virtue of the fact that it is posited as this negative identity with itself, it is essentially a subject, but it is no longer *subsumed* in its predicate. In consequence, the nature of the judgement of reflection is altogether changed.

That judgement was essentially a judgement of *subsumption*. The predicate was determined, in contrast to its subject, as the *implicit* universal; according to its content, it could be taken as an essential determination of relation, or also as a mark—a determination which makes the subject merely an essential *Appearance*. But when the predicate is determined to *objective universality*, it ceases to be subsumed under such a determination of relation, or comprehensive reflection; on the contrary, such a predicate in contrast to this universality is a particular. The relationship of subject and predicate has therefore become inverted and hence the judgement has, first of all, sublated itself.

This sublation of the judgement coincides with the advance in the *determination of the copula*, which we have still to consider; the sublation of the terms of the judgement is the same thing as their

transition into the copula. In other words, the subject, in raising itself to universality has, in this determination become equated with the predicate, which as reflected universality also contains particularity within itself; subject and predicate are therefore identical, that is they have coalesced into the copula. This identity is the genus or absolute nature of a thing. In so far, therefore, as this identity again sunders itself into a judgement it is the *inner nature* through which subject and predicate are related to one another—a relation of *necessity* in which these terms of the judgement are only unessential differences. *What belongs to all the individuals of a genus belongs to the genus by its nature*, is an immediate consequence and the expression of what we have seen, that the subject, for example *all men*, strips off its form determination, and *man* is to take its place. This intrinsic and explicit connection constitutes the basis of a new judgement, the *judgement of necessity*.

C. THE JUDGEMENT OF NECESSITY

The determination to which universality has advanced is, as we have seen, the *universality which is in and for itself* or *objective*, to which in the sphere of essence *substantiality* corresponds. It is distinguished from the latter in that it belongs to the Notion and is therefore not merely the *inner* but also the *posited* necessity of its determinations; or, in other words, the *difference* is immanent in it, whereas substance has its difference only in its accidents, but not as principle within itself.

Now in the judgement, this objective universality is *posited*; first, therefore, with this its essential determinateness as immanent in it, secondly, with its determinateness distinguished from it as *particularity*, of which this universality constitutes the substantial basis. In this way it is determined as *genus* and *species*.

(*a*) *The Categorical Judgement*

The *genus* essentially sunders itself, or repels itself into *species*; it is genus only in so far as it comprehends species under itself; the species is species only in so far as on the one hand it exists in the individuals, and on the other hand is in the genus a higher universality. Now the *categorical judgement* has such a universality for its predicate, a predicate in which the subject possesses its *immanent* nature. But the categorical judgement is itself the first or

immediate judgement of necessity; accordingly the determinateness of the sbuject whereby it is a particular or individual over against the genus or species, so far belongs to the immediacy of external existence. But objective universality, too, has here as yet only its *immediate* particularization; hence it is on the one hand itself a determinate universality in contrast to which there are higher genera; on the other hand, it is not exactly the *proximate* genus, that is, its determinateness is not exactly the principle of the specific particularity of the subject. But what is *necessary* in it is the *substantial identity* of the subject and predicate, contrasted with which that property of the subject which distinguishes it from the predicate is only an unessential positedness, or even merely a name; the subject is reflected in its predicate into its being-in-and-for-self. A predicate of this kind should not be classed with the predicates of the preceding judgements; to throw, for example, the judgements

The rose is red,
The rose is a plant,
or This ring is yellow,
It is gold,

into the one class, and to regard such an external property as the colour of a flower as a predicate on the same level as its vegetable nature, is to overlook a difference which must strike the meanest intelligence. The categorical judgement must therefore be definitely distinguished from the positive and negative judgements; in the latter, what is predicated of the subject is a *single contingent* content; in the former, the content is the totality of the form reflected into itself. Here therefore the *copula* has the meaning of *necessity*, whereas in the others it merely signifies abstract, immediate *being*.

The *determinateness* of the subject, which makes it a *particular* in contrast to the predicate, is in the first instance something *contingent*; subject and predicate are not *necessarily* related by the form or determinateness; the necessity is, therefore, still an *inner* necessity. But the subject is subject only as a *particular*, and in so far as it possesses objective universality it must possess it essentially in accordance with that primarily immediate determinateness. The objective universal in *determining* itself, that is in positing itself in the judgement, is essentially in an identical

relation with this expelled *determinateness* as such, that is, it is essential that the determinateness is not posited as a mere contingency. It is only through this *necessity* of its immediate being that the categorical judgement conforms to its objective universality and in this way it has passed over into the *hypothetical judgement*.

(*b*) *The Hypothetical Judgement*

If A is, then B is; or, the being of A is not its own being, but the being of another, of B. What is posited in this judgement is the *necessary connexion* of immediate determinatenesses, a connexion which is not yet posited in the categorical judgement. There are here *two* immediate Existences or external contingencies, of which in the categorical judgement there is at first only one, the subject; but since one is external to the other, this other is also external to the first. In accordance with this immediacy, the *content* of the two sides is still mutually indifferent; hence this judgement is in the first instance a proposition of empty form. Now in the first place the immediacy is indeed as such a self-subsistent, concrete *being*; but secondly, the relation of this being is the essential point; therefore this being is just as much a mere *possibility*; the hypothetical judgement involves, not *that A is* or *that B is*, but only that *if* one is, *then* the other is; only the connexion of the extremes is posited as being, not the extremes themselves. On the contrary, in this necessity each extreme is posited as equally the *being of an other*. The principle of identity affirms that *A* is only *A*, not *B*; and that *B* is only *B*, not *A*; in the hypothetical judgement, on the contrary, the being of finite things is posited by the Notion in accordance with their formal truth, namely that the finite is its own being, but equally is not its *own* being, but that of an other. In the sphere of being, the finite *alters* and becomes an other; in the sphere of essence it is *Appearance*, and being is posited as consisting in the *reflection* of an other in it, and *necessity* is the inner relation, not yet posited as such. But the Notion is the *positing* of this identity so that what is, is not an abstract self-identity but a *concrete* identity and is immediately in its own self the being of an other.

By employing reflective relationships, the hypothetical judgement can be more precisely characterized as a relationship of *ground* and *consequent*, *condition* and *conditioned*, *causality*, etc.

Just as in the categorical judgement substantiality appeared in the form of its Notion, so, too, does the nexus of causality in the hypothetical judgement. This and the other relationships all come under the hypothetical judgement; but here they are no longer relationships of *self-subsistent sides*, but these sides are essentially only moments of one and the same identity. However, in the hypothetical judgement they are not yet opposed as Notion determinations, as individual or particular to universal, but at first only as *moments in general*. Thus the hypothetical judgement has rather the shape of a proposition; just as the particular judgement has an indeterminate content, so the hypothetical is indeterminate in form, since its content is not determined as a relationship of subject to predicate. Yet since the being is the being of an other, for that very reason it is *in itself* a *unity of itself* and *its other*, and consequently *universality*; at the same time it is, strictly speaking, only a *particular*, for it is a determinate and in its determinateness is not purely self-related. But it is not the *simple*, abstract particularity that is posited; on the contrary, through the *immediacy* which the *determinatenesses possess*, the moments of the particularity are distinguished; at the same time, through the unity of the moments which constitutes their relation, the particularity is also their totality. What therefore is truly posited in this judgement is universality as the concrete identity of the Notion, whose determinations have no subsistence of their own but are only particularities posited in that identity. As such, it is the *disjunctive judgement*.

(*c*) *The Disjunctive Judgement*

In the categorical judgement, the Notion is objective universality and an external individuality. In the hypothetical judgement, the Notion in its negative identity emerges in this externality. Through this identity, its moments receive the same determinateness, now posited in the disjunctive judgement, that they possess immediately in the hypothetical judgement. Hence the disjunctive judgement is objective universality posited at the same time in union with the form. It therefore contains first concrete universality or the genus in *simple* form as the subject, and secondly the *same* universality but as totality of its distinct determinations. *A* is either *B* or *C*. This is the *necessity of the Notion*, in which first the identity of the two extremes is one and the same extent, content and universality;

secondly they are distinguished according to the form of the Notion-determinations, but in such a manner that, by reason of that identity, this distinction is a *mere form*. Thirdly, the identical objective universality appears for that reason as the determination that is reflected into itself in contrast to the unessential form, that is, as the *content*, but a content which possesses within itself the determinateness of form, once as the simple determinateness of the *genus*, and again, this same determinateness developed into its difference—in which way it is the particularity of the *species* and their *totality*, the universality of the genus. The particularity in its development constitutes the *predicate*, for it is the *more universal* in so far as it embraces the entire universal sphere of the subject, and this too in its detailed particularization.

A closer examination of this particularization shows first of all that the genus constitutes the substantial universality of the species; the subject is therefore *both B and C*; this *both-and* denotes the *positive* identity of the particular with the universal; this objective universal completely maintains itself in its particularity. Secondly, the species *mutually exclude one another; A* is *either B or C*; for they are the *specific difference* of the universal sphere. This *either-or* is their *negative* relation. Yet in this they are just as identical as in their positive relation; the genus is their *unity* as *determinate* particulars. If the genus were an abstract universality as in the judgements of existence, the species would also have to be taken as only *diverse* and mutually indifferent; but it is not that external universality which results merely from *comparison* and *omission* but is the immanent and concrete universality of the species. An empirical disjunctive judgement lacks necessity; *A* is either *B* or *C* or *D*, etc., because the species *B*, *C* and *D*, etc., have *already been given*; strictly speaking, this cannot give us an *either-or*, for species of this kind constitute, as it were, a merely subjective completeness; true, *one* species excludes the *other*; but *either-or* excludes *every further* species and shuts off within itself a total sphere. This totality has its *necessity* in the negative unity of the objective universal, which dissolves individuality within itself and possesses it as a simple *principle* of difference immanent in it by which the species are *determined* and *related*. Empirical species, on the contrary, have their differences in some contingency or other which is an external principle and therefore not *their* principle, and consequently also not the immanent determinateness of the

genus; for this reason they are also not related to one another according to their determinateness. But it is through the *relation* of their determinateness that the species constitute the universality of the predicate. It is here really that the so-called *contrary* and *contradictory* notions should first find their place; for in the disjunctive judgement is posited the essential difference of the Notion; but in it they at the same time also possess their truth, namely, that the contrary and contradictory themselves are each distinguished as contrary and contradictory. Species are contrary in so far as they are merely *diverse*, that is to say in so far as they possess through the genus as their objective nature an existence that is in and for itself; they are *contradictory* in so far as they exclude one another. But each of these determinations by itself is one-sided and lacks truth; in the *either-or* of the disjunctive judgement their unity is posited as their truth, in accordance with which the species' self-subsistent existence as *concrete universality* is itself also the *principle* of the negative unity whereby they mutually exclude one another.

By the just demonstrated identity of subject and predicate in accordance with the negative unity, the genus in the disjunctive judgement is determined as the *proximate* genus. This expression indicates in the first place, a mere quantitative difference of *more* or *less*—determinations possessed by a universal in relation to a particularity coming under it. From this point of view, it remains contingent what is properly the proximate genus. In so far, however, as the genus is taken as a universal formed merely by the omission of determinations, it cannot really form a disjunctive judgement; for it is contingent whether it has retained the determinateness which constitutes the principle of the *either-or*; the genus would not be exhibited at all in the species according to its *determinateness*, and the species could only possess a contingent completeness. In the categorical judgement, the genus is at first only in this abstract form over against the subject, and therefore not necessarily the proximate genus to it and is so far external. But when the genus is a concrete, essentially *determinate* universality, then it is, as a simple determinateness, the unity of the *moments of the Notion*, which in this simplicity are only sublated, but have their real difference in the species. Accordingly, a genus is the *proximate* genus of a species in so far as the latter has its specific difference in the essential determinateness of the genus,

and the species as a whole are differentiated by a principle that lies in the nature of the genus.

The aspect just considered constitutes the identity of subject and predicate from the aspect of their *determinedness* in general, an aspect which has been posited by the hypothetical judgement, whose necessity is an identity of immediate and diverse things and therefore essentially a negative unity. It is this negative unity in general that separates subject and predicate, but now it is itself posited as differentiated—in the subject as a *simple* determinateness, in the predicate as *totality*. This separation of subject and predicate is the *difference of the Notion*; and thus the *totality* of the *species* in the predicate cannot be *any other difference*. The *reciprocal determination* of the *disjunctive* terms is therefore given by this. It reduces to the difference of the Notion, for it is this alone that disjoins itself and in its determination reveals its negative unity. However, the species is considered here only in respect of its simple Notion determinateness, not in respect of the *shape* in which it has come forth from the Idea into a further self-subsistent *reality*; this latter is indeed *dropped* in the simple principle of the genus; but the *essential* distinction must be a moment of the Notion. In the judgement here considered, it is really the Notion's *own* progressive determination that now *posits* its disjunction; the same thing that we found, when considering the Notion, to be its essential and explicit determination, its differentiation into determinate Notions. Now because the Notion is the universal, both the positive and the negative totality of the particulars, it is *itself* for that very reason also immediately *one of its disjunctive members*; the *other*, however, is this universality resolved into *its particularity*, or the determinateness of the Notion *as determinateness*, that determinateness in which the universality exhibits itself as totality. If the disjunction of a genus into species has not yet attained this form, this is a proof that it has not risen to the determinateness of the Notion and has not proceeded from the Notion. *Colour* is either violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange or red; even the empirical confusion and impurity of such a disjunction is at once apparent; just from this aspect alone it must be termed barbarous. When colour has been grasped as the *concrete unity* of light and dark, then this *genus* contains within it the *determinateness* which constitutes the *principle* of its particularization into species. But of these species,

one must be the utterly simple colour which contains the opposition in equipose and confined and negated in the colour's intensity; over against this there must be presented the opposition of the relationship between light and dark, to which must be added, since a natural phenomenon is involved, the indifferent neutrality of the opposition. When mixtures such as violet and orange, and differences of degree, such as blue and light blue, are taken for species, this can only result from a completely thoughtless procedure that shows too little reflection even for empiricism. But this is not the place to discuss what further distinct and more precisely determined forms disjunction may have, according as they occur in the element of Nature or of spirit.

In the first instance, the disjunctive judgement has the members of the disjunction in its predicate; but it is itself no less disjoined; its subject and predicate are the members of the disjunction. They are the moments of the Notion, posited in their determinateness but at the same time as identical; *identical* (*a*) in the objective universality which, in the subject is the simple *genus*, and in the predicate is the universal sphere and the totality of the moments of the Notion, and (*b*) in the *negative* unity, in the developed connexion of necessity, in accordance with which the *simple determinateness* in the subject is sundered into the *difference of the species*, and in this very difference is their essential relation and self-identity.

This unity, the copula of this judgement into which the extremes have coalesced through their identity, is therefore the Notion itself, and the Notion, too, *as posited*; the mere judgement of necessity has thereby risen into the *judgement of the Notion.*

D. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE NOTION

The ability to form *judgements of existence* such as 'the rose is red', 'snow is white', and so forth, will hardly count as evidence of great powers of judgement. The *judgements of reflection* are rather *propositions*; in the judgement of necessity the object appears, it is true, in its objective universality, but it is only in the judgement now to be considered that *its relation to the Notion is found.* In this judgement the Notion is laid down as the basis, and since it is in relation to the object, it is an *ought-to-be* to which the reality may or may not be adequate. Therefore it is only a judgement of this kind that contains a true appreciation; the predicates *good*, *bad*,

true, *beautiful*, *correct*, etc. express that the thing is *measured* against its universal *Notion* as the simply presupposed *ought-to-be* and is, or is not, in *agreement* with it.

The judgement of the Notion has been called the judgement of *modality* and it has been regarded as containing that form of the relationship between subject and predicate which is found in an external understanding, and to be concerned with the value of the copula only *in relation to thinking*. According to this view, the *problematical* judgement is one where the affirmation or denial is taken as *optional* or *possible*; the *assertoric*, where it is taken as *true*, that is as *actual*; and the *apodeictic*, where it is taken as *necessary*. It is easy to see why it is so natural in the case of this judgement to step out of the sphere of judgement itself and to regard its determination as something merely *subjective*. For here it is the Notion, or the subjective, that reappears in the judgement and stands in relationship to an external actuality. But this subjectivity is not to be confused with *external reflection*, which of course is also something subjective, but in a different sense from the Notion itself; on the contrary, the Notion that re-emerges from the disjunctive judgement is the opposite of a mere *contingent mode*. The earlier judgements are in this sense merely subjective, for they are based on an abstraction and one-sidedness in which the Notion is lost. The judgement of the Notion, on the contrary, is objective and the truth as against those earlier judgements, just because it has for its basis the Notion, not the Notion in external reflection or in *relation to* a subjective, that is contingent, *thinking*, but the Notion in its determinateness as Notion.

In the disjunctive judgement the Notion was posited as identity of the universal nature with its particularization; consequently the relation of the judgement was cancelled. This *concretion* of universality and particularization is, at first, a simple result; it has now to develop itself further into totality, since the moments which it contains are at first swallowed up in it and as yet do not confront one another in determinate self-subsistence. The defect of the result may also be more definitely expressed by saying that in the disjunctive judgement, although objective *universality* has completed itself *in its particularization*, yet the negative unity of the latter merely returns *into the former* and has not yet determined itself to the third moment, that of *individuality*. Yet in so far as the

result itself is *negative unity*, it is indeed already this *individuality*; but as such it is only this *one* determinateness, which has now to *posit* its negativity, sunder itself into the *extremes* and in this way finally develop *into the syllogism.*

The proximate diremption of this unity is the judgement in which it is posited first as subject, as an *immediate individual*, and then as predicate, as the determinate relation of its moments.

(*a*) *The Assertoric Judgement*

The judgement of the Notion is at first *immediate*; as such it is the *assertoric* judgement. The subject is a concrete individual in general, and the predicate expresses this same as the *relation* of its *actuality*, determinateness, or *constitution* to its *Notion.* (This house is *bad*, this action is *good.*) More precisely, therefore, it involves (*a*) that the subject *ought* to be something; its *universal nature* has posited itself as the self-subsistent Notion; and (*b*) *particularity* which, not only on account of its immediacy but also on account of its express differentiation from its self-subsistent universal nature, appears as an *external existence* with such and such a *constitution*; this, on its side, because of the Notion's self-subsistence, is also indifferent to the universal and may or may not conform to it. This constitution is the *individuality*, which lies beyond the necessary *determination* of the universal in the disjunctive judgement, a determination which only appears as the particularization of the *species* and as the negative *principle* of the genus. Thus the concrete universality which has emerged from the disjunctive judgement is sundered in the assertoric judgement into the form of *extremes*, to which the Notion itself as the posited unity that relates them is still lacking.

For this reason the judgement is so far merely *assertoric*; the verification is a subjective *assurance.* The fact that something is good or bad, correct, suitable or not, is connected with an external third factor. But the fact that the connexion is *externally posited* means that it is, at first, only *implicit* or *internal.* When therefore something is good or bad, etc. no one will suppose that it is, say, good only in *subjective consciousness* but perhaps bad in itself, or that good and bad, correct, suitable, etc., are not predicates of the objects themselves. The merely subjective element in the assertion of this judgement consists therefore in the fact that the *implicit* connexion of subject and predicate is not yet *posited*, or, what is

the same thing, that it is only *external*; the copula is still an immediate, *abstract being*.

Accordingly, the assurance of the assertoric judgement is confronted with equal right by its contradictory. When one is assured that 'this action is good', then the opposite assurance that 'this action is bad', is equally justified. Or, considering the judgement *in itself*, because the subject of the judgement is an *immediate individual*, in this abstraction it does not as yet possess posited *within it* the *determinateness* that should contain its relation to the universal Notion; thus the subject is still something contingent which may or may not conform to the Notion. The judgement is therefore essentially *problematic*.

(*b*) *The Problematic Judgement*

The *problematic* judgement is the assertoric in so far as the latter must be taken both positively and negatively. From this qualitative side, the *particular* judgement is likewise a problematic one, for it is equally valid positively and negatively; similarly, in the *hypothetical* judgement, the being of the subject and predicate is problematic; also, it is posited by the particular and hypothetical judgements that the individual and the categorical judgements are as yet merely subjective. But in the problematic judgement as such this positing is more immanent than in the judgements just mentioned, because in it the *content of the predicate* is *the relation of the subject to the Notion*, and here, therefore, the *determination of the immediate as something contingent* is itself *given*.

At first, it appears only problematic whether the predicate is to be coupled with a certain subject or not, and so far the indeterminateness falls in the copula. From this, no determination can emerge for the *predicate*, for this is already the objective, concrete universality. The problematic element, therefore, concerns the immediacy of the *subject* which is hereby determined as a *contingency*. But further, we must not for that reason abstract from the individuality of the subject; if this latter were purged of its individuality altogether, it would be merely a universal; the predicate contains just this, that the Notion of the subject is to be posited in relation to its individuality. We cannot say: *the house* or *a house* is good, but: *according to its constitution*. The problematic element in the subject itself constitutes its *moment*

of contingency, the *subjectivity* of the *thing* over against its objective nature or its Notion, its merely *contingent mode* or its *constitution.*

Hence the *subject* itself is differentiated into its universality or objective nature, what it *ought* to be, and the particular constitution of its existence. Thus it contains the *ground* of its *being* or *not being* what it *ought to be.* In this way, it is equated with the predicate. The *negativity* of the problematic element, in so far as it is directed against the immediacy of the *subject*, accordingly means only this original partition of the subject which is already *in itself* the unity of the universal and particular, *into these its moments*—a partition which is the judgement itself.

It may further be remarked that each of the *two* sides of the subject, its Notion and its constitution, could be called its *subjectivity*. The *Notion* is the universal essence of a thing or a fact [*Sache*] withdrawn into itself, its negative unity with itself; this constitutes its subjectivity. But a thing is also essentially *contingent* and has an *external constitution*; this may equally be called the mere subjectivity of the thing in contrast to the other side, its objectivity. The thing itself is just this, that its Notion, as the negative of itself, negates its universality and projects itself into the externality of individuality. The *subject* of the judgement is here posited as this duality; those opposite significations of subjectivity are, in accordance with their truth, brought into a unity. The signification of the subjective element has itself become problematic by reason of its *having lost* the immediate *determinateness* which it possessed in the immediate judgement, and its determinate *opposition* to the *predicate.* This opposite signification of subjective which occurs even in the ratiocination of ordinary reflection might of itself at least draw attention to the fact that subjectivity in *one* of these significations *alone*, has no truth. The twofold signification is the manifestation of this truth that each by itself is one-sided.

When the problematic element is thus posited as the problematic element of the *thing*, as the thing with its *constitution*, then the judgement itself is no longer problematic, but *apodeictic.*

(*c*) *The Apodeictic Judgement*

The subject of the apodeictic judgement (the house constituted so and so is *good*, the action constituted so and so is *right*) has within it, first, the universal, what it *ought to be*, and secondly,

its *constitution*; this latter contains the *ground* why a predicate of the Notion judgement applies or does not apply to the *whole subject*, that is, whether the subject corresponds to its Notion or not. This judgement, then, is *truly* objective; or it is the *truth of the judgement* in general. Subject and predicate correspond to each other and have the same content, and this *content* is itself the posited *concrete universality*; it contains, namely, the two moments, the objective universal or the *genus*, and the *individualized* universal. Here, therefore, we have the universal which is *itself* and continues itself through *its opposite* and is a universal only as *unity* with this opposite. A universal of this kind, such as the predicate *good*, *suitable*, *correct*, etc., is based on an *ought-to-be* and at the same time contains the *correspondence* of *existence* to that ought-to-be; it is not this ought-to-be or the genus by itself, but this *correspondence* that is the *universality* which constitutes the predicate of the apodeictic judgement.

The *subject* likewise contains these two moments in *immediate* unity as the *fact* [*Sache*]. But it is the truth of the fact that it is internally *split* into *what it ought-to-be* and *what it is*; this is the *absolute judgement on all actuality*. It is because this original partition, which is the omnipotence of the Notion, is just as much a return into its unity and an absolute relation of the *ought-to-be* and *being* to each other that makes what is actual into *a fact*; its inner relation, this concrete identity, constitutes the *soul* of the fact.

The transition from the immediate simplicity of the fact to the *correspondence* which is the determinate relation of its ought-to-be and its being—or the copula—is now seen, on closer examination, to lie in the particular *determinateness* of the fact. The genus is the universal *in and for itself*, which as such appears as the unrelated; while the determinateness is that which in that universal is reflected *into itself*, yet at the same time is reflected *into an other*. The judgement therefore has its *ground* in the constitution of the subject and thereby is *apodeictic*. Hence we now have before us the *determinate* and *fulfilled* [*erfüllte*] copula, which formerly consisted in the abstract '*is*', but has now further developed itself into *ground* in general. It appears at first as an immediate *determinateness* in the subject, but it is no less the *relation* to the predicate which has no other *content* than this very *correspondence*, or the relation of the subject to the universality.

Thus the form of the judgement has perished; first because subject and predicate are *in themselves* the same content; secondly because the subject through its determinateness points beyond itself and relates itself to the predicate; but also, thirdly, *this relating* has passed over into the predicate, alone constitutes its content, and is thus the *posited* relation, or the judgement itself. Thus the concrete identity of the Notion which was the *result* of the disjunctive judgement and which constitutes the *inner* basis of the Notion judgement—which identity was at first posited only in the predicate—is now restored *in the whole.*

If we examine the positive element of this result which effects the transition of the judgement into another form, we find, as we have seen, that subject and predicate in the apodeictic judgement are each the whole Notion. The *unity* of the Notion as the *determinateness* constituting the copula that relates them, is at the same time *distinct* from them. At first, it stands only on the other side of the subject as the latter's *immediate constitution.* But since it is essentially that which *relates* subject and predicate, it is not merely such immediate constitution but the *universal* that *permeates* both subject and predicate. While subject and predicate have the same *content*, the *form relation*, on the other hand, is posited through this determinatenes, *determinateness as a universal* or *particularity*. Thus it contains within itself the two form determinations of the extremes and is the *determinate* relation of subject and predicate; it is the *fulfilled copula* of the judgement, the *copula pregnant with content*, the unity of the Notion that has reemerged from the *judgement* in which it was lost in the extremes. Through this *impregnation of the copula* the judgement has become the *syllogism.*

CHAPTER 3

THE SYLLOGISM

We have found the *syllogism* to be the restoration of the *Notion* in the *judgement*, and consequently the unity and truth of both. The Notion as such holds its moments sublated in *unity*; in the judgement this unity is internal or, what is the same thing, external; and the moments, although related, are posited as *self-subsistent extremes*. In the *syllogism* the Notion determinations are like the extremes of the judgement, and at the same time their determinate *unity* is posited.

Thus the syllogism is the completely posited Notion; it is therefore the *rational*. The understanding is regarded as the faculty of the *determinate* Notion which is held fast *in isolation* by abstraction and the form of universality. But in reason the *determinate* Notions are posited in their *totality* and *unity*. Therefore, not only is the syllogism rational, but *everything rational is a syllogism*. The syllogistic process has for a long time been ascribed to reason; yet on the other hand reason in and for itself, rational principles and laws, are spoken of in such a way that it is not clear what is the connexion between the former reason which syllogizes and the latter reason which is the source of laws and other eternal truths and absolute thoughts. If the former is supposed to be merely formal reason, while the latter is supposed to be creative of content, then according to this distinction it is precisely the *form* of reason, the syllogism, that must not be lacking in the latter. Nevertheless, to such a degree are the two commonly held apart, and not mentioned together, that it seems as though the reason of absolute thoughts was ashamed of the reason of the syllogism and as though it was only in deference to tradition that the syllogism was also adduced as an activity of reason. Yet it is obvious, as we have just remarked, that the logical reason, if it is regarded as *formal* reason, must essentially be recognizable also in the reason that is concerned with a content; the fact is that no content can be rational except through the rational form. In this matter we cannot look for any help in the common chatter about reason; for this refrains from stating what is to be understood by *reason*; this

supposedly rational cognition is mostly so busy with its objects that it forgets to cognize reason itself and only distinguishes and characterizes it by the objects that it possesses. If reason is supposed to be the cognition that knows about God, freedom, right and duty, the infinite, unconditioned, supersensuous, or even gives only ideas and feelings of these objects, then for one thing these latter are only negative objects, and for another thing the first question still remains, what it is in all these objects that makes them rational. It is this, that the infinitude of these objects is not the empty abstraction from the finite, not the universality that lacks content and determinateness, but the universality that is fulfilled or realized, the Notion that is *determinate* and possesses its determinateness in this true way, namely, that it differentiates itself within itself and is the unity of these fixed and determinate differences. It is only thus that reason *rises* above the finite, conditioned, sensuous, call it what you will, and in this negativity is essentially *pregnant with content*, for it is the unity of determinate extremes; as such, however, the *rational* is nothing but the *syllogism*.

Now the syllogism, like the judgement, is in the first instance *immediate*; hence its determinations (*termini*) are *simple*, *abstract* determinatenesses; in this form it is the *syllogism of the understanding*. If we stop short at this form of the syllogism, then the rationality in it, although undoubtedly present and posited, is not apparent. The essential feature of the syllogism is the *unity* of the extremes, the *middle term* which unites them, and the *ground* which supports them. Abstraction, in holding rigidly to the *self-subsistence* of the extremes, opposes this *unity* to them as a determinateness which likewise is fixed and *self-subsistent*, and in this way apprehends it rather as *non-unity* than as unity. The expression *middle term* (*medius terminus*) is taken from spatial representation and contributes its share to the stopping short at the *mutual externality* of the terms. Now if the syllogism consists in the *unity of the extremes* being *posited* in it, and if, all the same, this unity is simply taken on the one hand as a particular on its own, and on the other hand as a merely external relation, and *non-unity* is made the essential relationship of the syllogism, then the reason which constitutes the syllogism contributes nothing to rationality.

First, the *syllogism of existence* in which the terms are thus immediately and abstractly determined, demonstrates in itself (since, like the judgement, it is their *relation*) that they are not

in fact such abstract terms, but that each contains the *relation to the other* and that the middle term is not only particularity as opposed to the determinations of the extremes but contains these terms *posited* in it.

Through this its dialectic it is converted into the *syllogism of reflection*, into the second syllogism. The terms of this are such that each essentially *shows in*, or is *reflected into, the other*; in other words they are posited as *mediated*, which they are supposed to be in accordance with the nature of the syllogism in general.

Thirdly, in that this *reflecting* or mediatedness of the extremes is reflected into itself, the syllogism is determined as the *syllogism of necessity*, in which the mediating element is the objective nature of the thing. As this syllogism determines the extremes of the Notion equally as totalities, the *syllogism* has attained to the correspondence of its Notion or the middle term, and its existence or the differences of the extremes; that is, it has attained to its truth and in so doing has passed out of subjectivity into *objectivity*.

A. THE SYLLOGISM OF EXISTENCE

1. The syllogism in its *immediate* form has for its moments the determinations of the Notion as *immediate*. Hence they are the abstract determinatenesses of form, which are not yet developed by mediation into *concretion*, but are only *single* determinatenesses. The first syllogism is, therefore, strictly the *formal* syllogism. The *formalism* of the syllogizing process consists in stopping short at the determination of this first syllogism. The Notion, differentiated into its *abstract* moments, has *individuality* and *universality* for its extremes, and appears itself as the *particularity* standing between them. On account of their immediacy they are merely self-related determinatenesses, and one and all a *single content*. Particularity constitutes the middle term in the first instance since it unites *immediately* within itself the two moments of individuality and universality. On account of its determinateness it is on the one hand subsumed under the universal, while on the other hand the individual, as against which it possesses universality, is subsumed under it. But this *concretion* is in the first instance merely a *duality of aspect*; on account of the immediacy in which the middle term presents itself in the immediate syllogism. it appears as a *simple* determinateness, and the *mediation* which it constitutes is not

yet posited. Now the dialectical movement of the syllogism of existence consists in the positing in its moments of the mediation that alone constitutes the syllogism.

(*a*) *First Figure of the Syllogism*

I–P–U is the general schema of the determinate syllogism. Individuality unites with universality through particularity; the individual is not universal immediately, but through the medium of particularity; and conversely the universal similarly is not immediately individual but descends to individuality through particularity. These determinations confront each other as *extremes* and are united in a *different* third term. Each is determinateness; in this they are *identical*; this their general determinateness is *particularity*. But they are no less *extremes* against this particularity than against each other, because each is present in its *immediate* determinateness.

The general significance of this syllogism is that the individual, which as such is infinite self-relation and therefore would be merely *inward*, emerges by means of particularity into *existence* as into universality, in which it no longer belongs merely to itself but stands in an *external relationship*; conversely the individual, in separating itself into its determinateness as a particularity, is in this separation a concrete individual and, as the relation of the determinateness to itself, a *universal*, self-related individual, and consequently is also truly an individual; in the extreme of universality it has withdrawn from externality *into itself*. In the first syllogism, the syllogism's objective significance is only *superficially* present, since in it the determinations are not yet posited as the unity which constitutes the essence of the syllogism. It is still subjective in so far as the abstract significance possessed by its terms is not thus isolated in and for itself but only in subjective consciousness. Moreover, the relationship of individuality, particularity and universality is as we have seen the *necessary and essential form-relationship* of the determinations of the syllogism; the defect consists not in this determinateness of the form, but in the fact that *under this form* each single determination is not at the same time *richer*. Aristotle has confined himself rather to the mere relationship of *inherence*, in stating the nature of the syllogism as follows: *When three terms are related to one another in such a manner that one extreme is in the whole of the middle term and this*

middle term is in the whole of the other extreme, then these two extremes are necessarily united in a conclusion. What is expressed here is more the mere repetition of the *like relationship* of inherence between one extreme to the middle term, and again between the middle term and the other extreme, than the determinateness of the three terms to one another. Now since the syllogism rests on the stated relative determinateness of the terms, it is immediately evident that other relationships of the terms which are given by the other figures can only have validity as syllogisms of the understanding [*Verstandesschlüsse*] in so far as they can be *reduced* to that original relationship; they are not *different species* of figures which stand *alongside* the *first*; on the contrary, on the one hand, in so far as they purport to be correct syllogisms, they rest solely on the essential form of the syllogism in general, which is the first figure; on the other hand, in so far as they deviate from it they are transformations into which that first abstract form necessarily passes, thereby further determining itself and advancing to totality. We shall presently see what this process is.

I–P–U is thus the general schema of the syllogism in its determinateness. The individual is subsumed under the particular, and the latter under the universal; therefore the individual too is subsumed under the universal. Or the particular inheres in the individual and the universal in the particular; *therefore* the universal also inheres in the individual. From one aspect, namely, in relation to the universal, the particular is subject; in relation to the individual it is predicate; or, in relation to the former it is an individual, in relation to the latter it is a universal. Because the two determinatenesses are united in it, the extremes are linked together by this their unity. The *therefore* appears as the conclusion that has taken place in the *subject*, a conclusion deduced from *subjective* insight into the relationship between the two *immediate* premisses. As subjective reflection enunciates the two relations of the middle term to the extremes as particular and indeed immediate *judgements* or *propositions*, the conclusion as the *mediated* relation is also, of course, a particular *proposition*, and the *consequently* or *therefore* is the expression of the fact that it is the mediated one. But this *therefore* is not to be regarded as an external determination in this proposition, as if it had its ground and seat only in subjective reflection; on the contrary, it is grounded in the nature of the extremes themselves

whose *relation* again is expressed as a *mere judgement* or *proposition* only for the purpose of, and by means of, abstractive reflection, but whose *true relation* is posited as the middle term. That *therefore I is U* is a *judgement*, is a merely subjective circumstance; the very meaning of the syllogism is that this is not merely a *judgement*, that is, not a relation effected by the *mere copula* or the empty *is*, but one effected by the determinate middle term which is pregnant with content.

Consequently, to regard the syllogism merely as consisting *of three judgements*, is a formal view that ignores the relationship of the terms on which hinges the sole interest of the syllogism. It is altogether a merely subjective reflection that splits the relation of the terms into separate premisses and a conclusion distinct from them:

All men are mortal,
Gaius is a man,
Therefore he is mortal.

At the approach of this kind of syllogism we are at once seized with a feeling of boredom; this stems from that unprofitable form which by means of the separate propositions presents a semblance of difference that immediately dissolves in the fact itself. It is mainly this subjective shape that gives the syllogistic process the appearance of a subjective *makeshift*, to which reason or understanding resorts when it cannot cognize *immediately*. The nature of things, the rational element, certainly does not set to work by first framing for itself a major premiss, the relation of a particularity to a subsistent universal, and then secondly, picking up a separate relation of an individuality to the particular, out of which thirdly and lastly a new proposition comes to light. This syllogistic process that advances by means of separate propositions is nothing but a subjective form; the nature of the fact is that the differentiated Notion determinations of the fact are united in the essential unity. This rationality is not a makeshift; on the contrary, in contrast to the *immediacy* of relation that still obtains in the *judgement*, it is the *objective* element; and the former immediacy of cognition is rather the merely subjective element, whereas the syllogism is the truth of the judgement. Everything is a *syllogism*, a universal that through particularity is united with individuality; but it is certainly not a whole consisting of *three propositions*.

2. In the *immediate* syllogism of the understanding the terms have the form of *immediate determinations*; it is now to be considered from this aspect according to which they are a *content*. It may thus be regarded as the *qualitative* syllogism, just as the judgement of existence has the same aspect of qualitative determination. Accordingly the terms of this syllogism, like the terms of that judgement, are *individual* determinatenesses, the determinateness through its self-relation being posited as indifferent to the *form* and hence as content. The *individual* is any immediate concrete object; *particularity* a single one of its determinatenesses, properties or relationships; *universality* again a still more abstract, more individual determinateness in the particular. Since the subject as *immediately* determined is not yet posited in its Notion, its concretion is not reduced to the essential Notion determinations; its self-related determinateness is, therefore, an indeterminate, infinite *multiplicity*. In this immediacy the individual possesses an infinite number of determinatenesses which belong to its particularity, each of which therefore may constitute a middle term for it in a syllogism. But through *any other* middle term it is united *with another universal*; through each of its properties it stands in a different connexion and context of existence. Further, the middle term is also a concrete in comparison with the universal; it contains several predicates itself, and the individual in turn can be united through the same middle term with several universals. In general, therefore, it is *completely contingent* and *arbitrary* which of the many properties is adopted for the purpose of connecting it with a predicate; other middle terms are transitions to other predicates, and even the same middle term may by itself be a transition to various predicates, for as a particular against the universal it contains several determinations.

But not only is an indefinite number of syllogisms equally possible for one subject and not only is any single syllogism *contingent* in respect of its content, but these syllogisms that concern the same subject must also pass over into *contradiction*. For difference in general, which in the first instance is an indifferent *diversity*, is no less essentially *opposition*. The concrete is no longer something belonging merely to the sphere of Appearance, but is concrete through the unity in the Notion of the opposites that have become determined as moments of the Notion. Now

when, in accordance with the qualitative nature of the terms in the formal syllogism, the concrete is grasped in respect of a single one of the determinations belonging to it, the syllogism assigns to it the predicate corresponding to this middle term; but as from another side the opposite determinateness is inferred, this shows the former conclusion to be false, although its premisses by themselves and equally its inference are quite correct. If from the middle term, that a wall has been painted blue, it is inferred that therefore the wall is blue, this is a correct inference; yet in spite of this syllogism the wall can be green if it has also been painted over yellow, from which latter circumstance taken by itself it would follow that it was yellow. If from the middle term of sense-nature it is inferred that man is neither good nor evil, because neither the one nor the other can be predicated of sense, the syllogism is correct but the conclusion is false; because as man is a concrete being, the middle term of spirituality is equally valid. From the middle term of the gravitation of the planets, satellites and comets towards the sun, it correctly follows that these bodies fall into the sun; but they do not fall into it, because each is no less its own centre of gravity, or, as it is said, they are impelled by centrifugal force. Similarly, from the middle term of sociality we can deduce the community of goods among citizens, but from the middle term of individuality, if it is pursued with equal abstractness, there follows the dissolution of the state, as has happened for example in the Holy Roman Empire from holding to the latter middle term. It is justly held that there is nothing so inadequate as a formal syllogism of this kind, since it is a matter of chance or caprice which middle term is employed. No matter how elegantly a deduction of this kind has run its course through syllogisms, however fully its correctness may be conceded it still leads to nothing of the slightest consequence, for the fact always remains that there are still other middle terms from which the exact opposite can be deduced with equal correctness. The Kantian *antinomies* of reason amount to nothing more than that from a notion first one of its determinations is laid down as basis, and then with equal necessity, the other. In these cases this inadequacy and contingency of a syllogism must not merely be shifted on to the content, as though these defects were independent of the form and the latter alone were the concern of logic. On the contrary, it lies in the form of the formal syllogism that the content is such a

one-sided quality; it is determined to this one-sidedness by the said *abstract* form. It is, namely, one single quality of the many qualities or determinations of a concrete object or Notion because *according to the form* it is not supposed to be anything more than such an immediate, single determinateness. The extreme of individuality, as *abstract individuality*, is the *immediate* concrete, consequently the infinite or indeterminable manifold; the middle term is the equally *abstract particularity*, consequently a single one of these manifold qualities, and similarly the other extreme is the *abstract universal*. Therefore it is essentially on account of its form that the formal syllogism is wholly contingent as regards its content; and contingent, not in the sense that it is contingent for the syllogism whether *this* or *another* object be submitted to it—logic abstracts from this content—but in so far as a subject forms the basis it is contingent what kind of content determinations the syllogism shall infer from it.

3. The determinations of the syllogism are determinations of content in so far as they are immediate, abstract, and reflected into themselves. But their essential nature, on the contrary, is that they are not such mutually indifferent, intro-reflected determinations, but *determinations* of *form*; as such they are essentially *relations*. These relations are first, those of the extremes to the middle term—relations that are *immediate*, the *propositiones praemissae*, and, to name them, the *propositio major*, the relation of the particular to the universal, and the *propositio minor*, the relation of the individual to the particular. Secondly we have the relation of the extremes to one another, which is the *mediated* relation, *conclusio*. The *immediate* relations, the premisses, are propositions or judgements in general, and *contradict the nature of the syllogism* according to which the different Notion determinations are not related immediately, but their unity should also be posited; the truth of the judgement is the syllogism. All the less can the premisses remain immediate relations, since their content consists of immediately *distinguished* determinations and they are therefore not immediately identical in and for themselves—unless they are pure, identical propositions, that is empty tautologies that lead to nothing.

Accordingly, it is commonly demanded of the premisses that they shall be *proved*, that is, that *they likewise shall be presented as conclusions*. Consequently, the two premisses yield two further

syllogisms. But these *two* new syllogisms in turn yield between them *four* premisses which demand *four* new syllogisms; these have *eight* premisses whose *eight* syllogisms in turn yield for their *sixteen* premisses *sixteen* syllogisms, and *so on* in a geometrical progression to *infinity*.

Thus there here comes to view again the *progress to infinity* which appeared before in the lowlier *sphere of being*, but which was no longer to be expected in the domain of the Notion, of the absolute reflection-into-self out of the finite, in the region of free infinitude and truth. It was shown in the sphere of being that whenever we find the spurious infinite that runs away into a progression, we are faced with the contradiction of a *qualitative being* and an *impotent ought-to-be* that goes out and away beyond it; the progression itself is the repetition of the demand for unity in opposition to the qualitative, and of the persistent relapse into the limitation which is inadequate to that demand. Now in the formal syllogism the *immediate* relation or the qualitative judgement is the basis, and the *mediation* of the syllogism that which is posited as the higher truth over against it. The unending process of proving the premisses does not resolve this contradiction but only perpetually renews it and is the repetition of one and the same original defect. The truth of the infinite progression consists, on the contrary, in the sublation of the progression itself and the form which is already determined by it as defective. This form is that of mediation as *I–P–U*. The two relations *I–P* and *P–U* are to be mediated relations; if this is effected in the same way the defective form *I–P–U* will merely be duplicated, and so on to infinity. *P* has to *I* also the form determination of a *universal*, and to *U* the form determination of an *individual*, because these relations are, in general, judgements. Therefore they require mediation; but mediation in the form just mentioned only results in the re-appearance of the relationship that was to have been sublated.

The mediation must therefore be effected in another manner. For the mediation of *P–U*, we have *I*; accordingly the mediation must take the form *P–I–U*. To mediate *I–P*, we have *U*; this mediation therefore becomes the syllogism *I–U–P*.

When we examine this transition in the light of its Notion, we find in the first place that the mediation of the formal syllogism is, as has been shown, *contingent* in respect of its *content*. The

immediate *individual* has in its determinatenesses an indeterminable number of middle terms, and these in turn have a similar number of determinatenesses in general; so that it depends entirely on an external *caprice* or simply on some *external circumstance* and contingent determination, with what kind of a universal the subject of the syllogism shall be united. As regards content, therefore, the mediation is not anything necessary or universal; it is not grounded in the *Notion of the fact*; on the contrary, the *ground* of the syllogism is something external to it, that is, something *immediate*; but among the Notion determinations the immediate is the *individual.*

As regards the *form*, the *mediation* likewise has for its *presupposition* the *immediacy of the relation*; therefore the mediation is itself mediated, and mediated by the *immediate*, that is, the *individual.* More precisely, through the *conclusion* of the first syllogism, the individual has become the mediating factor. The conclusion is *I–U*; the *individual* is thereby posited as a *universal.* In one premiss, the minor *I–P*, it is already present as a *particular*; hence it is that in which these two determinations are united. Or we may say that the conclusion in and for itself enunciates the individual as a universal, and that too not in an immediate manner but through mediation; consequently as a necessary relation. The *simple* particularity was the middle term; in the conclusion this particularity is *posited* in its *developed* form as the *relation of the individual and universality*. But the universal is still a qualitative determinateness, a predicate of the *individual*; the individual in being determined as a universal is *posited* as the universality of the extremes or as the middle term; by itself it is the extreme of individuality, but because it is now determined as a universal it is at the same time the unity of the two extremes.

(*b*) *The Second Figure: P–I–U*

1. The truth of the first qualitative syllogism is that something is united with a qualitative determinateness as a universal, not in and for itself but through a contingency or in an individuality. In such a quality, the *subject* of the syllogism has not returned into its Notion, but is apprehended only in its *externality*; immediacy constitutes the ground of the relation and consequently the mediation; thus the individual is in truth the middle term.

But further, the syllogistic relation is the sublation of the immediacy; the conclusion is not an immediate relation but rela-

tion by means of a third term; it contains therefore a *negative* unity; consequently the mediation is now determined as possessing within itself a *negative* moment.

In this second syllogism the premisses are: *P–I* and *I–U*; only the first of these premisses is still immediate; the second, *I–U*, is already mediated, namely by the first syllogism. The second syllogism therefore presupposes the first, just as conversely the first presupposes the second. Here the two extremes are distinguished as particular and universal; thus the latter still keeps its *place*; it is predicate. But the particular has changed places; it is subject, or posited in the *determination of the extreme of individuality*, just as the *individual* is posited in the *determination of middle term*, or of particularity. Both are therefore no longer the abstract immediacies that they were in the first syllogism. However, they are not yet posited as concretes; in standing in the *place* of the other, each is posited in its own determination and at the same time, though only *externally*, in the determination of the *other*.

The *specific* and *objective meaning* of this syllogism is that the universal is not *in and for itself* a determinate particular—for on the contrary it is the totality of its particulars—but is *one* such of its species *through the medium of individuality*; the rest of its species are excluded from it by the immediate externality. On the other hand the particular likewise is not immediately and in and for itself the universal, but the negative unity strips it of its determinateness and thereby raises it into universality. The individuality stands in a *negative* relationship to the particular in so far as it is supposed to be its predicate; it is *not* predicate of the particular.

2. But in the first instance the terms are still immediate determinatenesses; they have not of themselves developed into any objective significance; the altered *position* which two of them occupy is the form, which is as yet only external to them. Therefore they are still, as in the first syllogism, simply a mutually indifferent content—two qualities that are connected, not in and for themselves, but by means of a contingent individuality.

The syllogism of the first figure was the *immediate* syllogism or, otherwise expressed, the syllogism in its Notion as *abstract form* which has not yet realized itself in its determinations. The transition of this pure form into another figure is on the one hand the beginning of the realization of the Notion, in that the *negative* moment of mediation, and thereby a further determinateness of

form, is posited in the initially immediate qualitative determinateness of the terms. But this is at the same time an *alteration* of the pure form of the syllogism; the latter no longer completely corresponds to its pure form, and the determinateness posited in its terms differs from the original form determination. Regarded merely as a subjective syllogism proceeding in an external reflection, it counts as a *species* of syllogism which ought to correspond to the genus, namely to the general schema *I–P–U*. But to begin with it does not correspond to this; its two premisses are *P–I*, or *I–P*, and *I–U*; hence the middle term is in both cases subsumed or in both cases the subject, in which accordingly the two other terms inhere. It is therefore not a middle term, for this should on the one hand subsume or be predicate, and on the other hand be subsumed or be subject, or one of the terms should inhere in it while it itself inheres in the other. The true meaning of the fact that this syllogism does not correspond to the general form of the syllogism, is that the general form has passed over into this syllogism since the truth of that form consists in its being a subjective and contingent connecting of the terms. If the conclusion in the second figure (that is, without taking advantage of the restriction about to be mentioned, which converts it into something indeterminate) is correct, then it is so because it is so on its own account, not because it is the conclusion of this syllogism. But the same is the case with the conclusion of the first figure; it is this, its truth, that is posited by the second figure. In the view that holds the second figure to be merely one species, the necessary transition of the first into this second form is overlooked and the former is adhered to as the true form. Consequently, if in the second figure (which from ancient custom is quoted without further reasons as *the third*) we are likewise supposed to have a syllogism *correct* in this subjective sense, then it would have to be conformable to the first; hence, since one premiss *I–U* has the relationship of the subsumption of the middle term under one extreme, then it would have to be possible to give the other premiss, *P–I*, the opposite relation to that which it has and to subsume *P* under *I*. But such a relation would be the sublation of the determinate judgement *I* is *P*, and could only occur in an indeterminate, in a particular judgement; consequently the conclusion in this figure can only be particular. The particular judgement, however, as remarked above, is both positive and negative—

a conclusion to which for that very reason no great value can be attached. Since too the particular and universal are the extremes, and are immediate, mutually indifferent determinatenesses, their relationship is itself indifferent; either can be taken at choice as major or minor term and therefore, too, either premiss can be taken as major or minor.

3. The conclusion, being positive as well as negative, is thus a relation indifferent to these determinatenesses and hence a *universal* relation. More precisely, the mediation of the first syllogism was *in itself* a contingent one; in the second syllogism this contingency is *posited.* Hence it is the self-sublating mediation; the mediation has the determination of individuality and immediacy; what is united by this syllogism must on the contrary be *in itself* and *immediately* identical; for this middle term, *immediate individuality*, is determined in an infinitely manifold and external manner. In it, therefore, is rather posited the self-*external* mediation. But the externality of the individuality is universality; the above mediation by means of the immediate individual points beyond itself to *its other* form, and the mediation is therefore effected by the *universal.* In other words, what is to be united by the second syllogism must be conjoined *immediately*; the immediacy on which this syllogism is based cannot bring about a definite conclusion. The immediacy to which it points is the opposite to its own—the sublated first immediacy of being—therefore the *universal* that is reflected into itself, or the *implicit, abstract universal.*

From the point of view we have just considered, the transition of this syllogism was an *alteration* like transition in the sphere of being, because the qualitative element, that of immediate individuality, lies at its base. But according to the Notion, individuality unites the particular and universal in so far as it *sublates* the *determinateness* of the particular, and this presents itself as the contingency of this syllogism; the extremes are not united by their determinate relation which they have for a middle term; this term is therefore *not* their *determinate unity*, and the positive unity which still attaches to the middle term is only *abstract universality.* But with the positing of the middle term in this determination, which is its truth, we have another form of the syllogism.

(*c*) *The Third Figure: I–U–P*

1. This third syllogism no longer has any immediate premiss; the

relation *I–U* has been mediated by the first syllogism, the relation *P–U* by the second. Hence it presupposes the first two syllogisms; but conversely, they both presuppose it, and in general each presupposes the other two. In this figure, therefore, the determination of the syllogism is in general completed. What this reciprocal mediation precisely contains is this, that each syllogism, although by itself mediation, is none the less not in its own self the totality of the mediation but contains an immediacy whose mediation lies outside it.

The syllogism *I–U–P*, regarded in itself, is the truth of the formal syllogism; it expresses that the mediation of the formal syllogism is the abstractly universal mediation, and that the extremes are not contained in the middle term according to their essential determinateness but only according to their universality; and that therefore what was supposed to be mediated in it is precisely what is not brought into unity. Here then is made explicit in what the formalism of the syllogism consists; its terms have an immediate content which is indifferent to the form, or, what is the same thing, they are determinations of form which have not yet reflected themselves into determinations of content.

2. The middle term of this syllogism is indeed the unity of the extremes, but a unity in which abstraction is made from their determinateness; it is the *indeterminate* universal. But since this universal is at the same time distinguished as *abstract* from the extremes as *determinate*, it is itself still a *determinate* relatively to them, and the whole is a syllogism whose relation to its Notion has now to be considered. The middle term, as the universal, is the subsuming term or predicate to *both* its extremes, and does not occur once as subsumed or as subject. In so far, therefore, as it is supposed to correspond, as *a species* of syllogism, to the syllogism, it can do so only on condition that when one relation *I–U*, already possesses the proper relationship, the other relation *U–P* also possesses it. This occurs in a judgement in which the relationship of subject and predicate is indifferent, in a *negative* judgement. In this way the syllogism becomes legitimate, but the conclusion necessarily negative.

Thus it is now also indifferent which of the two determinations of this proposition is taken as predicate and which as subject; and in the syllogism, whether it is taken as extreme of individuality or of particularity, therefore as minor or major term. Since on the

common assumption it depends on this which of the premisses is to be major and which minor, this too has become a matter of indifference. This is the ground of the ordinary *fourth figure* of the syllogism, a figure unknown to Aristotle and which in any case is concerned with a wholly empty and pointless distinction. In it the immediate position of the terms is the *reverse* of their position in the first figure. Since subject and predicate of the negative conclusion in the formal treatment of the judgement do not have the definite relationship of subject and predicate, but either can take the place of the other, it is indifferent which term is taken as subject and which as predicate; therefore equally indifferent which premiss is taken as major and which as minor. This indifference, aided as it is by the determination of particularity (especially when it is observed that this can be taken in the comprehensive sense) makes this fourth figure a sheer futility.

3. The objective significance of the syllogism in which the universal is the middle term, is that the mediating element, as unity of the extremes, is *essentially a universal*. But since the universality is in the first instance only qualitative or abstract universality, it does not contain the determinateness of the extremes; their conjunction, if it is to be effected, must similarly have its ground in a mediation lying outside this syllogism and is in respect of this latter just as contingent as in the case of the preceding forms of the syllogism. But now since the universal is determined as the middle term, and the determinateness of the extremes is not contained in it, this middle term is posited as a wholly indifferent and external one.

As the immediate result of this bare abstraction, we obtain, of course, a *fourth figure* of the syllogism, namely that of the *relationless* syllogism *U–U–U*, which abstracts from the qualitative difference of the terms and consequently has for its determination their merely external unity, namely their *equality*.

(d) The Fourth Figure: U–U–U, or the Mathematical Syllogism

1. The mathematical syllogism runs: if two things or determinations are equal to a third, they are equal to each other. Here the relationship of inherence or subsumption of the terms is extinguished.

The mediating factor is a third in general, but it has absolutely no determination whatever as against its extremes. Each of the

three can therefore equally well be the third, mediating term. Which one is to be used for this purpose, and which of the three relations, therefore, are to be taken as immediate and which as mediated, depends on external circumstances and other conditions, namely on which two of them are the immediately *given* terms. But this determination does not concern the syllogism itself and is completely external.

2. The mathematical syllogism ranks as an *axiom* in mathematics, as *an absolutely self-evident, primitive proposition*, that neither admits nor requires any proof, that is any mediation, and neither presupposes anything else nor can be deduced from anything else. If its prerogative of being immediately *self-evident* is looked at more closely, it will be seen that it lies in the formalism of this syllogism which abstracts from all qualitative distinction of the terms and only takes up their quantitative equality or inequality. But for this very reason it is not without presupposition or unmediated; the quantitative determination, which is the only thing in it taken into account, *is* only *through abstraction* from qualitative difference and from the determinations of the Notion. Lines, figures, posited as equal to one another, are understood only in terms of their magnitude; a triangle is affirmed to be equal to a square, but not as triangle to square, but only in regard to magnitude, etc. Similarly, the Notion and its determinations do not enter into this syllogizing; there is no *comprehending* at all [that is, in terms of the Notion] in this process; and understanding too has not even the formal, abstract determinations of the Notion before it. The self-evidence of this syllogism, therefore, rests merely on the fact that its thought content is so meagre and abstract.

3. But the *result of the syllogism of existence* is not merely this abstraction from all Notional determinateness; the *negativity* of the immediate, abstract determinations which emerged from it has yet another *positive* side, namely that the abstract determinateness has had *its other posited* in it and thereby has become *concrete*.

In the first place, the syllogisms of existence all mutually *presuppose* one another and the extremes united in the conclusion are only genuinely and in and for themselves united in so far as they are *otherwise* united by an identity that has its ground elsewhere; the middle term, as it is constituted in the syllogisms we have considered, is *supposed* to be their Notion unity, but is only a formal determinateness that is not posited as their concrete

unity. But this *presupposed* element of each of those mediations is not merely a *given immediacy* in general, as in the mathematical syllogism, but is itself a mediation, namely, for each of the two other syllogisms. Therefore what we truly have before us is not mediation based on a given immediacy, but mediation based on mediation. Hence this is not the quantitative mediation that abstracts from the form of mediation, but rather the *mediation that relates itself to mediation*, or the *mediation of reflection.* The circle of reciprocal presupposing that these syllogisms unite to form with one another is the return of this act of presupposition into itself, which herein forms a totality, and thus the *other* to which each individual syllogism points is not placed through abstraction *outside* the circle but embraced *within* it.

Further, from the side of the *individual determinations of the form* it has been seen that in this entirety of the formal syllogisms each individual term has in turn taken the *place of middle term.* This was determined as *particularity*; subsequently, through the dialectical movement it determined itself as *individuality* and *universality*. Similarly, each of these determinations occupied in turn the *places of the two extremes. The merely negative result* is the extinction of the qualitative form determinations in the merely quantitative, mathematical syllogism. But what we truly have here is the *positive result*, that mediation is not effected through an *individual* qualitative determinateness of form, but through the *concrete identity* of the determinations. The defect and formalism of the three syllogistic figures considered above consists just in this, that an individual determinateness of this kind was supposed to constitute their middle term. Mediation has thus determined itself as the indifference of the immediate or abstract form determinations and as positive *reflection* of one into the other. The immediate syllogism of existence has thereby passed over into the *syllogism of reflection.*

Remark: The Common View of the Syllogism

In the account here given of the nature of the syllogism and its various forms, passing reference has also been made to what in the usual consideration and treatment of syllogisms constitutes the main interest, namely, how a correct conclusion may be obtained in each figure; however, in those references only the main point has been indicated, and those cases and complexities which arise

when the distinction of positive and negative judgements, together with the quantitative determination—especially particularity—is also dragged in, have been passed over. Some remarks on the ordinary view and mode of treatment of the syllogism in logic will be in place here. It is a familiar fact that this doctrine was elaborated into such finely drawn distinctions that its so-called subtleties have been the object of universal aversion and disgust. The *natural understanding* in asserting itself in every department of mental and spiritual culture against the unsubstantial forms of reflection, also turned against this artificial knowledge of the forms of reason and supposed itself able to dispense with such a science on the ground that it performed the individual operations of thought specified therein naturally and spontaneously without any special instruction. In point of fact, if a pre-condition of rational thinking were the laborious study of syllogistic formulae, mankind would in that respect be in the same sorry plight as they would be, as already remarked in the Preface in another respect, if they could not walk or digest without having studied anatomy and physiology. Granting that the study of these sciences may not be without profit for the regulation of one's diet, we must undoubtedly credit the study of the forms of reason with an even more important influence on the correctness of thinking. But without going into this aspect of the matter which concerns the education of subjective thinking and therefore, strictly speaking, pedagogics, it must be admitted that the study which has for its subject matter the modes and laws of operation of reason, must in its own self be of the greatest interest—of an interest at least not inferior to an acquaintance with the laws of nature and of her particular forms. If it is not thought a small matter to have discovered some sixty species of parrots, one hundred and thirty-seven species of veronica, etc., much less ought it to be thought a small matter to discover the forms of reason; is not a figure of the syllogism something infinitely superior to a species of parrot or veronica?

Therefore, though contempt for the knowledge of the forms of reason must be regarded as sheer barbarism, equally we must admit that the ordinary presentation of the syllogism and its particular formations is not a *rational* cognition, not an exposition of them as *forms of reason*, and that syllogistic wisdom by its own worthlessness has brought upon itself the contempt which has been its lot. Its defect consists in its simply stopping short at the *understanding's*

form of the syllogism in which the Notion determinations are taken as *abstract*, formal terms. It is all the more inconsequent to cling to these determinations as abstract qualities, since in the syllogism it is their *relations* that constitute the essential feature, and inherence and subsumption already imply that the individual, because the universal inheres in it, is itself a universal, and the universal, because it subsumes the individual, is itself an individual; more exactly, the syllogism expressly posits this very *unity* as *middle term*, and its determination is precisely *mediation*, that is, the Notion determinations no longer, as in the judgement, have for basis their mutual externality, but rather their unity. It is thus the Notion of the syllogism that declares the imperfection of the formal syllogism in which the middle term is fixedly held, not as unity of the extremes but as a formal, abstract determination qualitatively distinct from them. The treatment is rendered still less meaningful by the fact that also relations or judgements in which even formal determinations become indifferent, as in negative and particular judgements, and which therefore approximate to propositions, are still regarded as perfect relationships. Now since the qualitative form *I–P–U* is generally accepted as the ultimate and absolute, the dialectical treatment of the syllogism no longer operates; the remaining syllogisms are consequently regarded not as *necessary alterations* of that first form but as *species*. In this case, it is indifferent whether the first formal syllogism itself is regarded only as a kind of species *alongside* the rest, or as *genus* and *species* at the same time; the latter occurs when the other syllogisms are reduced to the first. If this reduction is not expressly effected, yet the basis is always the same formal relationship of external subsumption expressed by the first figure.

This formal syllogism is the contradiction that the middle term which is supposed to be the determinate unity of the extremes does not appear as this unity but as a determination qualitatively distinct from those extremes whose unity it is supposed to be. Because the syllogism is this contradiction, it is in its own nature dialectical. Its dialectical movement exhibits it in each of the moments of the Notion, so that not only the above relationship of subsumption or particularity, but *equally essentially* negative unity and universality are moments in the union of the extremes. In so far as each of these by itself is equally only a one-sided moment of particularity, they are likewise imperfect middle terms,

but at the same time they constitute the developed determinations of the middle term; the entire course through the three figures presents the middle term in each of these determinations, and the true result that emerges from it is that the middle is not an individual Notion determination but the totality of them all.

The defect of the formal syllogism, therefore, does not lie in the *form of the syllogism*—on the contrary, this is the form of rationality—but in the fact that the form appears only as an *abstract* and therefore notionless form. It has been shown that the abstract determination, on account of its abstract relation-to-self, can equally be regarded as content; this being so, the formal syllogism merely serves to show that a relation of a subject to a predicate follows or does not follow *only from this middle term.* Nothing is gained in having proved a proposition by a syllogism of this kind; on account of the abstract determinateness of the middle term, which is a Notionless quality, other middle terms can just as well be given from which the opposite follows; in fact, from the same middle term opposite predicates may in turn be deduced by further syllogisms. Besides being of little service, the formal syllogism is also a very simple affair; the numerous rules which have been invented are tiresome not only because they contrast so strongly with the simple nature of the fact but also because they relate to cases where the formal worth of the syllogism is furthermore diminished by the external form determination, above all, particularity (especially as for this purpose it must be taken in a comprehensive sense), and where even in respect of form nothing but completely worthless results are deduced. However, the most merited and most important aspect of the disfavour into which syllogistic doctrine has fallen is that this doctrine is such a long-drawn out, notionless occupation with a subject matter whose sole content is the *Notion* itself. The numerous syllogistic rules remind one of the procedure of arithmeticians who similarly give a host of rules about arithmetical operations, all of which rules presuppose that one has not the *Notion* of the operation. But numbers are a notionless material and the operations of arithmetic are an external combining or separating of them, a mechanical procedure—indeed, calculating machines have been invented which perform these operations; whereas it is the harshest and most glaring of contradictions when the form determinations of the syllogism, which are Notions, are treated as a notionless material.

The extreme example of this irrational treatment of the Notion determinations of the syllogism is surely Leibniz's subjection of the syllogism to the calculus of combinations and permutations[1] and has reckoned thereby how many positions of the syllogism are possible—that is, with respect to the distinctions of positive and negative, of universal, particular, indeterminate and singular judgements; 2,048 such combinations are found to be possible of which, after the exclusion of the useless figures, twenty-four useful figures remain. Leibniz makes much of the usefulness of the analysis of combinations for ascertaining not only the forms of the syllogism but also the combinations of other concepts. The operation by which this is ascertained is the same as that by which it is calculated how many combinations of letters are possible in an alphabet, how many throws are possible in a game of dice, how many kinds of play with an ombre card, etc. Here therefore we find the determinations of the syllogism put in the same class with the points of the die and the ombre card, the rational is taken as a dead and non-rational thing, and the characteristic feature of the Notion and its determinations as spiritual essences *to relate themselves* and through this relating to *sublate* their *immediate* determination, is ignored. This Leibnizian application of the calculus of combinations and permutations to the syllogism and to the combination of other notions, differed from the notorious *Art of Lully*[2] solely in being more methodical on the *arithmetical* side, but for the rest, they were both equally meaningless. Connected with this was a pet idea of Leibniz, embraced by him in his youth, and in spite of its immaturity and shallowness not relinquished by him even in later life, the idea of a *characteristica universalis* of notions—a language of symbols in which each notion would be represented as a relation proceeding from others or in its relation to others—as though in rational combinations, which is essentially dialectical, a content still retained the same determinations *that it possesses when fixed in isolation.*

Ploucquet's[3] calculus has undoubtedly got hold of the most consistent method by which the relationship of the syllogism is made capable of being subjected to a calculus. It rests upon the

[1] *Opp. Tom. II*, p. 1.

[2] Raymundus Lullus, *c* 1232–1315: *Ars magna s. generalis*

[3] Ploucquet, Gottfried, 1716–1790: *Principia de Substantiis et Phaenomenis, Accedit Methodus Calculandi in Logicis Ab Ipso Inventa*, 1753.

abstraction from the difference of relationship, from the difference of individuality, particularity and universality in the judgement and upon strict adherence to the *abstract identity* of subject and predicate whereby they are in a *mathematical equality*—in a relation which converts the syllogizing process into a completely meaningless and tautological formulation of propositions. In the proposition: *the rose is red*, the predicate is not to denote red in general but only the specific *red of the rose*; in the proposition: *all Christians are men*, the predicate is to denote only those men who are Christians; from this proposition and the proposition: *the Jews are not Christians*, there follows the conclusion (which did not particularly commend this syllogistic calculus to Mendelssohn) *therefore the Jews are not men* (namely, not those men that the Christians are). Ploucquet states as a consequence of his discovery: '*posse etiam rudes mechanice totam logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur, ita quidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi torqueri, vel fallaciis circumveniri possint, si in calculo non errant.*' This recommendation, that by means of the calculus the whole of logic can be *mechanically* brought within reach of the uneducated, is surely the worst thing that can be said of a discovery bearing on the presentation of the science of logic.

B. THE SYLLOGISM OF REFLECTION

The course of the qualitative syllogism has sublated what was *abstract* in its terms with the result that the term has posited itself as a determinateness in which the other determinateness is also *reflected*. Besides the abstract terms, the syllogism also contains their *relation*, and in the conclusion this relation is posited as mediated and necessary; therefore each determinateness is in truth posited not as an individual, separate one, but as a relation to the other, as a *concrete* determinateness.

The middle term was abstract particularity, by itself a simple determinateness, and was a middle term only externally and relatively to the self-subsistent extremes. Now it is posited as the *totality* of the terms; as such it is the *posited* unity of the extremes, but in the first instance it is the unity of reflection which embraces them within itself—an inclusion which, as the *first* sublating of immediacy and the first relating of the terms, is not yet the absolute identity of the Notion.

The extremes are the determinations of the judgement of reflection, *individuality* proper and *universality* as a connective determination or a reflection embracing a manifold within itself. But the individual subject also contains, as we have seen in the case of the judgement of reflection, besides the bare individuality which belongs to form, determinateness as universality absolutely reflected into itself, as presupposed, that is here still immediately assumed, *genus*.

From this determinateness of the extremes which belongs to the progressive determination of the judgement, there results the precise content of the *middle term*, which is essentially the point of interest in the syllogism since it distinguishes syllogism from judgement. It contains (1) *individuality*, but (2) individuality extended to universality as *all*, (3) universality which forms the basis and absolutely unites within itself individuality and abstract universality—that is, *the genus*. It is in this way that the syllogism of reflection is the first to possess *genuine determinateness of form*, in that the middle term is *posited* as the totality of the terms; the immediate syllogism is by contrast *indeterminate*, because the middle term is still only abstract particularity in which the moments of its Notion are not yet posited. This first syllogism of reflection may be called *the syllogism of allness*.

(*a*) *The Syllogism of Allness*

1. The syllogism of allness is the syllogism of understanding in its perfection, but is as yet no more than that. That the middle term in it is not *abstract* particularity but is developed into its moments and is therefore concrete, is indeed an essential requirement for the Notion; but the form of *allness* so far only gathers the individual externally into universality, and conversely still preserves the individual in the universality as something possessing immediately a separate self-subsistence. The negation of the immediacy of the determinations which was the result of the syllogism of existence, is only the *first* negation, not yet the negation of the negation or absolute reflection into self. Therefore the single determinations still form the basis of the universality of reflection that embraces them within itself; in other words, allness is still not the universality of the Notion but the external universality of reflection.

The syllogism of existence was contingent because its middle term, as a single determinateness of the concrete subject, admits

of an indeterminable number of other such middle terms, and therefore the subject could be united in the syllogism with indeterminably different and even contradictory predicates. But since the middle term now contains *individuality* and is thereby itself concrete, it can only serve to connect the subject with a predicate which belongs to the subject as concrete. If for example from the middle term *green* it should be inferred that a picture was pleasing because green is pleasing to the eye, or that a poem or building was beautiful because it possessed *regularity*, the picture, etc., might all the same be ugly on account of other qualities from which this latter predicate could be inferred. On the other hand, since the middle term has the determination of *allness*, it contains the greenness or regularity as *a concrete*, which just for that reason is not the abstraction of something merely green or merely regular; with this *concrete* then only those predicates can be connected which conform to *the totality of the concrete* thing. In the judgement: what is green or regular is pleasing, the subject is only the abstraction of green or regularity; in the proposition: all green or regular things are pleasing, the subject is, on the contrary: all actual concrete objects that are green or regular—objects, therefore, which are taken as *concrete with all their properties* that they possess besides greenness or regularity.

2. But this very perfection of the syllogism of reflection makes it a mere delusion. The middle term has the determinateness '*all*'; to this is *immediately* attached in the major premiss the predicate that is united with the subject in the conclusion. But '*all*' are '*all individuals*'; therefore in the major premiss the individual subject already immediately possesses this predicate and *does not obtain it first through the syllogism.* Or to put it otherwise the subject obtains through the conclusion a predicate as a consequence; but the major premiss already contains this conclusion within it; *therefore the major premiss is not correct on its own account*, or is not an immediate, presupposed judgement, but *already presupposes the conclusion* whose ground it was supposed to be. In the favourite perfect syllogism:

All men are mortal
Now Gaius is a man
Therefore Gaius is mortal,

the major premiss is correct only because and in so far as the

conclusion is correct; if Gaius should chance to be not mortal, the major premiss would not be correct. The proposition which was supposed to be the conclusion must already be immediately correct on its own account, because otherwise the major premiss could not embrace all individuals; before the major premiss can pass as correct, there is the *prior* question whether the conclusion itself may not be an *instance* against it.

3. In the case of the syllogism of existence we found from the Notion of the syllogism that the premisses, as *immediate*, contradicted the conclusion, that is to say the *mediation* demanded by the Notion of the syllogism, and that the first syllogism therefore presupposed others and conversely these others presupposed it. In the syllogism of reflection, this is posited in the syllogism itself, namely, that the major premiss presupposes its conclusion, in that the former contains that connexion of the individual with a predicate which is supposed to appear only as conclusion.

What, then, we really have here may be expressed in the first instance by saying that the syllogism of reflection is only an external, empty *show of syllogizing*—hence that the essence of this syllogizing rests on subjective *individuality* and that therefore this latter constitutes the middle term and is to be posited as such—the individuality that is individuality as such and possesses universality only externally. We may also say that the precise content of the syllogism of reflection showed that the relation in which the individual stands to its predicate is *immediate*, not inferred, and that the major premiss, the connexion of a particular with a universal, or, more precisely, of a formal universal with an intrinsic universal, is mediated by the relation of individuality which is present in the former—of individuality as allness. But this is *the syllogism of induction.*

(*b*) *The Syllogism of Induction*

1. The syllogism of allness comes under the schema of the first figure, *I–P–U*; the syllogism of induction under that of the second, *U–I–P*, as it again has individuality for middle term, not *abstract* individuality but individuality as *complete*, namely, posited with its opposite determination, universality. *One extreme* is some predicate or other that is common to all these individuals; its relation to them constitutes the immediate premisses, of which

one, in the preceding syllogism was supposed to be the conclusion. The *other* extreme may be the immediate *genus* as it is found in the middle term of the preceding syllogism or in the subject of the universal judgement and which is exhausted in all the individuals or species collectively of the middle term. Accordingly the syllogism has the shape:

i
i
U– –P
i
i
ad
infinitum

2. The second figure of the formal syllogism *U–I–P* did not correspond to the schema, because *I* which constitutes the middle term was not the subsuming term or predicate. In induction this defect is eliminated; here the middle term is *all the individuals*; the proposition: *U–I*, which contains as subject the objective universal or genus separated off to form an extreme, has a predicate that is at least co-extensive with the subject, and consequently for external reflection is identical with it. Lion, elephant, and so on constitute the genus of quadruped; the difference, that the *same* content is posited once in individuality and again in universality, is accordingly a mere *indifferent determination of form*—an indifference which is the result of the formal syllogism posited in the syllogism of reflection, and here is posited through the equality of extension.

Induction, therefore, is not the syllogism of mere *perception* or of contingent existence, like the corresponding second figure, but the syllogism of *experience*—of the subjective taking together of the individuals into the genus and of the conjoining of the genus with a universal determinateness because this latter is found in all the individuals. It has also the objective significance that the immediate genus determines itself through the totality of individuality to a universal property, has its existence in a universal relationship or mark. But the objective significance of this, as of the other syllogisms, is at first only its inner Notion, and is not yet posited here.

3. On the contrary, induction is still essentially a subjective

syllogism. The middle terms are the individuals in their immediacy; the subjective taking together of them into the genus by means of allness is an *external* reflection. On account of the persistent *immediacy* of the individuals and their consequent *externality*, the universality is only completeness, or rather remains *a problem*. In induction, therefore, the *progress* into the spurious infinite once more makes its appearance; *individuality* is supposed to be posited as *identical* with *universality*, but since the *individuals* are no less posited as *immediate*, that unity remains only a perennial *ought-to-be*; it is a unity of *likeness*; those which are supposed to be identical are, at the same time, supposed *not* to be so. It is only when the *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e* are carried on to infinity that they constitute the genus and give the completed experience. The *conclusion* of induction thus remains *problematical*.

But induction, in expressing that perception in order to become experience *ought* to be carried on *to infinity*, presupposes that the genus is *in and for itself* united with its determinateness. Therefore, strictly speaking, it rather presupposes its conclusion as something immediate, just as the syllogism of allness presupposes the conclusion for one of its premisses. An experience that rests on induction is accepted as valid *although* the perception is admittedly *incomplete*; but the assumption that no *contradictory instance* of that experience can arise is only possible if the experience is true *in and for itself*. Thus the syllogism by induction, though indeed based on an immediacy, is not based on that immediacy on which it is supposed to be based, on the *merely affirmative* [*seiende*] immediacy of *individuality*, but on the immediacy which is *in and for itself*, the *universal* immediacy. The fundamental character of induction is that it is a syllogism; if individuality is taken as the essential, but universality as only the external, determination of the middle term, then the middle term would fall asunder into two unconnected parts and we should not have a syllogism; this externality belongs rather to the extremes. It is only as *immediately identical* with *universality* that *individuality* can be the middle term; such universality is properly *objective* universality, the *genus*. This may also be looked at in this way: universality is *external but essential* in the determination of individuality that forms the basis of the middle term of induction; but such an *external* is no less immediately its opposite, the *internal*. The truth of the syllogism of induction is, therefore, a syllogism that has for

its middle term an individuality that is immediately *in its own self* universality; this is the *syllogism of analogy*.

(*c*) *The Syllogism of Analogy*

1. This syllogism has for its abstract schema the third figure of the immediate syllogism *I–U–P*. But its middle term is no longer just any single quality, but universality that is the *reflection-into-self of a concrete*, and hence its *nature*; and conversely, because it is thus the universality of a concrete, it is at the same time in its own self this *concrete*. Here, then, the middle term is an individual but an individual taken in its universal nature; further, another individual forms an extreme possessing the same universal nature with the former. For example:

The *earth* is inhabited,
The moon is *an earth*,
Therefore the moon is inhabited.

2. Analogy is the more superficial, the more the universal in which the two individuals are one, and according to which one individual becomes the predicate of the other, is a mere *quality*, or (quality being taken subjectively) some *mark* or other, when the identity of the two therein is taken as a mere *similarity*. Superficiality of this kind, however, to which a form of understanding or reason is reduced by being degraded to the sphere of mere *representation*, should not find a place in logic at all. Also it is improper to represent the major premiss of this syllogism as though it should run: that which resembles an object in some characteristics resembles it in others also. By so doing, the *form of the syllogism* is expressed in the shape of a content, while the empirical content, the content properly so called, is relegated to the minor premiss. In this way the whole form, for example, of the first syllogism, could be expressed as its major premiss: *That which is subsumed under some other thing in which a third inheres, has also that third inherent in it: now* . . . , and so forth. But the importance of the syllogism itself does not depend on the empirical content, and to convert its own form into the content of a major premiss is no less a matter of indifference than to take any other empirical content for that purpose. But in so far as the importance of the syllogism of analogy does not depend on the former content which

contains nothing but the form peculiar to the syllogism, then the importance of the first syllogism would not depend on it either, that is to say, would not depend on that which makes the syllogism a syllogism. The main point always is the form of the syllogism, whether it have the form itself or something else for its empirical content. Thus the syllogism of analogy is a peculiar form, and it is quite futile not to regard it as such on the ground that its form can be converted into the content or matter of a major premiss, whereas logic is not concerned with the matter. What may lead to this misunderstanding in the case of the syllogism of analogy and perhaps also in the case of the syllogism of induction, is that in them the middle term and the extremes, too, are further determined than in the merely formal syllogism, and therefore the form determination, because it is no longer simple and abstract, must appear also as a *determination of content*. But the fact that the form determines itself to content in this way is in the first place a necessary advance of the formal element and therefore essentially concerns the nature of the syllogism; and therefore, secondly, a content determination of this kind cannot be regarded in the same way as any other empirical content, nor can abstraction be made from it.

When we consider the form of the syllogism of analogy in the above expression of its major premiss, which states that if two objects agree in one or more properties, then a property which one possesses also belongs to the other, it may seem that this syllogism contains *four terms*, the *quaternio terminorum*—a circumstance which entails the difficulty of bringing analogy into the form of a formal syllogism. There are *two* individuals, *thirdly*, a property immediately assumed as common, and *fourthly* the other property which one individual immediately possesses but which the other first obtains through the syllogism. This arises from the fact that, as we have seen, in the analogical syllogism the *middle term* is posited as individuality, but immediately *also* as the true universality of the latter. In *induction*, the middle term is, apart from the two extremes, an indeterminable number of individuals; in this syllogism therefore an infinite number of terms ought to be enumerated. In the syllogism of allness the universality in the middle term is so far merely the external form determination of allness; in the syllogism of analogy, on the contrary, it is essential universality. In the above example the middle term, *the earth*,

is taken as a concrete that in its truth is as much a universal nature or genus as an individual.

From this aspect, the *quaternio terminorum* would not render analogy an imperfect syllogism. Yet it does so from another aspect; for although one subject has the same universal nature as the other, it is undetermined whether the determinateness which is inferred for the second subject belongs to the first by virtue of its *nature* or by virtue of its *particularity*; whether for example the earth is inhabited as a heavenly body *in general*, or only as this *particular* heavenly body. Analogy is still a syllogism of reflection inasmuch as individuality and universality are *immediately* united in its middle term. On account of this immediacy, the *externality* of the unity of reflection is still with us; the individual is only *implicitly* the genus, it is not posited in that negativity by which its determinateness would be the determinateness proper to the genus itself. For this reason the predicate which belongs to the individual of the middle term is not already predicate of the other individual although both belong to the one genus.

3. *I–P* (the moon is inhabited) is the conclusion; but one premiss (the earth is inhabited) is likewise *I–P*; inasmuch as *I–P* is supposed to be a conclusion it involves the demand that the said premiss shall be one also. Hence this syllogism is in its own self the demand for itself to counter the immediacy which it contains, in other words it presupposes its conclusion. A syllogism of existence has its presupposition in the *other* syllogisms of existence; in the case of the syllogisms just considered the presupposition has been placed within them, because they are syllogisms of reflection. Since then the syllogism of analogy is the demand for its own mediation against the immediacy with which its mediation is burdened, it is the moment of *individuality* whose sublation it demands. Thus there remains for middle term the objective universal, the *genus*, purged of immediacy. In the syllogism of analogy the genus was a moment of the middle term only as an *immediate presupposition*; since the syllogism itself demands the sublation of the presupposed immediacy, the negation of the individuality, and consequently the universal, is no longer immediate, but *posited*. The syllogism of reflection contained only the *first* negation of immediacy; now the second has appeared, and with it the external universality of reflection is determined into universality in and for itself. Regarded from the positive side the con-

clusion shows itself to be identical with the premiss, the mediation as having coincided with its presupposition; thus there is an identity of the universality of reflection by which it has become a higher universality.

Looking over the course of the syllogisms of reflection, we see that the mediation is in general the *posited* or *concrete* unity of the form determinations of the extremes; the reflection consists in this positing of one determination in the other; thus the mediating element is *allness*. But *individuality* appears as the essential ground of allness and universality only as an external determination in it, as *completeness*. But universality is *essential* to the individual if it is to be a middle term that unites; the individual is therefore to be taken as *in itself* a universal. But the individual is not united with universality in this merely positive manner but is sublated in it and a negative moment; thus the universal is that whose essential being has become actual, the posited genus, and the individual as immediate is rather the externality of the genus, or it is an *extreme*. The syllogism of reflection taken in general comes under the schema *P–I–U*, in which the individual is still as such the essential determination of the middle term; but in that its immediacy has sublated itself, and the middle term has determined itself as the universality that is in and for itself, the syllogism has entered under the formal schema *I–U–P*, and the syllogism of reflection has passed over into the *syllogism of necessity*.

C. THE SYLLOGISM OF NECESSITY

The mediating element has now determined itself (1) as *simple* determinate universality, like the particularity in the syllogism of existence, but (2) as *objective* universality, that is to say, universality which contains the entire determinateness of the distinguished extremes like the allness of the syllogism of reflection, a *fulfilled* yet *simple* universality—the *universal nature* of the fact, the *genus*.

This syllogism is *pregnant with content*, because the *abstract* middle term of the syllogism of existence posited itself as *determinate difference* to become the middle term of the syllogism of reflection, while this difference has reflected itself into simple identity again. This syllogism is therefore the syllogism of *necessity*, for its middle term is not some alien immediate content, but the reflection-into-self of the determinateness of the extremes.

These possess in the middle term their inner identity, the determinations of whose content are the form determinations of the extremes. Consequently, that which differentiates the terms appears as an *external* and *unessential* form, and the terms themselves as moments of *a necessary* existence.

In the first instance this syllogism is immediate, and thus formal in so far as the *connexion* of the terms is the *essential nature* as *content*, and this content is present in the distinguished terms in only a *diverse form*, and the extremes by themselves are merely an *unessential* subsistence. The realization of this syllogism has so to determine it that the *extremes* also shall be posited as this *totality* which initially the middle term is, and that the *necessity* of the relation which is at first only the substantial *content*, shall be a relation of the *posited form*.

(*a*) *The Categorical Syllogism*

1. The categorical syllogism has the categorical judgement for one or both of its premisses. Here, with this syllogism, as with the judgement, is associated the more specific significance that its middle term is *objective universality*. Superficially the categorical syllogism too is taken for nothing more than a mere syllogism of inherence.

The categorical syllogism in its substantial significance is the *first syllogism of necessity*, in which a subject is united with a predicate through *its substance*. But substance raised into the sphere of the Notion is the universal, posited as being in and for itself in such a manner that it has for the form or mode of its being, not accidentality, which is the relationship peculiar to substance, but the Notion-determination. Its differences are therefore the extremes of the syllogism and, precisely, universality and individuality. The former, in contrast to the *genus*, which is the precise determination of the *middle term*, is abstract universality or universal determinateness—the accidentality of substance gathered into simple determinateness which however is its essential difference, *specific difference*. But individuality is the actual, in itself the concrete unity of genus and determinateness; here, however, in the immediate syllogism it appears at first as immediate individuality, accidentally gathered into the form of a subsistence *on its own*. The relation of this extreme to the middle term constitutes a categorical judgement; but since the other extreme, too, according

to the above-stated determination, expresses the specific difference of the genus or its determinate principle, this other premiss is also categorical.

2. This syllogism, as the first and therefore immediate syllogism of necessity, comes in the first instance under the schema of the first formal syllogism *I–P–U*. But as the middle term is the essential *nature* of the individual and not *just any* of its determinatenesses or properties, and as, similarly, the extreme of universality is not just any abstract universal nor again merely a single quality, but the universal determinateness, the *specific principle of difference*, the subject is no longer contingently united through the syllogism with *any quality* through *any* middle term. Consequently, as the relations too of the extremes to the middle term have not that external immediacy which they had in the syllogism of existence, the demand for proof, which occurred in the latter and led to the infinite progress, does not arise.

Further, this syllogism does not, as does a syllogism of reflection, presuppose its conclusion for its premisses. The terms, in keeping with their substantial content, stand in a relation to one another which is *in and for itself* identical; we have here *one* essential nature pervading the three terms, a nature in which the determinations of individuality, particularity and universality are merely *formal* moments.

To this extent therefore the categorical syllogism is no longer subjective; in the above identity, objectivity begins; the middle term is the pregnant identity of its extremes which are contained therein in their self-subsistence, for their self-subsistence is the above substantial universality, the genus. The subjective element of the syllogism consists in the indifferent subsistence of the extremes relatively to the Notion or middle term.

3. But this syllogism still continues to be subjective, in that the said identity is still the substantial identity or *content*, but is still not at the same time *identity of form*. Consequently, the identity of the Notion is still an *inner* bond of union, and therefore as relation is still *necessity*; the universality of the middle term is substantial, *positive* identity, but is not equally the *negativity of its extremes*.

More precisely, the immediacy of this syllogism, which immediacy is not yet *posited* as that which it is *in itself*, is present in the following manner. What is really immediate in the syllogism

is the *individual.* This is subsumed under its genus as middle term; but under the same genus come also an *indefinite number* of other individuals; it is therefore *contingent* that only *this* individual is posited as subsumed under it. But further, this contingency does not merely belong to the external reflection which finds the individual posited in the syllogism to be contingent by *comparison* with others; on the contrary, it is because the individual itself is related to the middle term as to its objective universality that it is posited as *contingent*, as a subjective actuality. On the other hand, in that the subject is an *immediate* individual, it contains determinations which are not contained in the middle term as the universal nature; therefore it also has a specific nature of its own indifferent to the middle term and possessing a content peculiar to itself. Hence, conversely, this other term also has an indifferent immediacy and an Existence distinct from the former. The same relationship also obtains between the middle term and the other extreme; for this likewise has the determination of immediacy and hence of a being that is contingent relatively to its middle term.

Accordingly, what is posited in the categorical syllogism is on the one hand extremes standing in such a relationship to the middle term that they possess *in themselves* objective universality or a self-subsistent nature, and at the same time appear as immediate terms and therefore as mutually *indifferent actualities.* But on the other hand they are equally determined as *contingent*, that is to say, their immediacy is *sublated* in their identity. But by reason of the said self-subsistence and totality of the actuality, this identity is only formal and inner; the syllogism of necessity has hereby determined itself to the *hypothetical syllogism.*

(b) The Hypothetical Syllogism

1. The hypothetical judgement contains only the necessary *relation* without the immediacy of the related terms. 'If *A* is, then *B* is'; or, the being of *A* is equally the being *of another*, of *B*; so far, it is not stated either that *A is*, or that *B is*. The hypothetical syllogism adds this *immediacy* of being:

If *A* is, then *B* is,
But *A is*,
Therefore *B* is.

The minor premiss by itself enunciates the immediate being of *A*.

But it is not only this that is added to the judgement. The syllogism contains the relation of subject and predicate, not as the abstract copula, but as the pregnant *mediating* unity. Accordingly, the being of *A* is to be taken *not as a mere immediacy*, but essentially as the *middle term of the syllogism*. This is to be examined more closely.

2. In the first place, the relation of the hypothetical judgement is *necessity* or inner *substantial identity* associated with external diversity of Existence, or mutual indifference of being in the sphere of Appearance—an identical *content* which forms the internal basis. The two sides of the judgement therefore do not appear as an immediate being but as a being held within the necessity and thus at the same time as *sublated* being or being only in the sphere of Appearance. Further, as sides of the judgement they stand to one another as *universality* and *individuality*; one of them, therefore, is the above content as *totality of conditions*, the other as *actuality*. It is, however, indifferent which side is taken as universality and which as individuality. That is to say, in so far as the conditions are still the *inner*, *abstract* side of an actuality, they are the *universal*, and it is through their being *gathered together into an individuality* that they enter into *actuality*. Conversely, the conditions are a *separated*, *scattered* Appearance which only in *actuality* obtains *unity* and significance and a *universally valid existence*.

The precise relation between the two sides that has here been assumed as the relation of condition and conditioned, may however also be taken as that of cause and effect, of ground and consequent—here this is indifferent; but the relation of condition corresponds more closely to the relation that obtains in the hypothetical judgement and syllogism, inasmuch as condition appears essentially as an indifferent Existence, whereas ground and cause are spontaneously transitive [*übergehend*]; also condition is a more universal determination in that it comprehends both sides of the above relations, since effect, consequent, etc., is just as much condition of the cause, ground, etc., as the latter are of the former.

Now *A* is the *mediating* being in so far as first it is an immediate being, an indifferent actuality, and secondly, in so far as it is no

less an *intrinsically contingent*, self-sublating being. What translates the conditions into the actuality of the new shape whose conditions they are is the fact that they are not being in its abstract immediacy, but *being in its Notion*, in the first instance, *becoming*; but as the Notion is no longer transition they are more specifically *individuality* as self-related *negative* unity. The conditions are a scattered material that waits and demands to be used; this *negativity* is the mediating element, the free unity of the Notion. It determines itself as *activity*, since this middle term is the contradiction of the *objective universality* or the totality of the identical content, and the *indifferent immediacy*. This middle term is therefore no longer merely an inner necessity, but a *necessity* that *is*; the objective universality contains self-relation as a *simple immediacy*, as being; in the categorical syllogism this moment is in the first instance a determination of the extremes, but as against the objective universality of the middle term it determines itself as *contingency*, consequently, as something only *posited* and also sublated, that is, as something withdrawn into the Notion or into the middle term as unity, which middle term itself in its objectivity is now also being.

The conclusion, 'therefore *B* is', expresses the same contradiction, that *B* is in the form of *immediate* being, but equally has its being through an other, or is *mediated*. In respect of its form, therefore, it is the same Notion that the middle term is, distinguished from *necessity* only as the *necessary*—in the wholly superficial form of individuality as against universality. The absolute *content* of *A* and *B* is the same; they are only two different names for the same underlying fact for *ordinary thinking* [*Vorstellung*] which clings to the appearance of the diversified shape of determinate being and distinguishes between the necessary and its necessity; but in so far as this necessity were to be separated from *B*, *B* would not be the necessary. Thus we have here the identity of the *mediating* and the *mediated*.

3. The hypothetical syllogism in the first instance exhibits *necessary relation* as connexion through the *form* or *negative unity*, just as the categorical syllogism exhibits through the positive unity, substantial *content*, objective universality. But *necessity* collapses into the *necessary*; the *form-activity* of translating the conditioning into the conditioned actuality is *in itself* the unity in which the determinatenesses of the opposition, that previously

were liberated into an indifferent determinate existence, are *sublated*, and the difference of *A* and *B* is an empty name. Thus it is a unity reflected into itself—hence an *identical* content; and it is so not merely *implicitly* but it is also *posited* as such through this syllogism, in that the being of *A* is also not its own but *B*'s, and *vice versa*, and in general the being of one is the being of the other, and in the conclusion the immediate being or indifferent determinateness appears specifically as mediated; the externality of the determinatenesses has therefore sublated itself and *their unity into which they have withdrawn is posited.*

The mediation of the syllogism has hereby determined itself as *individuality*, *immediacy*, and as *self-related negativity*, or as an identity that differentiates itself and gathers itself into itself out of that difference—as absolute form, and for that very reason as objective *universality*, a *content* that is identical with itself. The syllogism in this determination is the *disjunctive syllogism.*

(*c*) *The Disjunctive Syllogism*

As the hypothetical syllogism in general comes under the schema of the second figure of the formal syllogism, *U–I–P*, so the disjunctive syllogism comes under the schema of the third figure, *I–U–P*. But the middle term is the *universality* that is *pregnant with form*; it has determined itself as *totality*, as *developed* objective universality. Consequently the middle term is not only universality but also particularity and individuality. As universality it is first the substantial identity of the genus; but secondly an identity that *embraces within itself particularity*, but a particularity *co-extensive with this identity of the genus*; it is therefore the universal sphere that contains its total particularization—the genus disjoined into its species: *A* that is *B and C and D*. But particularization is differentiation and as such is just as much the *either-or* of *B*, *C* and *D*, the *negative* unity, the *reciprocal* exclusion of the terms. Further, this exclusion is not merely a reciprocal exclusion, or the determination merely a relative one, but it is just as essentially a *self-related* determination, the particular as *individuality* to the exclusion of the *others.*

A is either *B* or *C* or *D*,
But *A* is *B*,
Therefore *A* is neither *C* nor *D*.

or again:

A is either *B* or *C* or *D*,
But *A* is neither *C* nor *D*,
Therefore *A* is *B*.

A is subject not only in the two premisses but also in the conclusion. In the first premiss it is a universal, and in its predicate, the *universal* sphere particularized into the totality of its species; in the second premiss it appears as *determinate* or as a species; in the conclusion it is posited as the exclusive, *individual* determinateness. Or again, it already appears in the minor premiss as exclusive individuality and is positively posited in the conclusion as the determinate which it is.

Hence what appears in general as *mediated* is the *universality* of *A* with *individuality*. But the *mediating* factor is this *A*, which is the *universal* sphere of its particularizations and is determined as an *individual*. Consequently the truth of the hypothetical syllogism, namely the unity of the mediating and the mediated, is *posited* in the disjunctive syllogism, which for this reason is equally *no longer a syllogism* at all. For the middle term, which is posited in it as the totality of the Notion, contains itself the two extremes in their complete determinateness. The extremes, in distinction from this middle term, appear only as a positedness which no longer possesses any determinateness peculiar to itself as against the middle term.

Considering this point further with more particular reference to the hypothetical syllogism, we see that in the latter we had a *substantial identity* as the *inner* bond of necessity, and a *negative unity* distinguished therefrom—namely, the activity or form which translated one existence into another. The disjunctive syllogism is in general in the determination of *universality*; its middle term is the *A* as *genus* and as perfectly *determinate*; through this unity, that content which previously was inner is also *posited* and, conversely, the positedness or form is not the external, negative unity over against an indifferent existence, but is identical with the said substantial content. The whole form determination of the Notion is posited in its determinate difference and at the same time in the simple identity of the Notion.

In this way then the *formalism of the syllogistic process*, and with it the subjectivity of the syllogism and of the Notion in general,

has sublated itself. This formal or subjective side consisted in the fact that the mediating factor of the extremes is the Notion as an *abstract* determination, and this latter is *distinct* from the extremes whose unity it is. In the consummation of the syllogism, on the other hand, where objective universality is no less posited as totality of the form determinations, the distinction of mediating and mediated has disappeared. That which is mediated is itself an essential moment of what mediates it, and each moment appears as the totality of what is mediated.

The figures of the syllogism exhibit each determinateness of the Notion *individually* as the middle term, which at the same time is the Notion as an *ought-to-be*, a demand that the mediating factor shall be the Notion's totality. But the different genera of the syllogism exhibit the stages of *impregnation* or concretion of the middle term. In the formal syllogism the middle term is only posited as totality by all the determinatenesses, though each *singly*, functioning as the mediating factor. In the syllogisms of reflection the middle term appears as the unity that gathers together *externally* the determinations of the extremes. In the syllogism of necessity it has likewise determined itself to the unity that is no less developed and total than simple, and the form of the syllogism which consisted in the difference of the middle term from its extremes has thereby sublated itself.

Thus the Notion as such has been realized; more exactly, it has obtained a reality that is *objectivity*. The *first reality* was that the *Notion*, as within itself negative unity, sunders itself, and as *judgement* posits its determinations in a determinate and indifferent difference, and in the syllogism sets itself in opposition to them. In this way it is still the inwardness of this its externality, but the outcome of the course of the syllogisms is that this externality is equated with the inner unity; the various determinations return into this unity through the mediation in which at first they are united only in a third term, and thus the externality exhibits in its own self the Notion, which therefore is no longer distinguished from it as an inner unity.

However, this determination of the Notion which has been considered as *reality*, is, conversely, equally a *positedness*. For it is not only in this result that the truth of the Notion has exhibited itself as the identity of its inwardness and externality; already in the judgement the moments of the Notion remain, even in their

mutual indifference, determinations that have their significance only in their relation. The syllogism is *mediation*, the complete Notion in its *positedness*. Its movement is the sublating of this mediation, in which nothing is in and for itself, but each term *is* only by means of an other. The result is therefore an *immediacy* which has issued from the *sublating of the mediation*, a *being* which is no less identical with the mediation, and which is the Notion that has restored itself out of, and in, its otherness. This *being* is therefore a *fact* [*eine Sache*] that is *in and for itself—objectivity*.

Section Two: Objectivity

In Book One of the Objective Logic, abstract *being* was exhibited as passing over into *determinate being*, but equally as withdrawing into essence. In Book Two, essence reveals itself as determining itself into *ground*, thereby entering into *Existence* and realizing itself as *substance*, but again withdrawing into the *Notion*. Of the Notion, now, we have shown to begin with that it determines itself into *objectivity*. It is self-evident that this latter transition is identical in character with what formerly appeared in *metaphysics* as the *inference* from the *notion*, namely, the *notion of God*, to *his existence*, or as the so-called *ontological proof* of the *existence of God*. It is equally well known that Descartes' sublimest thought, that God is that *whose notion includes within itself its being*, after being degreaded into the defective form of the formal syllogism, that is, into the form of the said proof, finally succumbed to the *Critique of Reason* and to the thought that *existence cannot be extracted from the notion*. Some points connected with this proof have already been elucidated. In Vol. I, pp. 86 sqq., where *being* has vanished in its immediate opposite, *non-being*, and *becoming* has shown itself as the truth of both, attention was drawn to the confusion that arises when, in the case of a particular determinate being, what is fixed on is not the *being* of that determinate being but its *determinate content*; then, comparing *this determinnte content*, for example a hundred dollars, with another *determinate content*, for example, with the context of my perception or the state of my finances, it is found that it makes a difference whether the former content is added to the latter or not—and it is imagined that what has been discussed is the difference between being and non-being, or even the difference between being and the Notion. Further, in the same Vol., p.112 and Vol. II, p.442 we elucidated a determination that occurs in the ontological proof, that of *a sum-total of all realities*. But the essential subject matter of that proof, *the connexion of the Notion and determinate being*, is the concern of our consideration of the *Notion* just concluded, and the entire course through which the Notion determines itself into *objectivity*. The Notion, as absolutely self-identical negativity, is self-determining; we have remarked that the Notion, in determining itself into *judgement* in individuality, is already positing

itself as something *real*, something that *is*; this still abstract reality completes itself in *objectivity*.

Now though it might seem that the transition from the Notion into objectivity is not the same thing as the transition from the Notion of God to his existence, it should be borne in mind on the one hand that the determinate *content*, God, makes no difference in the logical process, and the ontological proof is merely an application of this logical process to the said content. On the other hand however it is essential to bear in mind the remark made above that the subject only obtains determinateness and content in its predicate; until then, no matter what it may be for feeling, intuition and pictorial thinking, for rational cognition it is only a *name*; but in the predicate with its determinateness there begins, at the same time, *realization* in general. The predicates, however, must be grasped as themselves still included within the Notion, hence as something subjective, which so far has not emerged into existence; to this extent we must admit on the one hand that the *realization* of the Notion in the judgement is still not complete. On the other hand however the mere determination of an object by predicates, when that determination is not at the same time the realization and objectifying of the Notion, also remains something so subjective that it is not even the genuine cognition and *determination of the Notion* of the object—subjective in the sense of abstract reflection and uncomprehended pictorial thinking. God, as the living God, and still more as absolute spirit, is known only in his *activity*; man was early instructed to recognize God in his *works*; only from these can proceed the *determinations*, which are called his properties, and in which, too, his *being* is contained. Thus the philosophical [*begreifende*] cognition of his *activity*, that is, of himself, grasps the *Notion* of God in his *being* and his being in his Notion. *Being* merely as such, or even *determinate being*, is such a meagre and restricted determination, that the difficulty of finding it in the Notion may well be the result of not having considered what being or determinate being itself is. *Being* as the wholly *abstract, immediate relation to self*, is nothing else than the abstract moment of the Notion, which moment is abstract universality. This universality also effects what one demands of being, namely, to be *outside* the Notion; for though this universality is moment of the Notion, it is equally the difference, or abstract judgement, of the Notion in which it opposes itself to itself.

The Notion, even as formal, already immediately contains *being* in a *truer* and *richer* form, in that, as self-related negativity, it is *individuality*.

But of course the difficulty of finding *being* in the Notion as such and equally in the Notion of God, becomes insuperable when the being is supposed to be that which obtains *in the context of outer experience* or *in the form of sensuous perception, like the hundred dollars in my finances*, something to be grasped with the hand, not with the mind, something visible essentially to the outer, not to the inner eye; in other words, when that being which things possess as sensuous, temporal and perishable, is given the name of reality or truth. A philosophizing that in its view of being does not rise above sense, naturally stops short at merely abstract thought, too, in its view of the Notion; such thought stands opposed to being.

The custom of regarding the Notion merely as something one-sided, such as abstract thought is, will already hinder the acceptance of what was suggested above, namely, to regard the transition from the *Notion of God* to his *being*, as an *application* of the logical course of objectification of the Notion presented above. Yet if it is granted, as it commonly is, that the logical element as the formal element constitutes the form for the cognition of every determinate content, then the above relation must at least be conceded, unless in this opposition between Notion and objectivity, one stops short at the untrue Notion and an equally untrue reality, as something ultimate. But in the exposition *of the pure Notion*, it was further made clear that this is the absolute, divine Notion itself, so that in truth the relationship of our *application* would not obtain, and the logical process in question would in fact be the immediate exposition of God's self-determination to being. But on this point it is to be remarked that if the Notion is to be presented as the Notion of God, it is to be apprehended as it is when taken up into the *Idea*. This pure Notion passes through the finite forms of the judgement and syllogism because it is not yet posited as in its own nature explicitly one with objectivity but is grasped only in process of becoming it. Similarly this objectivity, too, is not yet the divine existence, is not yet the reality that is reflected in the divine Idea. Yet objectivity is just that much richer and higher than the *being or existence* of the ontological proof, as the pure Notion is richer and higher than that metaphysical void of the *sum total of all reality*. But I reserve for another occasion the more

detailed elucidation of the manifold misunderstanding that has been brought by logical formalism into the ontological, as well as the other, so-called proofs of God's existence, as also the Kantian criticism of them, and by establishing their true significance, to restore the fundamental thoughts of these proofs to their worth and dignity.

As previously remarked, we have already met with several forms of immediacy, though in different determinations. In the sphere of being immediacy is being itself and determinate being; in the sphere of essence it is existence, and then actuality and substantiality; in the sphere of the Notion, besides immediacy as abstract universality, there is now objectivity. When the exactitude of philosophical distinctions of the Notion is not involved, these expressions may be used as synonymous; but the determinations mentioned have issued from the necessity of the Notion. *Being* is in general the *first* immediacy, and *determinate being* is the same *plus* the first determinateness. *Existence*, along with things, is the immediacy that issues from the *ground*—from the self-sublating mediation of the simple reflection of essence. But *actuality* and *substantiality* is the immediacy that has issued from the sublated difference of the still unessential Existence as Appearance and its essentiality. Finally, *objectivity* is the immediacy to which the Notion determines itself by the sublation of its abstraction and mediation. Philosophy has the right to select from the language of common life which is made for the world of pictorial thinking, such expressions as *seem to approximate* to the determinations of the Notion. There cannot be any question of *demonstrating* for a word selected from the language of common life that in common life, too, one associates with it the same Notion for which philosophy employs it; for common life has no Notions, but only pictorial thoughts and general ideas, and to recognize the Notion in what is else a mere general idea is philosophy itself. It must suffice therefore if pictorial thinking, in the use of its expressions that are employed for philosophical determinations, has before it some vague idea of their distinctive meaning; just as it may be the case that in these expressions one recognizes nuances of pictorial thought that are more closely related to the corresponding Notions. One will be less ready, perhaps, to admit that something can *be* without *existing*; but at least, one will hardly use '*being*' as copula of the judgement as interchangeable with the expression

'to exist' and say, 'this article *exists* dear, suitable, etc.', 'gold *exists* a metal or metallic', instead of 'this article *is* dear, suitable, etc.', 'gold *is* a metal or metallic'.[1] And surely it is usual to distinguish between *being* and *appearing*, *appearance* and *actuality*, as well as to distinguish mere *being* from *actuality*, and still more all these expressions from *objectivity*. However, even should they be employed synonymously, philosophy will in any case be free to utilize such empty superfluity of language for its distinctions.

When treating of the apodeictic judgement—the consummation of the judgement—where the subject loses its determinateness as against the predicate, we referred to the twofold meaning of *subjectivity* originating therefrom, namely, the subjectivity of the Notion, and equally of the externality and contingency opposed to the Notion. A similar twofold meaning also appears for objectivity which stands *opposed* to the self-subsistent *Notion*, yet is also the *being that is in and for itself*. In the former sense, the object stands opposed to the $I = I$ which in subjective idealism is enunciated as the absolutely true; in that case it is the manifold world in its immediate existence with which the ego or the Notion only engages in never-ending struggle, in order, by the negation of the *intrinsic nullity* of this other, to give to the first certainty of self the *actual truth* of its equality with itself. In a less specific sense it denotes an object in general for any interest or activity of the subject.

But in the opposite sense, objectivity signifies that which is *in and for itself*, and free from limitation and opposition. Rational principles, perfect works of art, etc., are called *objective* in so far as they are free and above all contingency. Although rational, theoretical or ethical principles belong only to subjectivity, to consciousness, yet that element in the latter that is in and for itself is called objective; the cognition of truth is placed in cognizing the object as object, free from anything added by subjective reflection, and right conduct in the obedience to objective laws that are not subjective in origin and admit no caprice and no treatment that might overthrow their necessity.

At the present standpoint of our exposition objectivity signifies,

[1] In a French report where the officer in command states that he was waiting for the wind, which usually rose near the island towards morning, to steer to shore, the expression occurs: *le vent ayant été longtemps sans exister*; here the distinction has arisen merely from the other common idiom, for example, *'il a été longtemps sans m'écrire'*.

in the first instance, *the absolute being of the Notion*, that is, the Notion that has sublated the *mediation* posited in its self-determination and converted it into *immediate* relation-to-self. Consequently this immediacy is itself immediately and wholly pervaded by the Notion, just as the Notion's totality is immediately identical with its being. But since, further, the Notion has equally to restore the free being-for-self of its subjectivity, there arises a relationship between the Notion as *end* and objectivity. In this relationship the immediacy of the objectivity becomes the negative element over against the end, an element to be determined by the activity of the end; this immediacy thus acquires the other significance, that of being in and for itself null in so far as it stands opposed to the Notion.

First, then, objectivity is an immediacy whose moments, by virtue of the totality of all the moments, exist in a self-subsistent indifference as *objects outside one another*, and in their relationship possess the *subjective unity* of the Notion only as an *inner* or an *outer* unity. This is *mechanism*.

But secondly, this unity reveals itself as the immanent law of the objects themselves, and thus their relationship becomes their *peculiar* specific difference founded on their law; it becomes a relation in which their determinate self-subsistence sublates itself. This is *chemism*.

Thirdly, this essential unity of the objects is thereby posited as distinct from their self-subsistence; it is the subjective Notion, but posited as in and for itself related to objectivity, as *end*. This is *teleology*.

Since the end is the Notion that is posited as in its own self relating itself to objectivity and as sublating by its own act its defect of being subjective, the purposiveness which is at first *external* becomes, through the realization of the end, *internal* and the *Idea*.

CHAPTER I

MECHANISM

As objectivity is the totality of the Notion withdrawn into its unity, an immediate is thereby posited that is in and for itself this totality, and is also *posited* as such, although in it the negative unity of the Notion has not as yet detached itself from the immediacy of this totality; in other words, objectivity is not yet posited as *judgement*. In so far as it has the Notion immanent in it, it contains the difference of the Notion, but on account of the objective totality, the differentiated moments are *complete* and *self-subsistent objects* which consequently, even in their relation, stand to one another only as *self-subsistent* things and remain *external* to one another in every combination. This is what constitutes the character of *mechanism*, namely, that whatever relation obtains between the things combined, this relation is one *extraneous* to them that does not concern their nature at all, and even if it is accompanied by a semblance of unity it remains nothing more than *composition*, *mixture*, *aggregation* and the like. *Spiritual* mechanism also, like *material*, consists in this, that the things related in the spirit remain external to one another and to spirit itself. A *mechanical style of thinking*, *a mechanical memory*, *habit*, *a mechanical way of acting*, signify that the peculiar pervasion and presence of spirit is lacking in what spirit apprehends or does. Although its theoretical or practical mechanism cannot take place without its self-activity, without an impulse and consciousness, yet there is lacking in it the freedom of individuality, and because this freedom is not manifest in it such action appears as a merely external one.

A. THE MECHANICAL OBJECT

The object is, as we have seen, the *syllogism*, whose mediation has been sublated [*ausgeglichen*] and has therefore become an immediate identity. It is therefore in and for itself a universal—universality not in the sense of a community of properties, but a universality that pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality.

1. In the first place therefore the object does not differentiate itself into *matter* and *form*—a matter as the self-subsistent universal side of the object and a form as the particular and individual side; such an abstract difference of individuality and universality is excluded by the Notion of object; if it is regarded as matter it must be taken as in principle formed matter. Similarly, it may be defined as a thing with properties, as a whole consisting of parts, as a substance with accidents, or in terms of other relationships of reflection; but these relationships have been altogether superseded already in the Notion; the object therefore has neither properties nor accidents, for these are separable from the thing or the substance, whereas in the object the particularity is absolutely reflected into the totality. In the parts of a whole, there is indeed present that self-subsistence which belongs to the differences of the object, but these differences are themselves directly and essentially objects, totalities, that are not, like parts, determined as such in contrast to the whole.

The object is therefore in the first instance *indeterminate*, in so far as it has no determinate opposition in it; for it is the mediation that has collapsed into immediate identity. In so far as the *Notion is essentially determinate*, the object possesses determinateness as a *manifoldness* which though complete is otherwise *indeterminate*, that is, *contains no relationships*, and which constitutes a totality that at first is similarly no further determined; *sides* or *parts* that may be distinguished in it belong to an external reflection. This quite indeterminate difference therefore means only that there are a *number* of objects, each of which only contains its determinateness reflected into its universality and does not reflect itself *outwards*. Because this indeterminate determinateness is essential to the object, the latter is within itself a *plurality* of this kind, and must therefore be regarded as a *composite* or *aggregate*. It does not however consist of *atoms*, for these are not objects because they are not totalities. The Leibnizian *monad* would be more of an object since it is a total representation of the world, but confined within its *intensive subjectivity* it is supposed at least to be essentially *one* within itself. Nevertheless, the monad determined as an *exclusive one* is only a principle that *reflection assumes*. Yet the monad is an object, partly in that the ground of its manifold representations—of the developed, that is, the *posited* determinations of its merely *implicit* totality—lies *outside it*, and partly also

in that it is indifferent to the monad that it constitutes an object *along with others*; it is thus in fact not *exclusive* or *determined for itself*.

2. As the object, then, in its determined being is a totality and yet on account of its indeterminateness and immediacy is not the *negative unity* of that determined being, it is *indifferent* to the *determinations* as *individual*, as determined in and for themselves, just as these latter are themselves *indifferent* to one another. These, therefore, are not comprehensible from it nor from one another; its totality is the form of general reflectedness of its manifoldness into individuality in general which is in its own self indeterminate. The determinatenesses, therefore, that it contains, do indeed belong to it, but the *form* that constitutes their difference and combines them into a unity is an external, indifferent one; whether it be a *mixture*, or again an *order*, a certain *arrangement* of parts and sides, all these are combinations that are indifferent to what is so related.

Thus the object, like any determinate being in general, has the determinateness of its totality *outside it* in *other* objects, and these in turn have theirs *outside them*, and so on to infinity. The return-into-self of this progression to infinity must indeed likewise be assumed and represented as a *totality*, a *world*; but that world is nothing but the universality that is confined within itself by indeterminate individuality, that is, a *universe*.

The object, therefore, being in its determinateness equally indifferent to it, it is the object's own nature that points it *outside and beyond itself* to other objects for its determination; but to these others, their *determinant function* is similarly a *matter of indifference*. Consequently, a principle of self-determination is nowhere to be found; *determinism*—the standpoint occupied by cognition when it takes the object, just as we have found it here, to be the truth—assigns for each determination of the object that of another object; but this other is likewise indifferent both to its being determined and to its active determining. For this reason determinism itself is also indeterminate in the sense that it involves the progression to infinity; it can halt and be satisfied at any point at will, because the object it has reached in its progress, being a formal totality, is shut up within itself and indifferent to its being determined by another. Consequently, the *explanation* of the determination of an object and the progressive determining of the object made for the

purpose of the explanation, is only an *empty word*, since in the other object to which it advances there resides no self-determination.

3. Now as the determinateness of an object *lies in an other*, no determinate difference is to be found between them; the determinateness is merely *doubled*, once in one object and again in the other, something utterly *identical*, so that the explanation or comprehension is *tautological*. This tautology is an external futile see-saw; since the determinateness obtains from the objects which are indifferent to it no peculiar distinctiveness and is therefore only identical, there is before us only *one* determinateness; and its being doubled expresses just this externality and nullity of a difference. But at the same time the objects are *self-subsistent* in regard to one another; therefore in the identity above-mentioned they remain absolutely *external* to one another. Here, then, we have the manifest *contradiction* between the complete mutual *indifference* of the objects and the *identity* of their *determinateness*, or the contradiction of their complete *externality* in the *identity* of their determinateness. This contradiction is, therefore, the *negative unity* of a number of objects which, in that unity, simply repel one another: this is the *mechanical process*.

B. THE MECHANICAL PROCESS

If objects are regarded merely as self-enclosed totalities, they cannot act on one another. In this determination they are the same thing as the *monads*, which for this very reason were thought of as exercising no influence whatever on one another. But the concept of a monad is, just for this reason, a defective reflection. For first it is a *determinate* conception of the monad's merely *implicit* totality; as a *certain degree* of the development and *positedness* of its representation of the world, it is *determinate;* now while it is a self-enclosed totality, it is also indifferent to this determinateness; therefore the determinateness is not its own, but one that is *posited* by *another* object. Secondly it is an *immediate* in general, in so far as it is supposed to be merely a *mirroring entity*; its relation to itself is therefore *abstract universality*; hence it is a *determinate being open to others*. To gain the freedom of substance it is not sufficient to represent it as a totality that is *complete within itself* and has nothing to receive *from without*. On the contrary,

the mechanical [*begrifflose*], merely mirrored relation to itself is precisely a *passivity* towards another. Similarly *determinateness*, whether taken as the determinateness of something that *is* or of a *mirroring* entity, that is a *degree* of the monad's own spontaneous development, is something *external*; the degree that the development reaches has its *limit* in an other. To shift the reciprocity of substances on to a *predetermined harmony* means nothing more than to convert it into a *presupposition*, that is, to withdraw it from the Notion. The need to avoid the *interaction* of substances was based on the moment of absolute *self-subsistence* and *originality* which was made a fundamental assumption. But since the *positedness*, the degree of development, does not correspond to this *in-itself*, it has for that very reason its ground in an other.

When treating of the relationship of substantiality, we showed that it passes over into the causal relationship. But here what *is*, no longer has the determination of a *substance*, but of an object; the causal relationship has been superseded in the Notion; the originality of one substance in relation to the other has shown itself to be illusory, its action to be transition into the opposed substance. This relationship therefore has no objectivity. Hence in so far as the one object is posited in the form of subjective unity as active cause, this no longer counts as an *original* determination but as something *mediated*; the active object has this its determination only by means of another object. *Mechanism*, since it belongs to the sphere of the Notion, has that posited within it which proved to be the truth of the causal relationship, namely that the cause, which is supposed to be the original and self-subsistent factor is essentially effect, positedness, as well. In mechanism therefore the causality of the object is immediately a non-originality; it is indifferent to this its determination, therefore its being cause is for it something contingent. To this extent, one might indeed say that the causality of substances is *only a subjective conception*. But this causality as thus represented is precisely *mechanism*; for mechanism is this, that causality as *identical* determinateness of different substances and hence as the extinction of their self-subsistence in this identity, is a *mere positedness*; the objects are indifferent to this unity and maintain themselves in face of it. But, no less is this their indifferent *self-subsistence* also a mere *positedness*; they are therefore capable of *mixing* and *aggregating* and of becoming, as an *aggregate*, *one object*. Through this indifference

both to their transition and to their self-subsistence, substances are *objects*.

(*a*) *The Formal Mechanical Process*

The mechanical process is the positing of what is contained in the Notion of mechanism, and therefore, in the first instance, of a *contradiction*.

1. It follows from the Notion just indicated that the interaction of objects takes the form of the *positing* of the *identical* relation of the objects. This consists merely in giving to the determinateness that is determined, the form of *universality*; this is *communication*, which does not involve transition into an opposite. *Spiritual communication*, which moreover takes place in that element which is the universal in the form of universality, is explicitly an *ideal* relation in which *a determinateness continues* itself from one person into another unimpaired, and universalizes itself without any alteration whatever—as a scent freely spreads in the unresisting atmosphere. But even in communication between material objects, their determinateness *spreads*, so to speak, in a similarly ideal manner; personality is an infinitely more intense *impenetrability* [*Härte*] than objects possess. The formal totality of the object in general, which is indifferent to the determinateness and hence is not a self-determination, makes it undistinguished from the other object and thus renders the interaction primarily an unimpeded continuation of the determinateness of the one in the other.

Now in the spiritual sphere there is an infinitely manifold content that is communicable; for being taken up into intelligence it receives this *form* of universality in which it becomes communicable. But the universal that is such not merely through the form but in and for itself, is the *objective* as such, both in the spiritual and in the material sphere; as against which the individuality of outer objects as well as of persons is an unessential element that can offer it no resistance. Laws, morals, rational conceptions in general, are in the spiritual sphere such communicable entities which penetrate individuals in an unconscious manner and exert their influence on them. In the material sphere the communicable entities are motion, heat, magnetism, electricity and the like—which, even if people insist on representing them as stuffs or matters, must be characterized as *imponderable* agents—

agents lacking that element of materiality which is the foundation *of matter's individualized existence.*

2. Now if in the interaction of objects their *identical* universality is first posited, it is equally necessary to posit the other moment of the Notion, *particularity*; objects accordingly demonstrate also their *self-subsistence*, maintain themselves as mutually external and establish an *individuality* in that universality. This establishing is *reaction* in general. To begin with, reaction is not to be conceived as a *mere suspension* of the action and of the communicated determinateness; what is communicated is, as a universal, positive in the particular objects and only *particularizes itself* in their diversity. So far, then, what is communicated remains what it is; it merely *distributes* itself to the objects or is determined by their particularity. The cause gets lost in its other, the effect, the activity of the causal substance in its action; but the *active object* only becomes a *universal*; its action is primarily not a loss of its determinateness but a *particularization*, whereby the object which at first was the whole of that *individual* determinateness in it, is now a *species* of it, and through this the *determinateness* is posited for the first time as a universal. The two processes, the raising of the individual determinateness into universality in communication, and the particularization of it, or the reduction of what was solely a one to a *species*, in distribution, are one and the same.

Now *reaction* is equal to *action.* The manner in which this first appears, is that the second object *has taken up into itself* the entire universal, and so is now active against the first. Thus its reaction is the same as the action, a *reciprocal repulsion* of the *impulse.* Secondly, what is communicated is the objective element; it therefore *remains* the substantial determination of the objects along with the presupposition of their diversity; thus the universal specifies itself at the same time in them, and each object therefore does not merely give back the whole action, but has its specific share. But thirdly, reaction is a *wholly negative action* in so far as each object through the *elasticity of its self-subsistence* expels the positedness of an other in it and maintains its relation-to-self. The specific particularity of the communicated determinateness in the objects, what was before called a species, returns to *individuality*, and the object asserts its externality in face of the *communicated universality.* The action thereby passes

over into *rest*. It shows itself to be a merely *superficial*, transient alteration in the self-enclosed indifferent totality of the object.

3. This return constitutes the *product* of the mechanical process. *Immediately*, the object is *presupposed* as an individual; further, it is a particular in relation to others; and again thirdly, as something indifferent to its particularity, as a universal. The *product* is that *presupposed* totality of the Notion now *posited* as a totality. It is the conclusion in which the communicated universal is united with individuality through the particularity of the object; but at the same time in rest the *mediation* is posited as a mediation that has *sublated* itself; in other words, it is posited that the product is indifferent to this determining of it, and that the determinateness it has received is an external one in it.

Accordingly the product is the same as the object that first enters into the process. But at the same time it is through this movement that it is first *determined*; *in general*, it is *only as a product* that the mechanical object is an *object*; because it is only *through the mediation of an other* in it that it is what it is. Thus in being a product it is what it is supposed to be in and for itself, a *compound* or *mixture*, a certain *order* and *arrangement* of parts, in general, something whose determinateness is not a self-determination but one that is *posited*.

On the other hand, it is no less true that the *result* of the mechanical process *does not already exist before that process*; its *end* is not in its *beginning* as in the case of the teleological end. The product is a determinateness in the object as an *externally* posited one. Therefore, as regards its *Notion*, this product is indeed the same thing as the object already is from the beginning. But in the beginning the external determinateness does not yet appear as *posited*. To this extent the result is something *quite other* than the first determinate being of the object for which it is something utterly contingent.

(*b*) *The real mechanical process*

The mechanical process passes over into *rest*. That is to say the determinateness which the object obtains through the process is only an *external* one. Equally external to it is this rest itself, since rest is the opposite determinateness to the *action* of the object, but every determinateness is indifferent to the object; rest can therefore be regarded as produced by an *external* cause, just as much as it was indifferent to the object to be active.

Now further, since the determinateness is a *posited* one and the Notion of the object has *returned to itself through mediation*, the object contains the determinateness as one that is reflected into itself. Hence in the mechanical process the objects and the process itself have a more precisely determined relationship. They are not merely diverse, but are now *specifically distinguished* as against one another. The result of the formal process which on the one hand is determinationless rest, is therefore, on the other hand, through the reflection into self of the determinateness, the *distribution of the opposition* which the object as such contains, among several objects standing in a mechanical relationship to one another. The object that on the one hand lacks all determination whatever and is neither *elastic* nor *self-subsistent* in its relationships, has on the other hand a *self-subsistence* that is *impenetrable* to other objects. Objects now also have as against one another this more specific opposition of *self-subsistent individuality* and a *universality that lacks self-subsistence*. The precise difference may be conceived as a merely *quantitative* one, as a difference of the magnitude of *mass* in the bodies, or as a difference of *intensity*, or in various other ways. But in general the difference is not to be adhered to in that abstraction; as objects, both are also *positively* self-subsistent.

Now the first moment of this real *process* is, as before, *communication*. The *weaker* can be seized and penetrated by the *stronger* only in so far as it accepts the latter and constitutes one *sphere* with it. Just as in the material sphere the weak is secured against the disproportionately strong (as a sheet hanging free in the air is not pierced by a musket ball, or a weak organic receptivity is less susceptible to strong, than to weak, stimuli), so the wholly feeble spirit is safer from the strong spirit than one that stands nearer to the strong. Imagine if you like someone quite dull-witted and ignoble, then on such a person lofty intelligence and nobility can make no impression. The only consistent defence *against* reason is to have no dealings with it at all. Where the object that is not self-subsistent cannot make contact with one that is and no communication can take place between them, the latter can also offer no *resistance*, that is, cannot specify the communicated universal for itself. If they were not in the same sphere, their relation to one another would be an infinite judgement, and no process between them would be possible.

Resistance is the precise moment of the overpowering of the one object by the other, for it is the incipient moment of the distribution of the communicated universal and of the positing of the self-related negativity, of the individuality to be established. Resistance is *overcome* where the determinateness of the object is *inadequate* to the communicated universal that has been taken up by the object and is supposed to individualize itself in it. The object's relative lack of self-subsistence manifests itself in the fact that its *individuality* lacks the *capacity* for what is *communicated* and therefore is disrupted by it, because it cannot constitute itself as *subject* in this universal, or make this latter its *predicate.* It is only in this second aspect that the *violence* [*Gewalt*] exercised on an object is something *extraneous* to it. What turns *power* [*Macht*] into *violence* is this, that though power, an objective universality, is *identical* with the *nature* of the object, its determinateness or negativity is not its own *negative reflection* into itself by which it is an individual. In so far as the negativity of the object is not reflected into itself in the power, and the power is not the object's own self-relation, it is, as against the power, only *abstract* negativity whose manifestation is extinction.

Power, as *objective universality* and as violence directed *against* the object, is what is called *fate*—a conception that falls within mechanism in so far as it is called *blind*, that is, its *objective universality* is not recognized by the subject in its specific peculiarity. To make a few observations on this point: the fate of the living being is in general the *genus*, which manifests itself through the perishableness of the living individuals, which in their *actual individuality* do not possess the genus as genus. As mere objects, merely animate natures, like all other things of a lower grade, have no fate; what befalls them is a contingency; but *in their Notion as objects* they are *external* to themselves; therefore the alien power of fate is nothing else but their *own immediate nature*, externality and contingency itself. Only self-consciousness has a fate in the proper meaning of the word, because it is *free*, and therefore in the *individuality* of its ego possesses a being that is absolutely *in and for itself* and can oppose itself to its objective universality and *estrange* itself from it. By this very separation, however, it excites against itself the mechanical relationship of a fate. In order therefore that this fate should be able to have power over it, it must have given itself some determinateness or other conflicting

with the essential universality; it must have committed a *deed*. By this, it has made itself into a *particular*, and this existence as abstract universality, is at the same time the side open to the communication of its estranged essence; it is on this side that it is drawn into the process. The nation without deeds is without blame; it is wrapped in objective moral universality and dissolved in it and lacks that individuality which, while it moves the unmoved, and gives itself a determinateness outwards and an abstract universality separated from the objective universality, yet in so doing converts the subject into something estranged from its essence, into an *object*, and brings it into the relationship of *externality* towards its nature, into that of mechanism.

(*c*) *The Product of the Mechanical Process*

The product of *formal* mechanism is the object in general, an indifferent totality in which *determinateness* appears as *posited*. The object having hereby entered the process as a *determinate* thing, the extinction of the process results on the one hand in *rest*, as the original formalism of the object, the negativity of its being determined for itself. But on the other hand the sublating of the determinedness as the *positive reflection of it* into itself, is the determinateness that has withdrawn into itself or the *posited totality of the Notion*—the *true individuality* of the object. The object, determined at first in its indeterminate universality then as a *particular*, is now determined as *objectively an individual*, so that in it that mere *semblance of individuality* which is only a self-subsistence *opposing* itself to the substantial universality, has been sublated.

This reflection into self then is, as we have seen, the objective oneness of the objects, a oneness which is an individual self-subsistence—the *centre*. Secondly, the reflection of negativity is a universality that is not a fate confronting the determinateness, but a fate immanently determined and rational—a universality that *particularizes itself from within*, the difference that is at rest and is constant in the unstable particularity of objects and in their process; in other words, the *law*. This result is the truth, and therefore also the foundation, of the mechanical process.

C. ABSOLUTE MECHANISM

(*a*) *The Centre*

In the first place then the empty manifoldness of objects is gathered

into objective individuality, into the simple self-determining *centre*. Secondly, in so far as the object as an immediate totality retains its indifference to determinateness, the latter is present in it also as unessential or as a *mutual externality* of many objects. The prior, the essential determinateness, on the other hand, constitutes the *real middle term* between the many mechanically interacting bodies, by which they are united *in and for themselves*, and is their objective universality. Universality exhibited itself at first in the relationship of *communication* as present only through *positing*; but as *objective* universality it is the pervading immanent essence of the objects.

In the material world it is the *central body* that is the *genus*, but it is the *individual* universality of the single objects and their mechanical process. The relationship in which the unessential single bodies stand to one another is one of mutual *thrust* and *pressure*; this kind of relationship does not hold between the central body and the objects whose essence it is, for their externality no longer constitutes their basic determination. Their identity with the central body is, therefore, rather rest, namely, the *being in their centre*; this unity is their absolute Notion. It remains, however, merely an *ought-to-be*, since the externality of the objects which is still also posited does not correspond to that unity. Their consequent *striving* towards the centre is their absolute universality, not a universality posited by *communication*; it consitutes the true *rest* that is itself *concrete* and not *posited from outside*, into which the process of the non-self-subsistent bodies must return. That is why it is an empty abstraction to assume in mechanics that a body set in motion would continue to move in a straight line to infinity if external resistance did not rob it of its motion. *Friction*, or whatever other form resistance takes, is only the manifestation of *centrality*; for it is centrality that in an absolute manner brings the body back to itself; for the thing in contact with which the moving body meets friction has the power of resistance solely through its union with the centre. In the *spiritual* sphere the centre and unity with the centre assume higher forms; but the unity of the Notion and its reality which here, to begin with, is mechanical centrality, must there too constitute the basic determination.

Thus the central body has ceased to be a mere *object*, for in the latter the determinateness is an unessential element; for the central

body no longer possesses the objective totality only *implicitly* but also *explicitly*. It can therefore be regarded as an *individual*. Its determinateness is essentially different from a mere *order* or *arrangement* and *external connexion* of parts; as determinateness in and for itself it is an *immanent* form, a self-determining principle in which the objects inhere and by which they are bound together into a genuine One.

But this central individual is thus at first only a *middle term* which as yet has no true extremes; but as negative unity of the total Notion it sunders itself into such. Or in other words the previously non-self-subsistent, self-external objects are likewise by the regress of the Notion determined into individuals; the identity of the central body with itself which is still a *striving*, is infected with *externality* which, being taken up into the central body's *objective individuality*, has this latter determination communicated to it. Through this centrality of their own, these individuals placed outside that first centre, are themselves centres for the non-self-subsistent objects. These second centres and the non-self-subsistent objects are brought into unity by the above absolute middle term.

But the relative individual centres themselves also constitute the middle term of a *second syllogism*, a middle term that on the one hand is subsumed under a higher extreme, namely the objective *universality* and *power* of the absolute centre, and on the other hand subsumes under itself the non-self-subsistent objects whose superficial or formal individualization is supported by it. Again, these non-self-subsistent objects are the middle term of a *third*, the *formal syllogism*, in that they are the link between the absolute and the relative central individuality to the extent that the latter has in them its externality by virtue of which the *relation-to-self* is at the same time *a striving* towards an absolute centre. The formal objects have for their essence the identical *gravity* of their immediate central body in which they inhere as in their subject and the extreme of individuality; through the externality which they constitute, that body is subsumed under the absolute central body; they are, therefore, the formal middle term of *particularity*. But the absolute individual is the objectively universal middle term which brings into unity and holds fast the being-within-self or inwardness of the relative individual and its externality. Similarly, too, the *government*, the *individual citizens*

and the *needs* or *external life* of the individuals, are three terms, each of which is the middle of the other two. The *government* is the absolute centre in which the extreme of the individuals is united with their external existence; similarly, the *individuals* are the middle term that activate that universal individual into external concrete existence and translate their moral essence into the extreme of actuality. The third syllogism is the formal syllogism, that of an illusory show, in which the individuals purport to be linked to this universal absolute individuality by their *needs* and external existence; a syllogism which, as merely subjective, passes over into the others and in them has its truth.

This totality, whose moments are themselves the complete relationships of the Notion, the *syllogisms* in which each of the three different objects runs through the determination of middle term and of extremes, constitutes *free mechanism.* In it the different objects have for their basic determination the objective universality, the *pervasive* gravity that maintains its *identity* in the *particularization.* The relations of *pressure*, *thrust*, *attraction* and the like, as also *aggregations* or *mixtures*, belong to the relationship of externality which forms the basis of the third of this group of syllogisms. *Order*, which is the merely external determinateness of objects, has passed over into the determination that is immanent and objective; this is *law.*

(*b*) *Law*

In law, the more specific difference between the *ideal reality* of objectivity and its *external reality* is made prominent. The object, as *immediate* totality of the Notion, does not yet possess externality as distinct from the *Notion* which is not yet posited for itself. The object, being withdrawn into itself through the process, there has arisen the opposition of *simple centrality* against an *externality* which is now determined *as* externality, that is, *is posited* as that which is not *in and for itself.* That identical or ideal aspect of individuality is, on account of the relation to externality, an *ought-to-be*; it is that unity of the Notion, absolutely determined and self-determining, to which that external reality does not correspond, and therefore gets no further than a *striving* towards it. But individuality is *in and for itself the concrete principle of negative unity*, and *as such* itself *totality*, a unity that sunders itself into the *specific differences of the Notion* and abides within its self-identical

universality; it is thus the centre *expanded* within its pure ideality *by difference.*

This reality which corresponds to the Notion is the *ideal* reality that is distinct from the reality that was merely a *striving*; it is the difference, not as in the first instance a plurality of objects, but difference in its essential nature and taken up into pure universality. This real ideality is the *soul* of the previously developed objective totality, *the absolutely determined identity* of the system.

The objective *being-in-and-for-self* appears therefore more specifically in its totality as the negative unity of the centre, which divides itself into *subjective individuality* and *external objectivity*, maintains the former in the latter and determines it in an ideal difference. This self-determining unity that absolutely reduces external objectivity to ideality is the principle of *self-movement* the *determinateness* of this animating principle, which is the difference of the Notion itself, is *law*. Dead mechanism was the mechanical process considered above of objects that appeared immediately as self-subsistent but which for that very reason are, in truth, not self-subsistent and have their centre outside themselves; this process, which passes over into *rest*, exhibits either *contingency* and indeterminate dissimilarity or *formal uniformity*. This uniformity is indeed a *rule*, but not a *law*. Only free mechanism has a *law*, the spontaneous determination of pure individuality or *of the explicated Notion*; as difference, it is in its own self the imperishable source of self-kindling movement, and since in the ideality of its difference it relates itself to itself alone, it is *free necessity*.

(*c*) *Transition of Mechanism*

This soul, however, is still submerged in its body: the Notion of the objective totality, *determinate now* but *inner*, is free necessity—the law has not yet confronted its object; it is the *concrete* centrality as universality *immediately* expanded into its objectivity. This ideality, therefore, has not the *objects themselves* for its determinate difference; these are *self-subsistent individuals* of the totality, or also, if we look back to the formal stage, non-individual, external *objects*. Law is indeed immanent in them and constitutes their nature and power; but its difference is confined within its ideality, and the objects are not themselves differentiated into the ideal difference of the law. But it is solely in the ideal centrality and its

laws that the object possesses its essential self-subsistence; it is therefore powerless to resist the judgement of the Notion and to maintain itself in abstract, indeterminate self-subsistence and aloofness. By virtue of the ideal difference immanent in it, its existence is a *determinateness posited by the Notion.* Its lack of self-subsistence is in this way no longer merely a *striving* towards the *centre*, as against which, just because its relation to it is only a striving, it still has the appearance of a self-subsistent external object; on the contrary, it is a striving towards the *object specifically opposed to it*; and similarly the centre itself has in consequence fallen asunder and its negative unity passed has over into *objectified opposition.* Centrality is, therefore, now a *relation* of these reciprocally negative objectivities in a state of mutual tension. Thus free mechanism determines itself into chemism.

CHAPTER 2

CHEMISM

Chemism constitutes in objectivity as a whole, the moment of judgement, of the difference that has become objective, and of the process. Since it already begins with determinateness and positedness and the chemical object is at the same time an objective totality, its immediate course is simple and is completely determined by its presupposition.

A. THE CHEMICAL OBJECT

The chemical object is distinguished from the mechanical by the fact that the latter is a totality indifferent to determinateness, whereas in the case of the chemical object the *determinateness*, and consequently the *relation to other* and the kind and manner of this relation, belong to its nature. This determinateness is at the same time essentially a *particularization*, that is, it is taken up into universality; thus it is a *principle—universal determinateness*, the determinateness not only of the *one individual object* but also of the *other*. In the chemical object, therefore, we now have the distinction between its Notion as the inner totality of the two determinatenesses, and the determinateness that constitutes the nature of the individual object in its *externality* and *concrete existence*. Since in this way it is *in itself* or *implicitly* the whole Notion, it has in its own self the *necessity* and the *urge* to sublate its opposed, *one sided-existence* and to give itself an existence as that *real whole* that according to its Notion it is.

With regard to the expression *chemism* for the relation of the difference of objectivity as it has presented itself, it may be further remarked that the expression must not be understood here as though this relation only exhibited itself in that form of elemental nature to which the name chemism so called is strictly applied. Even the meteorological relation must be regarded as a process whose parts have the nature more of physical than chemical elements. In the animate world, the sex relation comes under this schema and it also constitutes the *formal* basis for the spiritual relations of love, friendship, and the like.

Examined more closely the chemical object, as a *self-subsistent* totality in general, is in the first instance an object that is reflected into itself and to that extent is distinct from its reflectedness outwards—an indifferent *base*, the individual not yet specified as different; the *person*, too, is such a base related at first only to itself. But the immanent determinateness which constitutes its *difference*, is first reflected into itself in such a manner that this retraction of the relation outwards is only formal abstract universality; thus the relation outwards is the determination of its immediacy and concrete existence. From this aspect, it does not *in its own self* return into the individual totality; and the negative unity has the two moments of its opposition in two *particular objects*. Accordingly, a chemical object is not comprehensible from itself alone, and the being of one is the being of the other. But secondly, the determinateness is absolutely reflected into itself and is the concrete moment of the individual Notion of the whole, which Notion is the universal essence, the *real genus* of the particular object. The chemical object, which is thus the contradiction of its immediate positedness and its immanent individual Notion, is a *striving* to sublate the determinateness of its existence and to give concrete existence to the objective totality of the Notion. Therefore, though it also lacks self-subsistence, it spontaneously tenses itself against this deficiency and initiates the *process* by its self-determining.

B. THE CHEMICAL PROCESS

1. It begins with the presupposition that the objects in tension, tensed as they are against themselves, are in the first instance by that very fact just as much tensed against one another—a relationship that is called their *affinity*. Since each through its Notion stands in contradiction to the one-sidedness of its own existence and consequently strives to sublate it, there is immediately posited in this fact the striving to sublate the one-sidedness of the other object; and through this reciprocal adjustment and combination to posit a reality conformable to the Notion, which contains both moments.

As each of the objects is posited as self-contradictory and self-sublating in its own self, it is only by an *external compulsion* [*Gewalt*] that they are held apart from one another and from their

reciprocal integration. Now the middle term whereby these extremes are concluded into a unity is first the *implicit* nature of both, the whole Notion that holds both within itself. Secondly, however, since in their concrete existence they stand confronting each other, their absolute unity is also a still formal element having an *existence distinct* from them—the element of *communication* in which they enter into external *community* with each other. Since the real difference belongs to the extremes, this middle term is only the abstract neutrality, the real possibility of those extremes; it is, as it were, the *theoretical element* of the concrete existence of chemical objects, of their process and its result. In the material world *water* fulfils the function of this medium; in the spiritual world, so far as the analogue of such a relation has a place there, the *sign* in general, and more precisely *language*, is to be regarded as fulfilling that function.

The relationship of the objects, as a mere communication in this element, is on the one hand a quiescent coming-together, but on the other hand it is no less a *negative bearing* of each to the other· for in communication the concrete Notion which is their nature is posited as a reality, with the result that the *real differences* of the objects are reduced to *its* unity. Their previous self-subsistent *determinateness* is thus sublated in the union that conforms to the Notion, which is one and the same in both, and thereby their opposition and tension are weakened, with the result that in this reciprocal integration the striving reaches its quiescent *neutrality*.

The process is in this way *extinguished*; the contradiction between the Notion and reality being resolved, the extremes of the syllogism have lost their opposition and have thus ceased to be extremes both against each other and against the middle term. The *product* is *neutral*, that is, a product in which the ingredients, which can no longer be called objects, have lost their tension and with it those properties which belonged to them as tensed, while the *capability* of their former self-subsistence and tension is preserved. For the negative unity of the neutral product proceeds from a *presupposed* difference; the *determinateness* of the chemical object is identical with its objectivity, it is original. Through the process just considered this difference is as yet only *immediately* sublated; the determinateness is, therefore, as yet not absolutely reflected into itself, and consequently the product of the process is only a formal unity.

2. Now in this product, the tension of the opposition and the negative unity, as activity of the process, are indeed extinct. But since this unity is essential to the Notion and has at the same time come into concrete existence, it is still present, though its place is *outside* the neutral object. The process does not spontaneously re-kindle itself, for it had the difference only for its *presupposition* and did not itself *posit* it. This self-subsistent negativity outside the object, the existence of the *abstract* individuality whose being-for-self has its reality in the *indifferent object*, is now tensed within itself against its abstraction, and is an inward restless activity that turns outwards to consume. It relates itself *immediately* to the object whose quiescent neutrality is the real possibility of its opposition; that object is now the *middle term* of the previously merely formal neutrality, now inwardly concrete and determinate.

The more precise immediate relation of the *extreme* of *negative unity* to the object is that the latter is determined by it and thereby disrupted. This disruption may in the first instance be regarded as the restoration of that opposition of the objects in tension with which chemism began. But this determination does not constitute the other extreme of the syllogism but belongs to the immediate relation of the differentiating principle to the middle term in which this principle gives itself its immediate reality; it is the determinateness that the middle term in the disjunctive syllogism also possesses besides being the universal nature of the object, and by virtue of which the object is both objective universality and also determinate particularity. The *other extreme* of the syllogism stands opposed to the external *self-subsistent extreme* of individuality; it is therefore the equally self-subsistent extreme of *universality*; hence the disruption suffered by the real neutrality of the middle term in this extreme is that it is split up into moments whose relationship is not that of difference, but of *indifference*. Accordingly these moments are the abstract indifferent *base* on the one side, and its *energizing* principle on the other, which latter by its separation from the base attains likewise the form of indifferent objectivity.

This disjunctive syllogism is the totality of chemism in which the same objective whole is exhibited first as self-subsistent *negative* unity, then in the middle term as *real* unity, and finally as the chemical reality resolved into its *abstract* moments. In these latter the determinateness has not reached its *reflection-into-self*

in an other as in the neutral product, but has in itself returned into its abstraction, and is an *originally determinate element.*

3. These elementary objects are accordingly liberated from chemical tension; in them, the original basis of that *presupposition* with which chemism began has been *posited* through the real process. Now further, the inner *determinateness* as such of these objects is essentially the contradiction of their *simple indifferent subsistence* and themselves as *determinateness*, and is the urge outwards that sunders itself and posits tension in its object and in *another* object in order to have something with which it can enter into a relation of difference and in which it can neutralize itself and give to its simple determinateness an existent reality. Consequently, on the one hand chemism has returned into its beginning in which objects in a state of reciprocal tension seek one another and then by a formal, external middle term, unite to form a neutral product. On the other hand, chemism by this return into its *Notion* sublates itself and has passed over into a higher sphere.

C. TRANSITION OF CHEMISM

Even ordinary chemistry shows examples of chemical alterations in which a body, for example, imparts a higher oxidation to one part of its mass and thereby reduces another part to a lower degree of oxidation, in which lower degree alone it can enter into a neutral combination with another [chemically] different body brought into contact with it, a combination for which it would not have been receptive in that first immediate degree. What happens here is that the object does not relate itself to another in accordance with an immediate, one-sided determinateness, but that in accordance with the inner totality of an original *relation* it *posits* the *presupposition* which it requires for a real relation and thereby gives itself a middle term through which it unites its Notion with its reality; it is absolutely determined individuality, the concrete Notion as principle of the *disjunction* into *extremes* whose *re-union* is the activity of *the same* negative principle, which thereby returns to its first determination, but returns *objectified.*

Chemism itself is *the first negation* of *indifferent* objectivity and of the *externality* of determinateness; it is therefore still infected with the immediate self-subsistence of the object and with externality. Consequently it is not yet for itself that totality of self-

determination that proceeds from it and in which rather it is sublated. The three syllogisms yielded by the foregoing exposition constitute its totality; the first has for middle term formal neutrality and for extremes the objects in tension; the second has for middle term the product of the first, real neutrality, and for extremes the sundering activity and its product, the indifferent element; while the third is the self-realizing Notion, which posits for itself the presupposition by which the process of its realization is conditioned—a syllogism that has the universal for its essence. On account, however, of the immediacy and externality attaching to chemical objectivity, *these syllogisms still fall apart*. The first process whose product is the neutrality of the objects in tension is extinguished in its product, and it is an externally applied differentiation that re-kindles it; conditioned by an immediate presupposition, it exhausts itself in it. Similarly, the separation of the [chemically] different extremes out of the neutral product, as also their decomposition into their abstract elements, must proceed from *conditions* and stimulations of activity *externally brought into play*. Also, although the two essential moments of the process, on the one side neutralization, on the other separation and reduction, are combined in one and the same process, and the *union* of the extremes by weakening of the tension between them is also a *sundering* into such extremes, yet on account of the still underlying externality they constitute *two different* sides; the extremes that are separated in that same process are different objects or materials from those that unite in it; in so far as the former emerge again from the process as [chemically] different they must turn outwards; their new neutralization is a different process from the neutralization that took place in the first process.

But these various processes, which have proved themselves necessary, are so many stages by which *externality* and *conditionedness* are sublated and from which the Notion emerges as a totality determined in and for itself and not conditioned by externality. In the first process, the mutual externality of the different extremes that constitute the whole reality, or the distinction between the *implicitly* determinate Notion and its *existent* determinateness, is sublated; in the second, the externality of the real unity, the union as merely *neutral*, is sublated; more precisely, the formal activity in the first instance sublates itself in equally formal bases or indifferent determinatenesses, whose *inner Notion*

is now the indrawn absolute activity as inwardly self-realizing, that is, the activity that *posits* the determinate differences within itself and through this *mediation* constitutes itself as real unity—a mediation which is thus the Notion's *own* mediation, its self-determination, and in respect of its reflection thence into itself, an immanent *presupposing*. The third syllogism, which on the one hand is the restoration of the preceding processes, on the other hand sublates the last remaining moment of *indifferent* bases—the wholly abstract external *immediacy*, which in this way becomes the Notion's *own* moment of self-mediation. The Notion which has thus sublated all the moments of its objective existence as external, and posited them within its simple unity, is thereby completely liberated from objective externality, to which it relates itself only as to an unessential reality. This objective free Notion is end.

CHAPTER 3

TELEOLOGY

Where *purposiveness* is discerned, an *intelligence* [*Verstand*] is assumed as its author, and for the end we therefore demand the Notion's own free Existence. Teleology is especially contrasted with *mechanism*, in which the determinateness posited in the object, being external, is essentially one in which no *self-determination* is manifested. The opposition between *causae efficientes* and *causae finales*, between merely *efficient* and *final* causes, relates to this distinction; and this distinction, taken in a concrete form, is also made the criterion for deciding whether the absolute essence of the world is to be conceived as blind natural mechanism or as an intelligence that determines itself in accordance with ends. The antinomy between *fatalism*, along with *determinism* and *freedom*, is likewise concerned with the opposition of mechanism and teleology; for the free is the Notion in its Existence.

Earlier metaphysics has treated these concepts as it has treated others; it has for one thing presupposed a certain conception of the world and laboured to show that one or the other concept fitted it, while the opposite one was defective because it failed to *explain* that conception; and again, while doing this, it has not examined the concept of mechanical cause and of end, to see which possesses truth *in and for itself*. When this has been established independently, the objective world may present us with mechanical and final causes; but their existence is not the standard of *truth*: on the contrary, truth is the criterion that decides which of these existences is the true one. Just as the subjective understanding also exhibits errors in itself, so the objective world also exhibits aspects and stages of truth that by themselves are still one-sided, incomplete and only relationships in the sphere of Appearance. If mechanism and purposiveness stand opposed to one another, they cannot for that very reason be taken as *indifferent* concepts, each of which is correct on its own account, possessing as much validity as the other, the only question being where one or the other may be applied. This equal validity of both rests merely on the fact that they *are*, that is to say, that we *have* them both. But since they

are opposed, the necessary preliminary question is, which of the two is the true one; and the higher and real question is, *whether their truth is not a third concept, or whether one of them is the truth of the other.* But the *relation of end* has proved to be the truth of *mechanism*—what exhibited itself as chemism is included with mechanism in so far as end is the Notion in free Existence; and to end stands opposed in general the unfreedom of the Notion, its submergence in externality; both of them, therefore, mechanism and chemism, are included under natural necessity; for in the former the Notion does not *exist* in the object, since the object as mechanical does not contain self-determination, while in chemism the Notion either has a one-sided Existence in a state of tension, or, in emerging as the unity that disjoins the neutral object into tensed extremes, is external to itself in so far as it sublates this disjunction.

The more the teleological principle was linked with the concept of an *extramundane* intelligence and to that extent was favoured by piety, the more it seemed to depart from the true investigation of nature, which aims at cognizing the properties of nature not as extraneous, but as *immanent determinatenesses* and accepts only such cognition as a valid *comprehension.* As end is the Notion itself in its Existence, it may seem strange that the cognition of objects from their Notion appears rather as an unjustified trespass into a *heterogeneous* element, whereas mechanism, for which the determinateness of an object is a determinateness posited in it externally and by another object, is held to be a *more immanent* point of view than teleology. Of course mechanism, at least the ordinary unfree mechanism, and also chemism, must be regarded as an immanent principle in so far as the *external* determinant is itself *again just such another* object, externally determined and indifferent to such determining, or, in the case of chemism, the other object is one likewise chemically determined; in general, an essential moment of the totality always lies in something outside it. These principles therefore remain confined within the same natural form of finitude; yet though they do not seek to go beyond the finite and lead only to finite causes in their explanation of phenomena, which themselves demand a further progress, at the same time they expand themselves, partly into a formal totality in the concept of force, cause, and similar determinations of reflection which are supposed to denote a *primariness*, and partly also through the abstract *universality* of a *sum total* of forces, a *whole* of reciprocal

causes. Mechanism shows itself to be a striving for totality in the fact that it seeks to grasp nature *by itself* as a *whole* that for *its Notion* does not require any other—a totality that is not found in end and the extra-mundane intelligence associated with it.

Now purposiveness shows itself in the first instance as a *higher being* in general, as an *intelligence* that *externally* determines the multiplicity of objects by *a unity that exists in and for itself*, so that the indifferent determinatenesses of the objects become *essential through this relation*. In mechanism they become so through the *mere form of necessity*, their *content* being indifferent; for they are supposed to remain external, and it is only understanding as such that is supposed to find satisfaction in cognizing its own connective principle, abstract identity. In teleology, on the contrary, the content becomes important, for teleology presupposes a Notion, something *absolutely determined* and therefore self-determining, and so has made a distinction between the *relation* of the differences and their reciprocal determinedness, that is the *form*, and the *unity that is reflected into itself, a unity that is determined in and for itself* and therefore *a content*. But when the content is otherwise a *finite* and insignificant one, it contradicts what it is supposed to be; for end, according to its form, is a totality *infinite within itself*—especially when the activity that operates in accordance with ends is assumed to be an *absolute* will and intelligence. The reason why teleology has incurred so much the reproach of triviality is that the ends that it exhibited are more important or more trivial, as the case may be; and it was inevitable that the end relation of objects should so often appear trifling, since it appears to be so external and therefore contingent. Mechanism, on the contrary, leaves to the determinatenesses of objects, as regards their import, their contingent status, to which the object is indifferent, and these determinatenesses are not supposed to have, either for the objects or for the subjective intelligence, any higher validity. This principle, therefore, in its context of external necessity gives the consciousness of infinite freedom as compared with teleology, which sets up for something absolute what is trivial and even contemptible in its content, in which the more universal thought can only find itself infinitely cramped and even feel disgusted.

The formal disadvantage from which this teleology immediately suffers is that it only goes as far as *external purposiveness*. The

Notion being thus posited as something formal, then for such teleology the content is also something that for the Notion is given externally in the manifoldness of the objective world—in those very determinatenesses which are also the content of mechanism, but appearing there as something external and contingent. On account of this community of content, it is solely the *form of purposiveness* by itself that constitutes what is essential in this teleology. In this respect, without as yet attending to the difference of outer and inner purposiveness, the end-relation in general has proved itself to be in and for itself the *truth of mechanism*. Teleology possesses in general the higher principle, the Notion in its Existence, which is in and for itself the infinite and absolute—a principle of freedom that in the utter certainty of its self-determination is absolutely liberated from the *external determining* of mechanism.

One of Kant's great services to philosophy consists in the distinction he has made between relative or *external*, and *internal* purposiveness; in the latter he has opened up the Notion of life, the Idea, and by so doing has done *positively* for philosophy what the *Critique of Reason* did but imperfectly, equivocally, and only *negatively*, namely, raised it above the determinations of reflection and the relative world of metaphysics. It has been remarked that the opposition of teleology and mechanism is in the first instance the more general opposition of *freedom* and *necessity*. Kant has exhibited the opposition in this form among the *antinomies* of reason, namely, as the *third conflict of the transcendental ideas*. His exposition, which was referred to earlier, I cite quite briefly, as the gist of it is so simple as to require no detailed analysis, and the peculiar features of the Kantian antinomies have been elucidated in more detail elsewhere.

The *thesis* of the antinomy here to be considered runs thus: Causality according to natural laws is not the sole causality from which the phenomena of the world can one and all be derived. For their explanation a causality through freedom must be assumed as well.

The *antithesis* is: There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according to natural laws.

As in the case of the other antinomies, the proof first sets to work apagogically, the opposite of each thesis being assumed; secondly and conversely, in order to show the contradictory nature of this

assumption, its opposite, which is accordingly the proposition to be proved, is assumed and presupposed as valid. The whole roundabout method of proof could therefore be spared; the proof consists in nothing but the assertorical affirmation of the two opposed propositions.

Thus in order to prove the *thesis* we have first to assume that there is *no other causality* than that according to *natural laws*, that is, according to the necessity of mechanism in general, including chemism. This proposition we find to be self-contradictory, because we take natural law to consist just in this, that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined *a priori*, which cause therefore must contain an absolute spontaneity within itself; that is, the assumption opposed to the thesis is contradictory because it contradicts the thesis.

In order to prove the *antithesis*, we are to postulate that there exists a *freedom*, as a particular kind of causality, that absolutely initiates a state of things and therefore also a series of consequences of that state. But now, since such a beginning presupposes a state that has *no causal connexion* whatever with its predecessor, it contradicts *the law of causality* which alone makes unity of experience, and experience at all, possible; in other words the assumption of freedom, which is opposed to the antithesis, cannot be made because it contradicts the antithesis.

What is essentially the same antinomy recurs in the *Critique of Teleological Judgement* as the opposition between the assertion that all *production of materal things takes place according to merely mechanical laws* and the assertion that *some cases of production of material things according to such laws are not possible*. The Kantian solution of this antinomy is the same as the general solution of the others; namely that reason can prove neither the one proposition nor the other, because we cannot have *a priori* any determining principle of the possibility of things according to merely empirical natural laws; that further, therefore, both must be regarded not as *objective propositions* but as *subjective maxims*; that on the one hand *I* am always to *reflect* on all natural events according to the principle of natural mechanism alone, but that this does not prevent me, *when occasion demands it*, from *investigating* certain natural forms in accordance with *another maxim*, namely, on the principle of final causes; as though now these *two maxims*, which moreover are supposed to be necessary only for *human reason*, did not stand

in the same opposition as the *propositions* in question. As was remarked before, this whole standpoint fails to examine the sole question to which philosophic interest demands an answer, namely, which of the two principles possesses truth in and for itself; but for this point of view it makes no difference whether the principles are to be regarded as *objective*, which means here, externally existing determinations of nature, or as mere *maxims* of a *subjective* cognition; rather, that is a subjective, that is, a contingent conjunction which, as the *occasion demands*, applies one or the other maxim according as it holds it to be appropriate to the given objects, but without further enquiry into the *truth* of these determinations themselves, whether these are determinations of the objects or of cognition.

However unsatisfactory, therefore, the Kantian discussion of the teleological principle is in respect of its essential point of view, nevertheless the position that Kant gives to it is worthy of note. In ascribing it to a *reflective judgement*, he makes it a connecting *middle term* between the *universal of reason* and the *individual of intuition*; further, he distinguishes this *reflective* judgement from the *determining* judgement, the latter merely *subsuming* the particular under the universal. Such a suniversal which merely *subsumes*, is an *abstraction* which only becomes *concrete* in something *else*, in the particular. End, on the contrary, is the *concrete universal*, which possesses in its own self the moment of particularity and externality and is therefore active and the urge to repel itself from itself. The Notion, as end, is of course an *objective judgement*, in which one determination, the *subject*, namely the concrete Notion, is self-determined, while the other is not merely a predicate but external objectivity. But the end relation is not for that reason a *reflective* judging that considers external objects only according to a unity, *as though* an intelligence had given this unity *for the convenience of our cognitive faculty*; on the contrary it is the absolute truth that judges *objectively* and determines external objectivity absolutely. Thus the end-relation is more than *judgement*; it is the *syllogism* of the self-subsistent free Notion that unites itself with itself through objectivity.

End has shown itself to be the *third* to mechanism and chemism; it is their truth. Since it still stands within the sphere of objectivity, or of the immediacy of the total Notion, it is still affected by externality as such and is confronted by an objective world to

which it relates itself. From this side, mechanical causality, which in general is to be taken as including chemism, still makes its appearance in this *end relation* which is the *external* one, but as *subordinate to it* and as sublated in and for itself. As regards the more precise relationship, the mechanical object is, as an immediate totality, indifferent to its being determined, and on the other hand is equally indifferent to being a determinant. This external determinedness has now developed into self-determination and accordingly the Notion, which in the object was merely the *inner*, or what is the same thing, merely the *outer* Notion, is now *posited*; end is, in the first instance, just this very Notion that is external to the Notion of mechanism. Thus for chemism too, end is the self-determining principle which brings back into the unity of the Notion the external determinedness by which it is conditioned. From this can be seen the nature of the subordination of the two previous forms of the objective process; the other, which in them lies in the infinite progress, is the Notion posited at first as external to them, which is end; not only is the Notion their substance, but externality, too, is for them an essential moment constituting their determinateness. Thus mechanical or chemical technique, through its character of being externally determined, offers itself spontaneously to the end relation, which we have now to consider more closely.

A. THE SUBJECTIVE END

In the *centrality* of the objective sphere, which is an indifference to determinateness, the *subjective* Notion has first rediscovered and posited the *negative point of unity*; but in chemism it has posited the *objectivity* of the *Notion determinations* by which it is first posited as *concrete objective Notion.* Its determinateness or simple difference now possesses within itself the *determinateness of externality*, and its simple unity is consequently the unity that repels itself from itself and in so doing maintains itself. End therefore is the subjective Notion as an essential effort and urge to posit itself externally. In this process it is exempt from transition. It is neither a force expressing itself nor a substance and cause manifesting itself in accidents and effects. Force that has not expressed itself is only an abstract inner; that is, it is only in its expression, to which it must be solicited, that it has a determinate being.

Similarly with cause and substance; since they have actuality only in the accidents and the effect, their activity is transition, against which they do not maintain themselves in freedom. End may indeed also be defined as force and cause, but these expressions fulfil only an incomplete side of its significance; if they are to be predicated of it as it truly is, they can be predicated only in a way that sublates their Notion: as a force that solicits itself to expression, as a cause that is cause of itself, or whose effect is immediately cause.

When purposiveness is ascribed to an *intelligence*, as was mentioned above, then in doing so regard is had to the *specific element of the content*. But in general end is to be taken as the *rational in its concrete existence*. It manifests *rationality* because it is the concrete Notion, which holds the *objective difference within its absolute unity*. It is therefore essentially in its own self *syllogism*. It is the self-equal universal and this, as containing self-repellent negativity, is in the first instance universal, and therefore as yet *indeterminate, activity*; but because this is negative relation-to-self it *determines* itself immediately, giving itself the moment of *particularity*, which, as likewise the *totality of the form reflected into itself*, is *content as against the posited* differences of the form. Equally immediately this negativity, through its relation-to-self, is absolute reflection of the form into itself and *individuality*. On the one hand this reflection is the *inner universality* of the *subject*, while on the other it is a *reflection outwards*; and to this extent end is still a subjective end and its activity is directed against external objectivity.

For end is the Notion that has come to itself in objectivity; the determinateness it has given itself in that sphere is that of *objective indifference* to and *externality* of its determinedness; its self-repellent negativity is, therefore, one whose moments, being determinations only of the Notion itself, also have the form of objective indifference to one another. Even in the formal *judgement*, *subject* and *predicate* are determined as self-subsistent in their relationship; but their self-subsistence is so far only abstract universality. It has now attained the determination of *objectivity*; but as moment of the Notion, this complete difference is enclosed within the simple unity of the Notion. Now in so far as end is this total *reflection* of objectivity *into itself* and is so *immediately*, in the first place, the self-determination or particularity as *simple*

reflection into self is distinct from the *concrete* form, and is a *determinate content*. From this side end is *finite*, although in respect of its form it is infinite subjectivity. Secondly, because its determinateness has the form of objective indifference, it has the shape of a *presupposition*, and from this side its finitude consists in its being confronted by an *objective*, mechanical and chemical *world* to which its activity relates itself as to something *already there*; its self-determining activity is thus, in its identity, immediately *external to itself* and as much reflection outwards as reflection-into-self. To this extent end still has a genuinely *extramundane* existence —to the extent, namely, that it is confronted by this objectivity, just as the latter on the other hand confronts it as a mechanical and chemical whole not yet determined and pervaded by the end.

Accordingly, the movement of end can now be expressed as having for its aim to sublate its *presupposition*, that is the immediacy of the object, and to *posit* the object as determined by the Notion. This negative attitude towards the object is just as much a negative attitude towards itself, a sublating of the subjectivity of the end. Positively, it is the realization of the end, namely, the union of objective being with it, so that this being, which, as a moment of the end is immediately the determinateness identical with it, shall appear as *external* determinateness, and conversely the objective as *presupposition* shall instead be *posited* as determined by the Notion. End is in its own self the urge to realize itself; the determinateness of the moments of the Notion is externality; but their *simplicity* in the unity of the Notion is inadequate to the nature of this unity, and the Notion therefore repels itself from itself. This repulsion is in general the *resolution* [*Entschluss*] of the relation of the negative unity to itself, whereby it is *exclusive* individuality; but by this *exclusion* [*Ausschliessen*] it *resolves* itself [*sich entschliesst*] or *opens up* itself [*schliesst sich auf*], because this exclusion is a *self-determining*, a positing of *its own self*. On the one hand subjectivity in determining itself makes itself into particularity, gives itself a content which, enclosed within the unity of the Notion, is still an inner one; but this *positing*, the simple reflection-into-self, is immediately, as we have seen, also a *presupposing*; and in the same moment in which the subject of the end determines *itself*, it is related to an indifferent, external objectivity which is to be equated by it with the said inner deter-

minateness, that is to say, is to be posited as something *determined by the Notion*, and in the first instance as *means*.

B. THE MEANS

The first immediate positing in end is at one and the same time the positing of an *internality*, that is, of something determined as *posited*, and the presupposing of an objective world which is indifferent to the determination of end. But the subjectivity of end is *absolute negative unity*: its second determining is, therefore, the sublating of this presupposition altogether; this sublating is the *return-into-self* in so far as by it is sublated that moment of the *first negative*, the positing of the negative as against the subject, the external object. But as against the presupposition or the immediacy of the determining, as against the objective world, it is as yet only the *first* negation, itself immediate and therefore external. This positing is therefore not yet the realized end itself, but only the *initial* step towards it. The object thus determined is so far only the *means*.

The end unites itself through a means with objectivity, and in objectivity with itself. The means is the middle term of the syllogism. The end, because it is finite, requires a means for its realization—a means, that is a middle term, that at the same time has the shape of an *external* existence indifferent to the end itself and its realization. The absolute Notion possesses mediation within itself in such a manner that its first positing is not a presupposing whose object would have indifferent externality for its fundamental determination; on the contrary, the world as a creation has only the form of such externality, but its fundamental determination is really constituted by its negativity and positedness. The finitude of end consists accordingly in this, that its determining is altogether external to itself, and so its first determining, as we have seen, divides itself into a positing and a presupposing; therefore the *negation* of this determining, too, is so far only in one aspect already a reflection-into-self; in the other, it is in fact merely a *first* negation; in other words the very reflection-into-self is also external to itself and a reflection outwards.

The means is therefore the *formal* middle term of a *formal* syllogism; it is *external* as against the *extreme* of the subjective end, and therefore also to the extreme of the objective end; just as

particularity in the formal syllogism is an indifferent *medius terminus* that can be replaced by others. Further, just as this particularity is middle term only by being determinateness in relation to one extreme and a universal in relation to the other, and therefore owes its mediating determination to its relation to other terms, so the means, too, is only the mediating middle term, first because it is an immediate object, secondly because it is a means by virtue of the relation it possesses *externally* to the extreme of the end—a relation that is for it a form to which it is indifferent.

Notion and objectivity are therefore only externally combined in the means, which is accordingly a merely *mechanical object*. The relation of the object to the end is a premiss, or the immediate relation which with regard to the end has been shown to be *reflection into itself*, the means, is an inhering predicate; its objectivity is subsumed under the determination of end which on account of its concretion is universality. By virtue of this determination of end present in the means, the latter is now also subsumptive in relation to the other extreme of the initially still indeterminate objectivity. Conversely, in contrast to the subjective end, the means, as *immediate objectivity*, has a *universality of existence* that the subjective individuality of the end still lacks. The end being thus in the first instance only an external determinateness in the means, it is itself, as a negative unity, outside it; just as the means is a mechanical object that possesses the end only as a determinateness, not as simple concretion of the totality. As the unifying element, however, the middle term must itself be the totality of the end. It has been seen that the determination of end in the means is at the same time reflection-into-self; it is in so far *formal* self-relation, since the *determinateness*, as *real indifference*, is posited as the *objectivity* of the means. But for this very reason, this, in one respect, pure subjectivity, is at the same time also *activity*. In the subjective end the negative relation-to-self is still identical with determinateness as such, with content and externality. But in the incipient objectification of the end, in the becoming-other of the simple Notion, these moments separate themselves, or conversely, it is in such separation that this becoming-other or externality consists.

Consequently, this whole middle term is itself the totality of the syllogism, in which the abstract activity and the external means constitute the extremes, and their middle term is constituted by

that determinateness of the object by the end, which makes it a means. But further, *universality* is the *relation* of the activity of the end and the means. The means is an object, *in itself* the totality of the Notion; it has no power of resistance against the end, as it has in the first instance against another immediate object. To the end, therefore, which is the posited Notion, it is absolutely penetrable, and receptive of this communication, because it is *in itself* identical with the end. But now it is also *posited* as penetrable by the Notion, for in centrality it is an object striving towards the negative unity; similarly in chemism, it is as a neutral and also as a *different* object, no longer self-subsistent. Its lack of self-subsistence consists precisely in its being only *in itself* the totality of the Notion; but the latter is a being-for-self. Consequently the object has the character of being powerless against the end and of serving it; the end is the object's subjectivity or soul, that has in the object its external side.

The object, being in this manner *immediately* subjected to the end, is not an extreme of the syllogism; but this relation constitutes one of its premisses. But the means has also a side from which it still has self-subsistence as against the end. The objectivity that is connected with the end in the means is still external to it, because it is only immediately so connected; and therefore the *presupposition* still persists. The activity of the end through the means is for that reason still directed against this presupposition, and the end is activity and no longer merely an urge and a striving, precisely because the moment of objectivity is posited in the means in its determinateness as something external, and the simple unity of the Notion now has this objectivity *as such* in itself.

C. THE REALIZED END

1. The end in its relation to the means is already reflected into itself, but its *objective* return into itself is not yet posited. The activity of the end through its means is still directed against objectivity as an original presupposition; the nature of this activity is precisely this, to be indifferent to the determinateness. Were the activity again to consist in merely determining the immediate objectivity, the product would again be merely a means, and so on to infinity; the outcome would be only a means suitable to the end, but not the objectivity of the end itself. Therefore the end

which is active in its means, in determining the immediate object must not do so *as a determinant external to it*, and consequently the object must spontaneously conform to the unity of the Notion; in other words, the former external activity of the end through its means must determine itself as *mediation* and sublate its own self.

The relation of the activity of the end through the means to the external object is in the first instance the *second premiss* of the syllogism—an *immediate* relation of the middle term to the other extreme. It is *immediate* because the middle term has an external object in it and the other extreme is another such object. The means is effective and potent against the latter because its own object is connected with the self-determining activity, while for the other object the immediate determinateness that it possesses is an indifferent one. Their process in this relation is none other than the mechanical or chemical one; in this objective externality the previous relationships emerge but under the dominance of the end. These processes, however, as they themselves showed, spontaneously return into the end. If, therefore, in the first instance, the relation of the means to the external object it has to work upon is an immediate one, it has already at an earlier stage exhibited itself as a syllogism, the end having proved itself to be their true middle term and unity. As, therefore, the means is the object that stands on the side of the end and has within it the activity of the end, the mechanism that is found here is at the same time the return of objectivity into itself, into the Notion, which however is already presupposed as the end; the negative attitude of purposive activity towards the object is thus not an *external* attitude, but the alteration and transition of objectivity in its own self into the end.

That the end relates itself immediately to an object and makes it a means, as also that through this means it determines another object, may be regarded as *violence* [*Gewalt*] in so far as the end appears to be of quite another nature than the object, and the two objects similarly are mutually independent totalities. But that the end posits itself in a *mediate* relation with the object and *interposes* another object *between* itself and it, may be regarded as the *cunning* of reason. The finitude of rationality has, as remarked, this side, that the end enters into relationship with the presupposition, that is, with the externality of the object. In the *immediate relation* to the object, it would itself enter into the sphere of mechanism or

chemism and thereby be subject to contingency and the loss of its determination as the Notion that is in and for itself. But as it is, it puts forward an object as means, allows it to wear itself out in its stead, exposes it to attrition and shields itself behind it from mechanical violence.

Further, since the end is finite it has a finite content; accordingly it is not an absolute, nor simply something that in its own nature is *rational.* But the *means* is the external middle term of the syllogism which is the realization of the end; in the means, therefore, the rationality in it manifests itself as such by maintaining itself in *this external other*, and precisely *through* this externality. To this extent the *means* is *superior* to the *finite* ends of *external* purposiveness: the *plough* is more honourable than are immediately the enjoyments procured by it and which are ends. The *tool* lasts, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over external nature, even though in respect of his ends he is, on the contrary, subject to it.

But the end does not merely keep outside the mechanical process; rather it maintains itself in it and is its determination. The end, as the Notion that freely exists in face of the object and its process and is a self-determining activity, is no less the absolute truth of mechanism, and therefore in mechanism it is only meeting with itself. The power of the end over the object is this explicit identity and its activity is the manifestation of it. The end as *content* is the *determinateness* that exists in and for itself, which appears in the object as indifferent and external; but the activity of the end is, on the one hand, the *truth* of the process and as negative unity the *sublating of the illusory show of externality.* From the *abstract* point of view, it is the indifferent determinateness of the object that equally externally is replaced by another; but the simple *abstraction* of the determinateness is in its *truth* the totality of the negative, the concrete Notion that posits externality within itself.

The *content* of the end is its negativity as *simple particularity reflected into itself*, distinguished from its totality as *form.* On account of this *simplicity* whose determinateness is in and for itself the totality of the Notion, the content appears as the *permanently identical* element in the realization of the end. The teleological process is the *translation* of the Notion that has a distinct concrete existence as Notion into objectivity; this translation into a pre-

supposed other is seen to be the meeting of the Notion *with itself through itself*. Now the content of the end is this identity that has a concrete existence in the form of the identical. In every transition the Notion maintains itself; for example, when cause becomes effect it is only the cause meeting with itself in the effect; but in the teleological transition it is the Notion that as such already has a concrete existence *as cause*, as the absolute concrete unity that is *free* in the face of objectivity and its external determinability. The externality into which the end translates itself is itself, as we have seen, already posited as moment of the Notion, as form of its immanent differentiation. The end possesses, therefore, in externality *its own moment*; and the content, as content of the concrete unity, is its *simple form*, which not merely remains *implicitly* self-identical in the distinct moments of the end—as subjective end, as means and mediating activity, and as objective end—but also has a concrete existence as the abiding self-identical.

It can therefore be said of the teleological activity that in it the end is the beginning, the consequent the ground, the effect the cause, that it is a becoming of what has become, that in it only what already exists comes into existence, and so forth; which means that in general all the determinations of relationship belonging to the sphere of reflection or of immediate being have lost their distinctions, and what was enunciated as an *other*, such as end, consequent, effect, etc., no longer has in the end relation the determination of an other, but on the contrary is posited as identical with the simple Notion.

2. Now examining more closely the product of the teleological activity, we see that it contains the end only externally, in so far as it is an absolute presupposition over against the subjective end; that is to say, in so far as we stop short at the point of view that the purposive activity through its means is only in a mechanical relation with the object, and instead of positing one indifferent determinateness of the latter posits *another* equally external to it. A determinateness of this kind, which an object possesses through the end, differs in general from another merely mechanical one by the fact that the former is moment of a *unity*, so that although the determinateness is indeed external to the object, yet it is not in its own self something merely external. The object that exhibits such a unity is a whole, towards which its parts, its own externality, is

indifferent; a determinate *concrete* unity which unites within itself distinct relations and determinatenesses. This unity which cannot be comprehended from the specific nature of the object, and as regards determinate content is another content than that peculiar to the object, is not *by itself* a mechanical determinateness, but it is still mechanically related to the object. Just as in this product of the purposive activity the content of the end and the content of the object are external to each other, so a like relation holds between the determinations of this activity in the other moments of the syllogism—in the unifying middle term, between the purposive activity and the object which is means, and in the subjective end, the other extreme, between the infinite form as totality of the Notion and its content. According to the *relation* by which the subjective end is united with objectivity, both premisses alike—the relation of the object determined as means to the still external object, and the relation of the subjective end to the object which is made means—are immediate relations. The syllogism therefore suffers from the defect of the formal syllogism in general, that the relations of which it consists, are not themselves conclusions or mediations, but in fact already presuppose the conclusion for whose production they are supposed to serve as means.

If we consider one of the *premisses,* the immediate relation of the subjective end to the object which thereby becomes the means, then the former cannot immediately relate itself to the latter; for the latter is no less immediate than the object of the other extreme, in which the end is to be realized *through mediation.* Since they are thus posited as *diverse*, it is necessary to interpolate between this objectivity and the subjective end a means of their relation; but this means is likewise an object already determined by the end, and between that object's objectivity and the teleological determination a new means must be interpolated, and so on to infinity. Thus there is posited the *infinite progress of mediation.* The same thing takes place in respect of the other premiss, the relation of the means to the as yet undetermined object. Since they are absolutely self-subsistent, they can only be united in a third, and so on to infinity. Or conversely, since the premisses already presuppose the *conclusion,* the conclusion, being based on these merely immediate premisses, can only be imperfect. The conclusion or the *product* of the purposive act is nothing but an object determined by an end external to it; *consequently it is the same thing as the means.* In

such a product, therefore, *only a means*, not *a realized end*, has resulted, or the end has not truly attained an objectivity in it. It is therefore a matter of complete indifference whether we regard an object determined by external end as a realized end or only as a means; the determination here is relative, external to the object itself and not objective. All objects, therefore, in which an external end is realized, are equally only a means of the end. Whatever is intended to be used for realizing an end and to be taken essentially as means, is a means which, in accordance with its destiny, is to be destroyed. But the object that is supposed to contain the realized end, and to represent the objectivity of the end, is also perishable; it too fulfils its end not by a tranquil existence in which it preserves itself, but only in so far as it is worn away; for only thus does it conform to the unity of the Notion, in that its externality, that is, its objectivity, sublates itself in that unity. A house, a clock, may appear as ends in relation to the tools employed for their production; but the stones and beams, or wheels and axles, and so on, which constitute the actuality of the end fulfil that end only through the pressure that they suffer, through the chemical processes with air, light, and water to which they are exposed and that deprive man of them by their friction and so forth. Accordingly, they fulfil their destiny only by being used and worn away and they correspond to what they are supposed to be only through their negation. They are not positively united with the end, because they possess self-determination only externally and are only relative ends, or essentially nothing but means.

These ends, as we have seen, have in general a limited content; their form is the infinite self-determination of the Notion, which through that content has limited itself to an external individuality. The limited content makes these ends inadequate to the infinity of the Notion and reduces them to an untruth; such a determinateness is already through the sphere of necessity, through being, at the mercy of becoming and alteration and must pass away.

3. Thus we obtain the result that external purposiveness which has as yet only the form of teleology, really only comes to be a means, not an objective end—because the subjective end remains an external subjective determination; or, in so far as the end is active and realizes itself, though only in a means it is still connected with the object *immediately*, immersed in it; it is itself an object, and the end, one may say, does not attain to a means, because the

realization of the end is a prior requirement before that realization could be brought about through a means.

In fact, however, the result is not only an external end relation, but the truth of it, an internal end relation and an objective end. The externality of the object, self-subsistent as against the Notion, which the end presupposes for itself is *posited* in this presupposition as an unessential illusory show and is also already sublated in and for itself; the activity of the end is therefore, strictly speaking, only the representation of this illusory show and the sublating of it. As the Notion has shown us, the first object becomes by communication a means, because it is in itself totality of the Notion, and its determinateness which is none other than externality itself is posited merely *as* something external and unessential and therefore appears within the end itself as the end's own moment, not as a self-subsistent moment relatively to the end. Thus the determination of the object as a means is purely an immediate one. Accordingly, in order to make that object a means, the subjective end requires to use no violence against the object, no reinforcement against it other than the reinforcing of itself; the *resolve* [*Entschluss*], the explication [*Aufschluss*], this determination of itself, is the *merely posited* externality of the object, which appears therein as immediately subjected to the end and possesses no other determination counter to it than that of the nullity of the being-in-and-for-self.

The second sublating of objectivity by objectivity differs from the above as follows: the former sublation, as the first, is the end in objective *immediacy*, and therefore the second is not merely the sublating of a first immediacy but of both, of the objective as something merely posited, and of the immediate. In this way, the negativity returns into itself in such a manner that it is equally a restoration of the objectivity but of an objectivity identical with it, and in this it is as at the same time also a positing of the objectivity as an external objectivity determined only by the end. Through the latter circumstance this product remains as before also a means; through the former it is objectivity that is identical with the Notion, the realized end, in which the side of being a means is the reality of the end itself. In the realized end the means vanishes, for it would be the objectivity that is as yet only immediately subsumed under the end, and in the realized end objectivity is present as the return of the end into itself; further, with it there also vanishes the

mediation itself as a relation of something external, on the one side, into the concrete identity of the objective end, and on the other, into the same identity as abstract identity and immediacy of existence.

Herein is also contained the mediation that was demanded for the first premiss, the immediate relation of the end to the object. The realized end is also means, and conversely the truth of the means is just this, to be itself a real end, and the first sublating of objectivity is already also the second, just as the second proved to contain the first, as well. That is to say, the Notion *determines itself*; its determinateness is external indifference, which is immediately determined in the resolution [*Entschluss*] as *sublated*, namely as *internal, subjective* indifference, and at the same time as a *presupposed object*. Its further passage out from itself which appeared, namely, as an *immediate* communication and subsumption of the presupposed object under it, is at the same time a sublating of the former determinateness of externality that was internal and *enclosed within the Notion*, that is, posited as sublated, and at the same time a sublating of the presupposition of an object; consequently, this apparently first sublating of the indifferent objectivity is already the second as well, a reflection-into-self that has passed through mediation, and the realized end.

Since the Notion here in the sphere of objectivity, where its determinateness has the form of *indifferent externality*, is in reciprocal action with itself, the exposition of its movement here becomes doubly difficult and involved, because this movement is itself double and a first is always a second also. In the Notion taken by itself, that is in its subjectivity, its difference from itself appears as an *immediate* identical totality on its own account; but since its determinateness here is indifferent externality, its identity with itself in this externality is also immediately again self-repulsion, so that what is determined as external and indifferent to the identity is the identity itself; and the identity as identity, as reflected into itself, is rather its other. Only by keeping this firmly in mind can we grasp the objective return of the Notion into itself, that is, the true objectification of the Notion—grasp that each of the single moments through which this mediation runs its course is itself the entire syllogism of those moments. Thus the original *inner* externality of the Notion through which it is self-repellent unity, the end and the striving of the end towards objectification,

is the immediate positing or presupposition of an external object; the *self-determination* is also the determination of an *external object* not determined by the Notion; and conversely, the latter determination is self-determination, that is, externality sublated and *posited as internal*—or the certainty of the *unessentiality* of the external object. Of the second relation, the determination of the object as means, it has just been shown how it is within itself the mediation of the end in the object with itself. Similarly, the third relation, mechanism, which proceeds under the dominance of the end and sublates the object by the object, is on the one hand a sublating of the means, of the object already posited as sublated and is therefore a second sublating and a reflection-into-self; while on the other hand it is a first determining of the external object. The latter, as has been remarked, is the production again in the realized end only of a means; the subjectivity of the finite Notion, contemptuously rejecting the means, has attained to nothing better in its goal. But this reflection that the end is reached in the means, and that in the fulfilled end, means and mediation are preserved, is the *last result of the external end-relation*, a result in which that relation has sublated itself, and which it has exhibited as its truth. The third syllogism that was considered last is distinguished by the fact that it is, in the first place, the subjective purposive activity of the preceding syllogisms, but is also the *spontaneous* sublation of external objectivity, and therewith of externality in general, and hence is *the totality in its positedness*.

First we saw subjectivity, the Notion's *being-for-self*, pass over into its *in-itself*, *objectivity*, to be followed by the reappearance in the latter of the negativity of the Notion's being-for-self; in that negativity the Notion has determined itself in such a manner that its *particularity* is an *external objectivity*, or it has determined itself as a simple concrete unity whose externality is its self-determination. The movement of the end has now reached the stage where the moment of externality is not merely posited in the Notion, where the end is not merely an *ought-to-be* and a *striving* to realize itself, but as a concrete totality is identical with the immediate objectivity. This identity is on the one hand the simple Notion and the equally *immediate* objectivity, but on the other hand, it is just as essentially a *mediation*, and only through the latter as a self-sublating mediation is it that simple immediacy;

the Notion is therefore essentially this: to be distinct as an explicit identity from its *implicit* objectivity, and thereby to possess externality, yet in this external totality to be the totality's self-determining identity. As such, the Notion is now the *Idea*.

Section Three: The Idea

The Idea is the *adequate Notion*, that which is objectively *true*, or the *true as such*. When anything whatever possesses truth, it possesses it through its Idea, or, *something possesses truth only in so far as it is Idea*. The expression 'idea' has often been employed in philosophy as in ordinary life for 'notion', indeed, even for a mere ordinary conception: 'I have no *idea* yet of this lawsuit, building, neighbourhood', means nothing more than the ordinary conception. Kant has reclaimed the expression Idea for the *notion of reason*. Now according to Kant, the notion of reason is supposed to be the notion of the *unconditioned*, but a notion *transcendent* in regard to phenomena, that is, no *empirical use* can be made of such notion that is *adequate to it*. The notions of reason are to serve for the comprehension of perceptions, the notions of the understanding for understanding them. But in fact, if the latter really are *Notions*, then *they are Notions*—they enable one to comprehend [*begreifen*], and an *understanding* of perceptions by means of notions of the understanding will be a *comprehension* of them. But if understanding is only a determining of perceptions by such categories as for example whole and parts, force, cause, and the like, it signifies only a determining by reflection; and similarly, by understanding can be meant only the specific *representation* of a completely determined sensuous content; thus when someone, having been directed that at the end of the wood he must turn left, replies 'I *understand*', *understanding* means nothing more than the grasping of something in pictorial thought and in memory. '*Notion of reason*', too, is a somewhat clumsy expression; for the Notion is something altogether rational; and in so far as reason is distinguished from understanding and the Notion as such, it is the totality of the Notion and of objectivity. In this sense the Idea is the *rational*; it is the unconditioned, because only that has conditions which essentially relates itself to an objectivity, but an objectivity that it has not itself determined but which still confronts it in the form of indifference and externality, just as the external end still had conditions.

Reserving then the expression 'Idea' for the objective or real Notion and distinguishing it from the Notion itself and still more from mere pictorial thought, we must also reject even more vigor-

ously that estimate of the Idea according to which it is not anything actual, and true thoughts are said to be *only ideas*. If *thoughts* are merely *subjective* and contingent, they certainly have no further value; but in this respect they are not inferior to temporal and contingent *actualities* which likewise have no further value than that of contingencies and phenomena. On the other hand if, conversely, the Idea is not to have the value of truth, because in regard to phenomena it is *transcendent*, and no congruent object can be assigned to it in the world of sense, this is an odd misunderstanding that would deny objective validity to the Idea because it lacks that which constitutes Appearance, namely, the *untrue being* of the objective world. In regard to practical Ideas, Kant recognizes that 'nothing can be more harmful and unworthy of a philosopher than the *vulgar* appeal to an *experience* that allegedly conflicts with the Idea. This very experience would not even exist if, for example, political institutions had been established at the proper time in conformity with Ideas, and if *crude conceptions*, crude just because they had been drawn from experience, had not taken the place of Ideas and so nullified every good intention.' Kant regards the Idea as a necessity and as the goal which, as the *archetype*, it must be our endeavour to set up for a maximum and to which we must strive to bring the condition of the actual world ever nearer.

But having reached the result that the Idea is the unity of the Notion and objectivity, is the true, it must not be regarded merely as a *goal* to which we have to approximate but which itself always remains a kind of *beyond*; on the contrary, we must recognize that everything actual *is* only in so far as it possesses the Idea and expresses it. It is not merely that the object, the objective and subjective world in general, *ought to be congruous* with the Idea, but they are themselves the congruence of Notion and reality; the reality that does not correspond to the Notion is mere *Appearance*, the subjective, contingent, capricious element that is not the truth. When it is said that no object is to be found in experience that is perfectly congruous with the *Idea*, one is opposing the Idea as a subjective standard to the actual; but what anything actual is supposed in truth *to be*, if its Notion is not in it and if its objectivity does not correspond to its Notion at all, it is impossible to say; for it would be nothing. It is true that the mechanical and chemical object, like the non-spiritual subject and the spirit that is conscious

only of the finite, not of its essence, do not, according to their various natures, have their Notion existent in them *in its own free form*. But they can only be true at all in so far as they are the union of their Notion and reality, of their soul and their body. Wholes like the state and the church cease to exist when the unity of their Notion and their reality is dissolved; man, the living being, is dead when soul and body are parted in him; dead nature, the mechanical and chemical world—taking, that is, the dead world to mean the inorganic world, otherwise it would have no positive meaning at all—dead nature, then, if it is separated into its Notion and its reality, is nothing but the subjective abstraction of a thought form and a formless matter. *Spirit* that was not Idea, was not the unity of the Notion with its own self, or the Notion that did not have the Notion itself for its reality would be dead, spiritless spirit, a material object.

The Idea being the unity of Notion and reality, *being* has attained the significance of *truth*; therefore what now *is* is only what is Idea. Finite things are finite because they do not possess the complete reality of their Notion within themselves, but require other things to complete it—or, conversely, because they are presupposed as objects, hence possess the Notion as an external determination. The highest to which they attain on the side of this finitude is external purposiveness. That actual things are not congruous with the Idea is the side of their *finitude* and *untruth*, and in accordance with this side they are *objects*, determined in accordance with their various spheres and in the relationships of objectivity, either mechanically, chemically or by an external end. That the Idea has not completely leavened its reality, has imperfectly subdued it to the Notion, this is a possibility arising from the fact that the Idea itself has a *restricted content*, that though it is essentially the unity of Notion and reality, it is no less essentially their difference; for only the object is their immediate, that is, merely *implicit* unity. But if an object, for example the state, *did not correspond at all* to its Idea, that is, if in fact it was not the Idea of the state at all, if its reality, which is the self-conscious individuals, did not correspond at all to the Notion, its soul and its body would have parted; the former would escape into the solitary regions of thought, the latter would have broken up into the single individualities. But because the Notion of the state so essentially constitutes the nature of these individualities, it is present in them

as an urge so powerful that they are impelled to translate it into reality, be it only in the form of external purposiveness, or to put up with it as it is, or else they must needs perish. The worst state, one whose reality least corresponds to the Notion, in so far as it still exists, is still Idea; the individuals still obey a dominant Notion.

However, the Idea has not merely the more general meaning of the *true being*, of the unity of *Notion* and *reality*, but the more specific one of the unity of *subjective Notion* and *objectivity*. That is to say, the Notion as such is itself already the identity of itself and *reality*; for the indefinite expression 'reality' means in general nothing else but *determinate being*, and this the Notion possesses in its particularity and individuality. Similarly too, *objectivity* is the total *Notion* that out of its determinateness has withdrawn into *identity* with itself. In the former subjectivity the determinateness or difference of the Notion is an *illusory being* [*Schein*] that is immediately sublated and has withdrawn into being-for-self or negative unity; it is an *inhering* predicate. But in this objectivity the determinateness is posited as an immediate totality, as an external whole. Now the Idea has shown itself to be the Notion liberated again into its subjectivity from the immediacy in which it is submerged in the object; to be the Notion that distinguishes itself from its objectivity, which however is no less determined by it and possesses its substantiality only in that Notion. This identity has therefore rightly been defined as the *subject-object*, for it is as well the formal or subjective Notion as it is the object as such. But this must be understood more precisely. The Notion, having truly attained its reality, is this absolute judgement whose *subject*, as self-related negative unity, distinguishes itself from its objectivity and is the latter's being-in-and-for-self, but essentially relates itself to it through itself; it is therefore its *own end* [*Selbstzweck*] and the *urge* to realize it; but for this very reason the subject does not possess objectivity in an immediate manner, for if it did it would be merely the totality of the object as such lost in objectivity; on the contrary, objectivity is the realization of the end, an objectivity *posited* by the activity of the end, an objectivity which, as *positedness*, possesses its subsistence and its form only as permeated by its subject. As objectivity, it has in it the moment of the *externality* of the Notion and is therefore in general the side of finitude, change and Appearance, a side, however, which meets

with extinction in its retraction into the negative unity of the Notion; the negativity whereby its indifferent mutual externality exhibits itself as unessential and a positivity, is the Notion itself. The Idea is, therefore, in spite of this objectivity utterly *simple* and *immaterial*, for the externality exists only as determined by the Notion and as taken up into its negative unity; in so far as it exists as indifferent externality it is not merely at the mercy of mechanism in general but exists only as the transitory and untrue. Although therefore the Idea has its reality in a material externality, this is not an abstract *being* subsisting on its own account over against the Notion; on the contrary, it exists only as a *becoming* through the negativity of indifferent being, as a simple determinateness of the Notion.

This yields the following more precise definitions of the Idea. First, it is the simple truth, the identity of the Notion and objectivity as *a universal* in which the opposition and subsistence of the particular is dissolved into its self-identical negativity and is equality with itself. Secondly, it is the *relation* of the explicit subjectivity of the simple Notion and its objectivity which is *distinguished* therefrom; the former is essentially the *urge* to sublate this separation, and the latter is the indifferent positedness, the subsistence that is in and for itself null. As this relation, the Idea is the *process* of sundering itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again of bringing this inorganic nature under the power of the subject and returning to the first simple universality. The *identity* of the Idea with itself is one with the *process*; the thought which liberates actuality from the illusory show of purposeless mutability and transfigures it into the Idea must not represent this truth of actuality as a dead repose, as a mere *picture*, lifeless, without impulse or movement, as a genius or number, or an abstract thought; by virtue of the freedom which the Notion attains in the Idea, the Idea possesses within itself also the *most stubborn opposition*; its repose consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes that opposition, in it meeting with *itself*.

In the first instance, however, the Idea is once again only *immediate* or only in its *Notion*; objective reality is, it is true, conformable to the Notion, but it is not yet liberated into the Notion, and the latter does not exist explicitly *for itself as Notion*. Thus though the Notion is *soul*, it is soul in the guise of an

immediate, that is, its determinateness does not appear *as* soul itself, it has not grasped itself as soul, it does not possess its objective reality within itself; the Notion is as a soul that is not yet *fully a soul.*

At this first stage the Idea is *Life*: the Notion that, distinguished from its objectivity, simple within itself, pervades its objectivity and, as its own end, possesses its means in the objectivity and posits the latter as its means, yet is immanent in this means and is therein the realized end that is identical with itself. This Idea, on account of its immediacy, has *individuality* for the form of its existence. But the reflection-into-self of its absolute process is the sublating of this immediate individuality; thereby the Notion which, as universality in this individuality, is the *inwardness* of the latter, converts the externality into universality, or posits its objectivity as being the same as itself.

In this second stage, the Idea is the Idea of the *true* and the *good*, as *cognition* and *volition*. In the first instance, it is finite cognition and finite volition, in which the true and the good are still distinguished and each appears as yet only as a *goal*. The Notion has, in the first instance, liberated *itself* into itself and as yet given itself only an *abstract objectivity* for its reality. But the process of this finite cognition and action converts the initially abstract universality into a totality, whereby it becomes a *complete objectivity*. Or, to consider it from the other side, finite, that is, subjective spirit, *makes* for itself the *presupposition* of an objective world, just as life *has* such a presupposition; but its activity consists in sublating this presupposition and converting it into a positedness. In this way its reality is for it the objective world, or conversely, the objective world is the ideality in which it cognizes itself.

Thirdly, spirit cognizes the Idea as its *absolute truth*, as the truth that is in and for itself; the infinite Idea in which cognition and action are equalized, and which is the *absolute knowledge of itself*.

CHAPTER I

LIFE

The Idea of Life is concerned with a subject matter so concrete, and if you will so real, that with it we may seem to have overstepped the domain of logic as it is commonly conceived. Certainly, if logic were to contain nothing but empty, dead forms of thought, there could be no mention in it at all of such a content as the Idea of life. But if absolute truth is the subject matter of logic, and *truth* as such is essentially *in cognition*, then *cognition* at least would have to be discussed. So-called pure logic is usually followed up with an *applied* logic—a logic dealing with *concrete cognition*, not to mention the mass of *psychology* and *anthropology* that it is often deemed necessary to interpolate into logic. But the anthropological and psychological side of cognition is concerned with its *manifested aspect* [*Erscheinung*], in which the Notion on its own account has not yet come to have an objectivity the same as itself, that is, to have itself for object. The part of logic that treats of this concrete side does not belong to *applied logic* as such; if it did, then every science would have to be dragged into logic, for each is an applied logic in so far as it consists in apprehending its subject matter in forms of thought and the Notion. The subjective Notion has presuppositions which present themselves in psychological, anthropological and other forms. But to logic belong only the presuppositions of the pure Notion in so far as they have the form of pure thoughts, of abstract essentialities, that is, the determinations of *being* and *essence*. Similarly, in respect of *cognition*, the Notion's apprehension of itself, logic will not deal with other shapes of its presupposition but only with that which is itself Idea; this latter, however, necessarily falls to be dealt with in logic. Now this presupposition is the *immediate* Idea; for since cognition is the Notion in so far as this is for itself but as a subjectivity is in relation to an objectivity, the Notion is related to the Idea as *presupposed* or *immediate* Idea. But the immediate Idea is *life*.

To this extent the necessity of treating of the Idea of life in logic would be based on the necessity, otherwise recognized, too, of treating here of the concrete Notion of cognition. But this Idea

has come upon the scene through the Notion's own necessity; the *Idea*, that which is *true* in and for itself, is essentially the subject matter of logic; since it is at first to be considered in its immediacy, it must be apprehended and cognized in this determinateness in which it is *life*, in order that its treatment shall not be an empty affair devoid of determinate content. All that we need perhaps to remark is how far the logical view of life differs from any other scientific view of it; this is not the place, however, to concern ourselves with how life is treated in the unphilosophical sciences, but only with differentiating logical life as pure Idea from natural life which is dealt with in the *philosophy of nature*, and from life in so far as it stands in connexion with *spirit*. The former of these, as the life of nature, is life as projected into the *externality of existence* and having its *condition* in inorganic nature, and where the moments of the Idea are a multiplicity of actual formations. Life in the Idea is without such *presuppositions* which are in the form of shapes of actuality; its presupposition is the *Notion* as we have considered it, on the one hand as subjective, on the other hand as objective. In nature life appears as the highest stage, a stage that nature's externality attains by withdrawing into itself and sublating itself in subjectivity. In Logic it is simple inwardness [*Insichsein*], which in the Idea of life has attained an externality that genuinely corresponds to it; the Notion that earlier appeared on the scene as subjective Notion is the soul of life itself; it is the urge that mediates for itself its reality throughout objectivity. Nature, having reached this Idea from the starting point of its externality, transcends itself; its end does not appear as its beginning, but as its limit, in which it sublates itself. Similarly, in the Idea of life the moments of its reality do not receive the shape of external actuality but remain enclosed within the form of the Notion.

In *spirit*, however, life appears partly as opposed to it, partly as posited as at one with it, this unity being reborn as the pure offspring of spirit. For here life is to be taken generally in its proper sense as *natural life*, for what is called the *life of spirit* as spirit, is its peculiar nature that stands opposed to mere life; just as we speak, too, of the nature of *spirit*, although spirit is not a natural being and is rather the opposite of nature. Life as such, then, is for spirit partly a *means*, and as such spirit opposes it to itself; partly spirit is a living individual and life is its body; and again, this unity of spirit with its living corporeality is born from spirit

itself as an *ideal.* None of these relations to spirit concerns logical life and life is to be considered here neither as instrument [*Mittel*] of a spirit, nor as a moment of the ideal and of beauty. In both cases, as *natural* life and as life standing in relation *with spirit*, life possesses a *determinateness of its externality*, in the first case through its presuppositions which are other formations of nature, in the second case through the ends and the activity of spirit. The Idea of life by itself is free from the former presupposed and conditioning objectivity as well as from relation to the latter subjectivity.

Life, considered now more closely in its Idea, is in and for itself absolute *universality*; the objectivity that it possesses is permeated throughout by the Notion and has the Notion alone for substance. What is distinguished as part, or in accordance with some other external reflection, has within itself the whole Notion; the Notion is the *omnipresent* soul in it, which remains simple self-relation and remains a one in the multiplicity belonging to objective being. This multiplicity, as self-external objectivity, has an indifferent subsistence, which in space and time, if these could already be mentioned here, is a mutual externality of wholly diverse and self-subsistent elements. But in life externality is at the same time present as the *simple determinateness* of its Notion; thus the soul is an omnipresent outpouring of itself into this multiplicity and at the same remains absolutely the simple oneness of the concrete Notion with itself. The thinking that clings to the determinations of the relationships of reflection and of the formal Notion, when it comes to consider life, this unity of its Notion in the externality of objectivity, in the absolute multiplicity of atomistic matter, finds all its thoughts without exception are of no avail; the omnipresence of the simple in manifold externality is for reflection an absolute contradiction, and as reflection must at the same time apprehend this omnipresence from its perception of life and therefore admit the actuality of this Idea, it is an *incomprehensible mystery* for it, because it does not grasp the Notion, and the Notion as the substance of life. This simple life, however, is not only omnipresent; it is absolutely the *subsistence* and *immanent substance* of its objectivity; but as subjective substance it is the *urge*, and moreover the *specific urge*, of the *particular* difference, and no less essentially the one and universal urge of the specialized difference that reduces this its particularization into unity and maintains it

therein. It is only as this *negative unity* of its objectivity and particularization that life is a self-related life that is for itself, a soul. As such it is essentially an individual, which relates itself to objectivity as to an *other*, to a non-living nature. Consequently the original *judgement* of life consists in this, that it detaches itself as an individual subject from objectivity, and in constituting itself the negative unity of the Notion, makes the *presupposition* of an immediate objectivity.

Life is therefore first to be considered as a *living individual* that is for itself the subjective totality and is presupposed as indifferent to an objectivity that confronts it as indifferent.

Secondly, it is the *life process*, the process of sublating its presupposition, positing as negative the objectivity that is indifferent to it and actualizing itself as that objectivity's power and negative unity. By so doing it makes itself into the universal that is the unity of itself and its other.

Hence life is thirdly the *genus process*, the process of sublating its individualization and relating itself to its objective existence as to *itself*. Accordingly, this process is on the one hand the return to its Notion and the repetition of the first diremption, the becoming of a new individuality and the death of the first, immediate one; but on the other hand, the *Notion* of life that has *withdrawn into itself* is the becoming of the Notion that is in relationship with itself and exists universally and freely for itself—the transition into *cognition*.

A. THE LIVING INDIVIDUAL

1. The Notion of life, or universal life, is the immediate Idea, the Notion whose objectivity corresponds to it; but its objectivity corresponds to it only in so far as the Notion is the negative unity of this externality, that is to say, *posits* it as corresponding to the Notion. The infinite relation of the Notion to itself is as negativity a self-determining, the diremption of itself *into itself as subjective individuality and itself as indifferent universality*. The Idea of life in its immediacy is as yet only the creative universal soul. By reason of this immediacy, its first negative relation of the Idea within it is the self-determination of itself as *Notion*—the *implicit* positing that only becomes *explicit* or *for itself* through its return into itself—a creative *presupposing*. Through this self-determining, the *universal* life becomes a *particular*; it has thereby sundered

itself into the two extremes of the judgement, which immediately becomes a syllogism.

The determinations of the opposition are the general determinations of the *Notion*, for it is the Notion which has been sundered; but the *filling* of these determinations is the Idea. One extreme is the *unity* of the Notion and reality, which is the Idea, as the *immediate* unity that at an earlier stage appeared as *objectivity*. But here it is in a different determination. There it was the unity of Notion and reality, where the Notion has passed over into the reality in which it is merely lost; it did not stand over against the reality, or in other words, because the Notion is for the reality only an inner, it is merely a reflection *external* to it. That objectivity is therefore the immediate itself in an immediate form. Here, on the contrary, it has proceeded only from the Notion, so that its essence is positedness, and it exists as a *negative*. It is to be regarded as the *side of the universality of the Notion*, consequently as *abstract* universality, essentially only *inhering* in the subject and in the form of immediate *being* which, posited on its own account, is indifferent to the subject. Thus the totality of the Notion which attaches to the objectivity is, as it were, only *lent* to it; the last self-subsistence that objectivity possesses as against the subject is this *being* which, in its truth, is only the above moment of the Notion, the Notion that, as *presupposing*, is in the first determinateness of an *implicit* positing, which does not yet exist *as* a positing, as the unity that is reflected into itself. Self-subsistent objectivity, therefore, having proceeded from the Idea, is immediate being only as the *predicate* of the judgement of the Notion's self-determination—a being that is indeed distinct from the subject, but at the same time is essentially posited as *moment* of the Notion.

In respect of content this objectivity is the totality of the Notion; but this totality is confronted by the subjectivity or negative unity of the Notion, which constitutes the true centrality, namely the Notion's free unity with itself. This *subject* is the Idea in the form of *individuality*, as simple but negative self-identity—the *living individual*.

This is in the first place life as *soul*, as the Notion of itself that is completely determined within itself, the initiating, self-moving *principle*. The Notion in its simplicity contains determinate externality as a *simple* moment enclosed within it. But, further,

this soul *in its immediacy* is immediately external and possesses an objective being of its own—a reality that is subjugated to the end, the immediate *means*, in the first instance, objectivity as *predicate* of the subject; but further, objectivity is also the *middle term* of the syllogism; the corporeality of the soul is that whereby the soul unites itself with external objectivity. The living being possesses corporeality in the first instance as reality that is immediately identical with the Notion; thus it has this corporeality in general by *nature*.

Now because this objectivity is predicate of the individual and taken up into the subjective unity, the earlier determinations of the object, the mechanical or chemical relationship does not attach to it, still less the abstract relationship of reflection, of whole and parts and the like. As externality it is indeed *capable* of such relationships, but to that extent it is not a living being; when the living thing is regarded as a whole consisting of parts, or as a thing operated on by mechanical or chemical causes, as a mechanical or chemical product, whether it be regarded merely as such product or also as determined by an external end, then the Notion is regarded as external to it and it is treated as a *dead* thing. Since the Notion is immanent in it, the *purposiveness* of the living being is to be grasped as *inner*; the Notion is in it as determinate Notion, distinct from its externality, and in its distinguishing, pervading the externality and remaining identical with itself. This objectivity of the living being is the *organism*; it is the *means and instrument* of the end, perfect in its purposiveness since the Notion constitutes its substance; but for that very reason this means and instrument is itself the realized end, in which the subjective end is thus immediately brought into unity with itself. In respect of its externality the organism is a manifold, not of *parts* but of *members*. These members, as such, (*a*) subsist only in the individuality; in so far as they are external and can be apprehended in this externality, they are separable; but when separated, they revert to the mechanical and chemical relationships of common objectivity. (*b*) Their externality is opposed to the negative unity of the living individuality; the latter is therefore the *urge* to posit the abstract moment of the Notion's determinateness as a real difference; since this difference *is immediate*, it is the *urge* of each *single, specific moment* to produce itself, and equally to raise its particularity to universality, sublate the other moments external to it and

produce itself at their expense, but no less to sublate itself and make itself a means for the others.

2. This *process* of the living individuality is restricted to that individuality itself and still falls entirely within it. Above, in the syllogism of external purposiveness, we considered its first premiss, namely that the end relates itself immediately to objectivity and makes it a means, and we found that in this premiss the end does indeed remain similar to itself and has withdrawn into itself in the objectivity, but that the objectivity has not yet *in its own self* sublated itself, and therefore the end is to that extent not yet *in and for itself* in this premiss, and only becomes so in the conclusion. The process of the living being with itself is this same premiss, but in so far as the latter is also conclusion, and in so far as the immediate relation of the subject to objectivity, which objectivity thereby becomes a means and instrument, is at the same time the *negative unity* of the Notion in its own self; the end realizes itself in this its externality by being the subjective power over that externality and the process in which the externality displays its self-dissolution and its return into this the negative unity of the end. The restlessness and mutability of the external side of the living being is the manifestation in it of the Notion, which as in its own self negativity only has an objectivity in so far as the latter's indifferent subsistence reveals itself as self-sublating. The Notion therefore produces itself by its urge in such a manner that the product, the Notion being its essence, is itself the producing agent; that is to say the product is product only as the externality that equally posits itself as negative, or is product only in being the process of production.

3. Now the Idea just considered is the *Notion* of the *living subject* and *its process*; the determinations, which are in relationship with each other, are the self-related *negative unity* of the Notion and *objectivity*, which is the Notion's *means*, but in which it has *returned* into itself. But since these are moments of the Idea of life *within its Notion*, they are not the specific Notion-moments of the *living individual in its reality*. The objectivity or corporeality of this individual is a concrete totality; the above moments are the sides out of which life constitutes itself; they are therefore not the moments of this life that is already constituted by the Idea. But the living *objectivity* as such of the individual, since it is ensouled by the Notion and has the Notion for its substance, also possesses

for its essential difference the determinations of the Notion, *universality*, *particularity* and *individuality*; accordingly the *shape* [*Gestalt*], in which they are *externally* distinguished, is divided or incised (*insectum*) on the basis of that difference.

Thus it is in the first place *universality*, the purely internal vibration of vitality, or *sensibility*. The Notion of universality, as we have found it above, is simple immediacy, which however is this only by being within itself absolute negativity. This Notion of *absolute difference* with its negativity *dissolved* in *simplicity* and self-similar, is brought to view [*Anschaung*] in sensibility. It is inwardness [*Insichsein*], not as abstract simplicity but as an infinitely *determinable* receptivity, which in its *determinateness* does not become something manifold and external, but is simply reflected into itself. *Determinateness* is present in this universality as simple *principle*; the individual external determinateness, a so-called *impression*, returns from its external and manifold determination into this simplicity of *self-feeling*. Sensibility may therefore be regarded as the determinate being of the inwardly existent soul, since it receives all externality into itself, while reducing it to the perfect simplicity of self-similar universality.

The second determination of the Notion is *particularity*, the moment of the *posited* difference, the opening up of the negativity that is locked up in simple self-feeling, or is an ideal, not yet a real, determinateness in it, that is, *irritability*. On account of the abstraction of its negativity, feeling is an urge; it *determines* itself; the self-determination of the living being is its judgement or its self-limitation [*Verendlichung*], whereby it relates itself to the external as to a *presupposed* objectivity and is in reciprocal *activity* with it. Now as a *particular* living being it is on one side a *species* alongside other species of living beings; the *formal* reflection of this *indifferent diversity* into itself is the formal *genus* and its systematization; but the individual reflection is this, that the particularity, the negativity of its determinateness, as a direction outwards, is the self-related negativity of the Notion.

According to this third determination the living being is an *individual*. The precise determination of this reflection-into-self is such that in irritability, the living being is its own externality to itself, to the objectivity which it possesses immediately as its means and instrument, and which is externally determinable. The reflection-into-self sublates this immediacy—on the one side

as a theoretical reflection, that is, in so far as the negativity is present as the simple moment of sensibility that was considered in the latter and which constitutes *feeling*—on the other side as real reflection, in that the unity of the Notion posits itself *in its external objectivity* as negative unity; this is *reproduction*. The first two moments, sensibility and irritability, are abstract determinations; in reproduction life is *concrete* and is vitality; in it, as in its truth, life for the first time has also feeling and the power of resistance. Reproduction is the negativity as simple moment of sensibility, and irritability is only a living power of resistance, so that the relationship to the external is reproduction and individual identity with self. Each of the individual moments is essentially the totality of all; their difference constitutes the ideal form determinateness, which is posited in reproduction as concrete totality of the whole. This whole is, therefore, on the one hand opposed as a third, namely as a *real* totality, to the former determinate totalities, while on the other hand it is their implicit essential nature, and at the same time that in which they are embraced as moments, and in which they have their subject and their subsistence.

With reproduction as the moment of individuality, the living being posits itself as an *actual* individuality, a self-related being-for-self; but at the same time it is a real *relation outwards*, the reflection of *particularity* or irritability *towards an other*, towards the *objective* world. The process of life, which is enclosed within the individual, passes over into a relation to the presupposed objectivity as such, in consequence of the fact that when the individual posits itself as a *subjective* totality, the *moment of its determinateness* as a *relation* to externality becomes a *totality* as well.

B. THE LIFE-PROCESS

The living individual, in shaping itself inwardly, tenses itself against its original act of presupposition, and opposes itself as an absolute subject to the presupposed objective world. The subject is its own end [*Selbstzweck*], the Notion, which has its means and subjective reality in the objectivity that is subjugated to it. As such, it is constituted as the Idea in and for itself and as a being that is essentially self-subsistent, in face of which the presupposed external world has the value only of something negative and lacking

self-subsistence. In its self-feeling the living being has this *certainty* of the intrinsic *nullity* of the *otherness* confronting it. Its urge is the need to sublate this otherness and to give itself the truth of this certainty. The individual is, as subject, in the first instance no more than the *Notion* of the Idea of life; its subjective inward process in which it draws on its own resources, and the immediate objectivity which it posits conformably to its Notion as a natural means is mediated by the process that relates itself to the completely posited externality, to the objective totality standing *indifferently* alongside it.

This process begins with *need*, that is, with a moment that is twofold. First the living being determines itself, in so doing posits itself as denied, and thereby relates itself to an *other* to it, to the indifferent objectivity; but secondly, it is equally not lost in this loss of itself but maintains itself therein and remains the identity of the self-similar Notion; thus it is the urge to posit this *other* world *as its own*, as similar to itself, to sublate it and to objectify *itself*. By doing this, its self-determination has the form of objective externality, and as it is at the same time identical with itself it is absolute *contradiction*. The immediate shape is the Idea in its simple Notion, objectivity that is conformable to the Notion; as such, it is *good* by nature. But since its negative moment realizes itself as an objective particularity, that is, since each of the essential moments of its unity is realized as a separate totality, the Notion is *sundered* into an absolute disparity with itself; and since, all the same, it is absolute identity in this disharmony, the living being is *for itself* this disharmony and has the feeling of this contradiction, which is *pain*. *Pain* is therefore the prerogative of living natures; because they are the existent Notion, they are an actuality of infinite power such that they are within themselves the *negativity* of themselves, that this *their negativity* is *for them*, and that they maintain themselves in their otherness. It is said that contradiction is unthinkable; but the fact is that in the pain of a living being it is even an actual existence.

This diremption of the living being within itself is *feeling*, the diremption being taken up into the simple universality of the Notion, into sensibility. From pain begin the *need* and the *urge* that constitute the transition by which the individual, which is explicitly the negation of itself, becomes also explicitly its own identity—an identity that exists only as the negation of the former

negation. The identity that is in the urge as such is the subjective certainty of itself, in accordance with which it relates itself to its external, indifferently existing world as to an Appearance, to an intrinsically Notionless and unessential actuality. This actuality has to await the subject, which is the immanent end, before it receives the Notion into itself. The indifference of the objective world to the determinateness, and consequently to the end, constitutes its external capability of being conformable to the subject; whatever other specifications it may possess, its mechanical determinability, the absence of the freedom of the immanent Notion, constitutes its impotence to maintain itself against the living being. In so far as the object confronts the living being in the first instance as an indifferent externality, it can act upon it mechanically; but in doing so it is not acting as on a living being; where it enters into relationship with a living being it does not act on it as a cause, but *excites* it. Because the living being is an urge, externality cannot approach or enter it except in so far as it is in its own very nature already *in the living being*; therefore the action on the subject consists merely in the latter finding the externality presented to it *conformable*. This externality may not be conformable to the subject's totality, but at least it must correspond to a particular side of it, and this possibility resides simply in the fact that the subject in its external relationship is a particular.

Now the subject, as specifically related in its need to the externality, and so itself an externality or instrument, uses *violence* on the object. Its particular character, its finitude in general, falls into the more specific manifestation of this relationship. The external element in this is the process of objectivity in general, mechanism and chemism. But this process is immediately broken off and the externality transformed into internality. The external purposiveness that is produced at first by the activity of the subject in the indifferent object is sublated by reason of the fact that the object, relatively to the Notion, is not a substance, and that therefore the Notion cannot become merely the object's external form, but must posit itself as its essence and immanent pervading determination, in conformity with the Notion's original identity.

With the seizure of the object, therefore, the mechanical process passes over into the inner process by which the individual *appropriates* the object in such a manner as to deprive it of its peculiar nature [*Beschaffenheit*], convert it into a means for itself, and give

its own subjectivity to it for substance. This assimilation accordingly coincides with the individual's process of reproduction considered above; in this process the individual in the first instance draws upon itself in making its own objectivity its object; the mechanical and chemical conflict of its members with external things is an objective moment of itself. The mechanical and chemical side of the process is a beginning of the dissolution of the living being. Since life is the truth of these processes, and therefore as a living being is the concrete existence of this truth and the power dominating these processes, it takes them within its embrace, pervades them as their universality, and their product is completely determined by it. This conversion of them into the living individuality constitutes the return of this latter into itself, so that production, which as such would be transition into an other, becomes reproduction, in which the living being posits itself as self-identical *for itself*.

The immediate Idea is also the immediate, not the *explicit*, identity of the Notion and reality; through the objective process the living being gives itself its feeling of *self*; for in that process it *posits* itself as what it is in and for itself, namely, as a self-identity and the negative unity of the negative in its otherness, which is posited as indifferent to it. In this coming together of the individual and its objectivity, that at first was presupposed as indifferent to it, the individual, which on one side has constituted itself an actual unity, has none the less *sublated its particularity* and raised itself to *universality*. Its particularity consisted in the diremption by which life posited as its species the individual life and the objectivity external to it. Through the external life process it has thus posited itself as real universal life, that is, as *genus*.

C. THE GENUS

The living individual, at first disengaged from the universal Notion of life, is a presupposition that is not as yet authenticated by the living individual itself. Through its process with the simultaneously presupposed world, it has posited itself *on its own account* as the negative unity of its otherness, as the foundation of itself; as such it is the actuality of the Idea, in such a manner that now the individual brings itself forth out of *actuality*, whereas before it proceeded only from the *Notion*, and that

its genesis which was an act of *presupposing*, now becomes its production.

But the further determination that it has attained by the sublation of the opposition is that of being the *genus* as identity of itself with its previously indifferent otherness. This Idea of the individual, since it is this essential identity, is essentially the particularization of itself. This its diremption, in accordance with the totality from which it proceeds, is the duplication of the individual—a presupposing of an objectivity that is identical with it, and a relationship of the living being to itself as to another living being.

This universal is the third stage, the truth of life in so far as this is still confined within its sphere. This sphere is the self-related process of the individual, where externality is its immanent moment; secondly, this externality is itself, as a living totality, an objectivity that for the individual is its own self, an objectivity in which, not as *sublated* but as *persisting*, the individual has the certainty of itself.

Now because the relationship of the genus is the identity of individual self-feeling in what is at the same time another self-subsistent individual, it is *contradiction*; thus the living being is again an *urge*. Now the genus is indeed the consummation of the Idea of life, but at first it is still within the sphere of immediacy; this universality is therefore *actual* in an *individual* shape—the Notion, whose reality has the form of immediate objectivity. Consequently, though the individual is indeed *in itself* genus, it is not *explicitly* or *for itself* the genus; what is *for* it is as yet only another living individual; the Notion distinguished from itself has for object, with which it is identical, not itself as Notion but a Notion that as a living being has at the same time external objectivity for it, a form that is therefore immediately reciprocal.

The identity with the other individual, the individual's universality, is thus as yet only *internal* or *subjective*; it therefore has the longing to posit this and to realize itself as a universal. But this *urge* of the genus can realize itself only by sublating the single individualities which are still particular relatively to one another. In the first instance, in so far as it is these latter which, *in themselves* universal, satisfy the tension of their longing and dissolve themselves into the universality of their genus, their realized identity is the negative unity of the genus that is reflected into itself out of

its diremption. It is thus the individuality of life itself, *generated* no longer from its Notion, but from the *actual* Idea. In the first instance, it is itself only Notion that has yet to objectify itself, but it is *the actual Notion—the germ of a living individual.* The germ is visible evidence to *ordinary perception* of what the Notion is, and it demonstrates that the *subjective Notion* has *external actuality.* For the germ of the living being is the complete concretion of individuality, in which all its diverse aspects, properties and articulated differences are contained in their *entire determinateness*, and the initially *immaterial*, subjective totality is undeveloped, simple and non-sensuous; the germ is thus the entire living being in the inner form of the Notion.

The reflection of the genus into itself is from this side the means whereby it obtains *actuality*, the moment of negative unity and individuality being thereby posited in it—the propagation of the living species. The Idea, which as life, is still in the form of immediacy, thus falls back into actuality and this its reflection is only repetition and the infinite progress, in which it does not emerge from the finitude of its immediacy. But this return into its first Notion has also the higher side, that the Idea has not merely run through the mediation of its processes within its immediacy, but by this very act has sublated this immediacy and thereby raised itself to a higher form of its existence.

That is to say, the process of the genus, in which the single individuals sublate in one another their indifferent immediate existence and in this negative unity expire, has further for the other side of its product the *realized genus*, which has posited itself identical with the Notion. In the genus process, the separated individualities of individual life perish; the negative identity in which the genus returns into itself, while it is on the one hand the process of *generating individuality*, is on the other hand the *sublating of it*, and is thus the genus coming together with itself, the *universality* of the Idea in process of *becoming for itself.* In copulation the immediacy of the living individuality perishes; the death of this life is the procession of spirit. The Idea, which as genus is *implicit*, is now *explicit*, in that it has sublated its particularity which constituted the living species, and has thereby given itself a *reality* that is *itself simple universality.* As such it is the Idea that *relates itself to itself as Idea*, the universal that has universality for its determinateness and existence—the Idea of *cognition.*

CHAPTER 2

THE IDEA OF COGNITION

Life is the immediate Idea, or the Idea as its *Notion* not yet realized in its own self. In its *judgement*, the Idea is *cognition* in general.

The Notion is, as Notion, *for itself* in so far as it *freely* exists as abstract universality or as genus. As such, it is its pure self-identity, which inwardly differentiates itself in such a manner that the differentiated moment is not an *objectivity*, but is likewise liberated into subjectivity or the form of simple self-likeness, and hence the object of the Notion is the Notion itself. Its *reality* in general is the *form of its determinate being*, and the point of interest is the determination of this form; on this determination rests the difference between what the Notion is *in itself* or as *subjective*, and what it is when submerged in objectivity, and then in the Idea of life. In the latter it is indeed distinguished from its external reality and posited *for itself*, yet this its being-for-self it possesses only as the identity that is a relation to itself as submerged in its subjugated objectivity, or to itself as indwelling, substantial form. The elevation of the Notion above life means that its reality is the Notion form liberated into universality. Through this judgement the Idea is duplicated into the subjective Notion whose reality is the Notion itself, and into the objective Notion that is in the form of life. *Thinking*, *spirit*, *self-consciousness*, are determinations of the Idea where it has itself for object, and its determinate being, that is, the determinateness of its being, is its own difference from itself.

The *metaphysics of the spirit*, or, as it was more commonly expressed, of the *soul*, revolved round the determinations of substance, simplicity, immateriality—determinations in which the *general idea* of spirit taken from *empirical* consciousness, was laid down as subject, and it was then asked, What predicates agree with our observations? This kind of procedure could get no further than the procedure of physics, which reduces the world of phenomena to general laws and reflective determinations since it too was based on spirit merely in its *phenomenal* aspect; in fact this procedure was bound to fall short even of the scientific character of

physics. Since spirit is not only infinitely richer than nature, but also, its essence is constituted by the absolute unity of opposites in the *Notion*, it exhibits in its phenomenal aspect and relation to externality contradiction in its extreme form. Consequently, it must be possible to adduce an experience in support of each of the opposed reflective determinations, or starting from experience it must be possible to arrive at opposite determinations by way of formal syllogistic reasoning. Since the predicates immediately yielded by spirit's phenomenal aspect in the first instance still belong to empirical psychology, there only remain, strictly speaking, for the metaphysical consideration, the wholly inadequate determinations of reflection. Kant, in his criticism of *rational psychology*, adheres to this metaphysics, insisting that, in so far as rational psychology purports to be a rational science, the smallest *addition* from observation to the *general idea* of self-consciousness would transform that science into an *empirical* one and mar its rational purity and its independence of all experience. Consequently, on this view, nothing is left but the simple representation, 'I', a representation devoid of any content of its own, of which we cannot even say that it is a *notion*, but a mere *consciousness* that *accompanies every notion*. Now according to the further Kantian conclusions, by this 'I', or if you like, *it* (the *thing*) that thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts $= x$, which is cognized only through the thoughts which are its *predicates*, and of which, taken in its isolation, we can *never* have the *least conception*. In this context, the 'I' has the *inconvenience*, to use Kant's own expression, that *we must already make use of it* whenever we want to make any judgement about it; for it is not so much a *single representation* by which a particular object is distinguished, but rather a *form* of representation in general in so far as this is to be called cognition. Now the paralogism committed by rational psychology, says Kant, consists in this, that *modes* of self-consciousness in thinking are converted into *notions of the understanding* as applied to an *object*; that the '*I think*' is taken as a *thinking being*, a *thing-in-itself*; and that in this way, from the fact that I always occur in consciousness as a *subject*, and that too as a *singular* subject, *identical* in all the multiplicity of representation, and distinguishing myself from the latter as from something external to me, the unjustified inference is drawn that the 'I' is a *substance*, and further a qualitatively *simple* being,

and a *one*, and something that has a *real existence independently* of the things of time and space.

I have drawn out this exposition in some detail, because it shows clearly the nature of the previous *metaphysics of the soul* and especially, too, the nature of the *criticism* by which it was made obsolete. The former aimed at determining the *abstract essence* of the soul; in doing so, it started originally from observation and converted the empirical universality of observation and the wholly *external* reflective determination attaching to the individuality of the actual, into the form of the above-mentioned *determinations of essence*. Kant in his criticism had generally in mind only the state of the metaphysics of his time, which in the main adhered to these abstract, one-sided determinations wholly devoid of dialectic; the genuinely *speculative* ideas of older philosophers on the notion of spirit he neither heeded nor examined. In his criticism then of those determinations, he followed quite simply Hume's style of scepticism; that is to say, he holds fast to the 'I' as it appears in self-consciousness, from which, however, since it is its essence—the *thing-in-itself*—that we are to cognize, everything empirical must be omitted; nothing then is left but this phenomenon of the '*I think*' that accompanies every representation—of which '*I think*' we have *not the slightest conception*. Certainly, it must be conceded that we have not the least conception of the 'I', or of anything whatever, not even of the Notion itself, so long as we do not really *think*, but stop short at the simple, fixed *general idea* [*Vorstellung*] and the *name*. It is an odd thought—if it can be called a thought at all—that I must already *make use* of the 'I' in order to judge of the 'I'; the 'I' that *makes use* of self-consciousness as a means in order to judge, this is indeed an x of which, as well as of the relationship of such 'making use', we cannot have the slightest conception. But surely it is ridiculous to call this nature of self-consciousness, namely, that the 'I' thinks itself, that the 'I' cannot be thought without its being the 'I' that thinks, an *inconvenience* and, as though there was a fallacy in it, a *circle*. It is this relationship through which, in immediate self-consciousness, the absolute, eternal nature of self-consciousness and the Notion itself manifests itself, and manifests itself for this reason, that self-consciousness is just the *existent* pure *Notion*, and therefore *empirically perceptible*, the absolute relation-to-self that, as a separating judgement, makes itself its own object and is solely this

process whereby it makes itself a circle. A stone does not have this *inconvenience*; when it is to be thought or judged it does not stand in its own way. It is relieved from the burden of making use of *itself* for this task; it is something else outside it that must give itself this trouble.

These conceptions, which must be called barbarous, place the defect in the fact that in thinking of the 'I', the 'I' as *subject* cannot be omitted; but the same defect then also appears the other way round, namely in this way, that 'I' occurs *only* as *subject of self-consciousness*, or I can *use* myself only as *subject* of a judgement, and the *intuition* is lacking by which the 'I' might be *given* as an *object*; but the notion of a thing that can exist only as subject does not so far involve any objective reality at all. If external intuition, determined in space and time, is required for objectivity, and it is this that is missing here, then it is quite clear that by objectivity is meant merely sensuous reality; and to have risen above *that* is a condition of thinking and of truth. But of course, if 'I' is taken not in its Notion but as a mere, simple, general idea, in the way we pronounce 'I' in everyday consciousness, then it is the abstract determination and not the self-relation that has itself for object. In that case, it is only *one* of the extremes, a one-sided subject without its objectivity, or else it would be merely an object without subjectivity, were it not for the inconvenience alluded to, that the thinking subject cannot be eliminated from the 'I' as object. But in fact the same inconvenience occurs with the former determination, with the 'I' as subject; the 'I' thinks *something*, itself or something else. This inseparability of the two forms in which it opposes itself to itself belongs to the innermost nature of its Notion and of the Notion itself; it is precisely what Kant wants to stave off in order to retain the mere *general idea*, which does not inwardly differentiate itself and therefore, of course, lacks the Notion. Now a Notionless conception of this kind may indeed oppose itself to the abstract reflective determinations or categories of the previous metaphysics: for in one-sidedness it stands on a level with them, though these are indeed on a higher level of thought; but on the other hand it appears all the more meagre and empty when compared with the profounder ideas of ancient philosophy on the conception of the soul or of thinking, as for example the genuinely speculative ideas of Aristotle. If the Kantian philosophy investigated the reflective categories in question, it was even more

bound to investigate the firmly held abstraction of the empty 'I', the presumed idea of the thing-in-itself, which, precisely on account of its abstraction, proves on the contrary to be something completely untrue. The experience of the inconvenience complained of is itself the empirical fact in which the untruth of that abstraction expresses itself.

Mendelssohn's proof of the persistence of the soul is the only one mentioned in the Kantian critique of rational psychology, and I cite here the Kantian refutation of it on account of the remarkable nature of the argument employed to disprove it. The proof in question is based on the *simplicity* of the soul, by virtue of which it is incapable of alteration, *of transition into an other*, in time. Qualitative simplicity is in general the form of *abstraction* considered above; as *qualitative* determinateness it was investigated in the sphere of being, and it was proved that the qualitative, as such abstractly self-related determinateness, is on the contrary for that very reason dialectical, and is merely transition into an other. But in treating of the Notion it was shown that when it is considered in relation to persistence, indestructibility, imperishableness, it is the absolutely true being and the eternal, just because it is not *abstract*, but *concrete* simplicity, is determined not as abstractly self-related, but as the unity *of itself and its other*; it cannot therefore pass into that other as though it altered itself in it for the very reason that the *other* to which it is determined is the Notion itself, so that in this transition it only comes to itself. Now the Kantian criticism opposes to the said *qualitative* determination of the unity of the Notion, the *quantitative*. Although the soul is not a manifold of juxtaposed parts and contains no *extensive* magnitude, yet we are told consciousness has *a degree*, and the soul like *every concrete existent* has an *intensive magnitude*; but this postulates the possibility of transition into nothing by a *gradual passing away*. Now what is this refutation but the application to spirit of a category *of being*, of *intensive magnitude*—a determination that has no truth in itself but on the contrary is sublated in the Notion?

Metaphysics—even the metaphysics that restricted itself to fixed concepts of the understanding and did not rise to speculative thinking, to the nature of the Notion and of the Idea—had for its aim *the cognition of truth*, and investigated its objects to ascertain whether they were *true* things or not, substances or phenomena.

The victory of the Kantian criticism over this metaphysics consists, on the contrary, in doing away with the investigation that has *truth* for its aim, and this aim itself; it omits altogether to raise the one question of interest, whether a particular subject, here the *abstract 'I' of ordinary thinking* possesses truth in and for itself. But to cling to phenomena and the mere conceptions given in everyday consciousness is to renounce the Notion and philosophy. Anything rising above this is stigmatized in the Kantian criticism as something high-flown to which reason is in no way entitled. As a matter of fact, the Notion does reach beyond the Notion-less, and the immediate justification for going beyond it is first, the Notion itself, and secondly, from the negative side, the untruth of phenomena and of ordinary thinking, as well as of abstractions like things-in-themselves and the above 'I', that is supposed not to be an object to itself.

In the content of this logical exposition it is from the *Idea of life* that the Idea of spirit has issued, or what is the same thing, that the Idea of spirit has proved itself to be the truth of the Idea of life. As this result, the Idea possesses its truth in and for itself, with which one may then also compare the empirical side or the manifestation of spirit to see how far the latter accords with the former. We have seen that *life* is the Idea, but at the same time it has shown itself not to be as yet the true representation or mode of the Idea's existence. For in life, the reality of the Idea exists as *individuality*; *universality* or genus is the *inwardness*; the truth of life as absolute negative unity is therefore to sublate the abstract, or what is the same, the immediate, individuality, and as *identical*, to be self-identical, as genus, to be self-similar. Now this Idea is *spirit*. In this context we may once more remark that spirit is here considered in the form that belongs to this Idea as logical. For it has other shapes as well that may be mentioned here in passing; in these it falls to be considered in the concrete sciences of spirit, namely as *soul, consciousness and spirit as such*.

The name *soul* was formerly employed for the individual finite spirit generally, and rational or empirical *psychology* was intended to be synonymous with *doctrine of spirit*. The expression *soul* evokes a mental picture of it as a *thing* like other things; one enquires as to its *seat*, the specific position in *space* from which its forces operate; still more, as to how this thing can be *imperishable*, how it can be subject to *temporal* conditions and yet be exempt

from alteration therein. The system of *monads* exalts matter to the psychical [*Seelenhaftigkeit*]; in this conception the soul is an atom like the atoms of matter in general; the atom that rises as steam from the coffee cup is capable in favourable circumstances of developing into a soul; it is only the *greater* obscurity of its ideation that distinguishes it from a thing of the kind that manifests as soul.

The Notion that is for itself is necessarily also in *immediate existence*; in this substantial identity with life, as submerged in its externality, it is the subject matter of *anthropology*. But even anthropology must regard as alien to it the metaphysics that makes this form of *immediacy* into a *psychical thing*, into an *atom*, like the atoms of matter. To anthropology must be left only that obscure region where spirit is subjected to what were once called *sidereal* and *terrestrial* influences, where it lives as a natural spirit in *sympathy* with Nature and becomes aware of Nature's changes in *dreams and presentiments*, and indwells the brain, the heart, the ganglia, the liver, and so forth. According to Plato, God, mindful that even the *irrational* part of the soul should partake of his bounty and share in higher things, gave to the liver the gift of prophecy above which self-conscious man is exalted. To this irrational side belong further the conditions of ordinary thinking and higher spiritual activity in so far as this activity is subjected in the individual subject to the play of a wholly contingent physical constitution, of external influences and particular circumstances.

This lowest of the concrete shapes in which spirit is sunk in the material, has its immediate superior in *consciousness*. In this form the free Notion, as *ego that is for itself*, is withdrawn from objectivity, but relates itself to it as *its other*, as an object confronting it. Here spirit is no longer present as soul; on the contrary, in the *certainty* of itself, the *immediacy* of *being* has the significance of *a negative* for it; consequently, its identity with itself in the objectivity is at the same time still only an *illusory show*, since the objectivity, too, still has the form of an *implicit* being. This stage is the subject matter of the *phenomenology of spirit*—a science which stands midway between the science of the natural spirit and spirit as such. The phenomenology of spirit considers spirit that is *for itself*, but at the same time in its *relation to its other*, an other which, as we have recalled, is determined by that relation as

both *implicitly* an object and also as negated. Thus it considers spirit in its *manifestation*, as exhibiting itself in its counterpart.

But the higher truth of this form is *spirit that is for itself*; for spirit in this form, the object that for consciousness has an *implicit* being has the form of spirit's own determination, of *ordinary thinking* as such; this *spirit*, acting on the determinations as on its own, on feelings, representations, thoughts, is thus infinite within itself and in its form. The consideration of this stage belongs to the *doctrine of spirit* proper, which would embrace what is the subject matter of ordinary *empirical psychology*, but which, to be the science of spirit, must not go empirically to work, but be scientifically conceived. Spirit is at this stage *finite* spirit, in so far as the *content* of its determinateness is an immediate, given content; the science of finite spirit has to display the process in which it liberates itself from this its determinateness and goes on to grasp the truth of itself, which is infinite spirit.

On the other hand, the *Idea of spirit* as the subject matter of *logic* already stands within the pure science; it has not therefore to watch spirit progressing through its entanglement with nature, with immediate determinateness and material things, or with pictorial thinking; this is dealt with in the three sciences mentioned above. The Idea of spirit already has this progress behind it, or what is the same thing, still before it—the former when logic is taken as *the last* science, the latter when logic is taken as *the first* science, out of which the Idea first passes over into nature. In the logical Idea of spirit, therefore, the 'I' is immediately the free Notion, as it revealed itself to be in issuing from the Notion of nature as nature's truth, the free Notion that in its judgement is itself the object, *the Notion as its Idea*. But even in this shape the Idea is still not consummated.

While the Idea is indeed the free Notion that has itself for object, yet it is *immediate*, and just because it is immediate it is still the Idea in its *subjectivity*, and therefore in its finitude in general. It is the end that has to realize itself, or it is the *absolute Idea* itself still in its *manifested* aspect. What it *seeks* is the *true*, this identity of the Notion itself and reality, but as yet it is only seeking it; for it is here in its *first* stage still *subjective*. Consequently though the object that is for the Notion is here also a given object, it does not enter into the subject as an object operating on it, or as an object having a constitution of its own, or as a picture thought; on the

contrary, the subject converts it into *a determination of the Notion.* It is the Notion that is active in the object, relates itself to itself therein, and by giving itself its reality in the object finds *truth.*

The Idea is therefore in the first instance one of the extremes of a syllogism, as the Notion that as end has initially its own self for subjective reality; the other extreme is the limitation of subjectivity, the objective world. The two extremes are identical in that they are the Idea; first their unity is that of the Notion, which in one is only *for itself,* in the other only *in itself*; secondly in one the reality is abstract, in the other it is present in its concrete actuality. This unity is now *posited* by cognition; and since this is the subjective Idea that, as end, proceeds from itself, the unity appears, at first, only as a *middle term.* The cognizing subject, through the determinateness of its Notion, namely abstract being-for-self, relates itself, it is true, to an outer world, but it does so in the absolute self-certainty of itself, in order to raise its own implicit reality, this formal truth, into real truth. It possesses in its Notion the *entire essentiality* of the objective world; its process consists in positing for itself the concrete content of that world as identical with the *Notion,* and conversely, in positing the latter as identical with objectivity.

Immediately, the Idea as manifested Idea is the *theoretical* Idea, *cognition* as such. For immediately the objective world has the form of *immediacy* or of *being* for the Notion that exists for itself; just as the latter, at first, is to itself only the abstract Notion of itself, confined within itself; it is therefore merely a *form*; its reality that it has within it is no more than its simple determinations of *universality* and *particularity,* while the individuality or *specific determinateness,* the content, is received by this form from outside.

A. THE IDEA OF THE TRUE

The subjective Idea is in the first instance an *urge.* For it is the contradiction of the Notion to have itself for *object* and to be its own reality, yet without the object being an other, that is, self-subsistent over against it, or without the difference of the Notion from itself possessing at the same time the essential determination of *diversity* and indifferent existence. The specific nature of this urge is therefore to sublate its own subjectivity, to make its first, abstract reality into a concrete one and to fill it with the *content*

of the world presupposed by its subjectivity. From the other side, this urge is determined in the following manner: the Notion is, it is true, the absolute certainty of itself; but its *being-for-self* is confronted by its presupposition of a world having the form of *implicit* being, but a world whose indifferent *otherness* has for the self-certainty of the Notion the value merely of an *unessentiality*; it is thus the urge to sublate this otherness and to intuit in the object its identity with itself. This reflection-into-self is the sublated opposition, and the individuality which initially appears as the presupposed *implicit being* of a world is now *posited* as individuality and made actual for the subject; accordingly the reflection-into-self is the self-identity of the form restored out of the opposition—an identity that is therefore determined as indifferent to the form in its distinctiveness and is *content*.

This urge is therefore the urge to *truth* in so far as truth is in *cognition*, accordingly to *truth* in its proper sense as *theoretical* Idea. *Objective* truth is no doubt the Idea itself as the reality that corresponds to the Notion, and to this extent an object may or may not possess truth; but, on the other hand, the more precise meaning of truth is that it is truth *for* or *in* the subjective Notion, in *knowing*. It is the relation of the Notion judgement which showed itself to be the formal judgement of truth; in it, namely, the predicate is not merely the objectivity of the Notion, but the relating comparison of the Notion of the subject-matter with its actuality. This realization of the Notion is *theoretical* in so far as the Notion, as *form*, has still the determination of *subjectivity*, or has still the determination for the subject of being its own determination. Because cognition is the Idea as end, or as subjective, the negation of the world presupposed as an *implicit being* is the *first* negation; therefore also the conclusion in which the objective is posited in the subjective, has at first only this meaning, that the *implicit being* is only *posited* in the form of subjectivity, or in the Notion determination, and for this reason is not, in that form, in and for itself. Thus the conclusion only attains to a *neutral unity* or a *synthesis*, that is, to a unity of things that are originally separate and only are externally so conjoined. Since therefore in this cognition the Notion posits the object as *its own*, the Idea in the first instance only gives itself a content whose basis is *given*, and in which only the form of externality has been sublated. Accordingly, this cognition still retains its *finitude* in its

realized end; in its realized end it has at the same time *not* attained its end, and *in its truth* has *not* yet arrived at *truth*. For in so far as in the result the content still has the character of a *datum*, the presupposed *implicit being* confronting the Notion is not sublated; equally therefore the unity of Notion and reality, truth, is also not contained in it. Oddly enough, it is this side of *finitude* that latterly has been clung to, and accepted as the *absolute* relation of cognition—as though the finite as such was supposed to be the absolute! At this standpoint, the object is credited with being an unknown *thing-in-itself behind* cognition, and this character of the object, and with it truth too is regarded as an absolute *beyond* for cognition. In this view of cognition, thought determinations in general, the categories, reflective determinations, as well as the formal Notion and its moments, are assigned the position of being finite determinations not in and for themselves, but finite in the sense that they are subjective in relation to this empty *thing-in-itself*; the fallacy of taking this untrue relation of cognition as the true relation has become the universal opinion of modern times.

From this determination of finite cognition it is immediately evident that it is a contradiction that sublates itself—the contradiction of a truth that at the same time is supposed not to be truth—of a cognition of what *is*, which at the same time does not cognize the thing-in-itself. In the collapse of this contradiction, its content, subjective cognition and the thing-in-itself, collapses, that is, proves itself an untruth. But cognition must, in the course of its own movement, resolve its finitude and with it its contradiction; this examination of it made by us is an external reflection; but cognition is itself the Notion, the Notion that is its own end and therefore through its realization fulfils itself, and in this very fulfilment sublates its subjectivity and the presupposed implicit being. We have therefore to consider cognition in its own self in its positive activity. Since this Idea is, as we have seen, the urge of the Notion to realize itself *for itself*, its activity consists in determining the object, and by this determining to relate itself in the object identically to itself. The object is in general something simply determinable, and in the Idea it has this essential side of not being in and for itself opposed to the Notion. Because cognition is still finite, not speculative, cognition, the presupposed objectivity has not as yet for it the shape of something that is in

its own self simply and solely the Notion and that contains nothing with a particularity of its own as against the latter. But the fact that it counts as an implicit beyond, necessarily implies that its *determinability by the Notion* is a determination it possesses essentially; for *the Idea* is the Notion that exists for itself, is that which is absolutely infinite within itself, in which the object is *implicitly* sublated and the end is now solely to sublate it *explicitly*. Hence, though the object is presupposed by the Idea of cognition as possessing an *implicit being*, yet it is essentially in a relationship where the Idea, certain of itself and of the nullity of this opposition, comes to the realization of its Notion in the object.

In the syllogism whereby the subjective Idea now unites itself with objectivity, the *first premiss* is the same form of immediate seizure and relation of the Notion to the object that we saw in the relation of end. The determining activity of the Notion upon the object is an immediate *communication* of itself to the object and unresisted *pervasion* of the latter by the Notion. In this process the Notion remains in pure identity with itself; but this its immediate reflection-into-self has equally the determination of objective immediacy; that which *for the Notion* is its own determination, is equally a *being*, for it is the *first* negation of the presupposition. Therefore the posited determination ranks just as much as a presupposition that has been merely *found*, as an *apprehension* of a *datum*; in fact the activity of the Notion here consists merely in being negative towards itself, restraining itself and making itself passive towards what confronts it, in order that the latter may be able to *show* itself, not as determined by the subject, but as it is in its own self.

Accordingly in this premiss this cognition does not appear even as an *application* of logical determinations, but as an acceptance and apprehension of them just as given, and its activity appears to be restricted merely to the removal of a subjective obstacle, an external husk, from the subject-matter. This cognition is *analytic* cognition.

(*a*) *Analytic Cognition*

We sometimes find the difference between analytic and synthetic cognition stated in the form that one proceeds from the known to the unknown, the other from the unknown to the known. But if this distinction is closely examined, it will be difficult to discover

in it a definite thought, much less a Notion. It may be said that cognition begins in general with ignorance, for one does not learn to know something with which one is already acquainted. Conversely, it also begins with the known; this is a tautological proposition; that with which it begins, which therefore it actually cognizes, is *ipso facto* something known; what is not as yet known and is to be known only later is still an unknown. So far, then, it must be said that cognition, once it has begun, always proceeds from the known to the unknown.

The distinguishing feature of analytic cognition is already defined in the fact that as the first premiss of the whole syllogism, analytic cognition does not as yet contain mediation; it is the immediate communication of the Notion and does not as yet contain otherness, and in it the activity empties itself of its negativity. However, this immediacy of the relation is for that reason itself a mediation, for it is the negative relation of the Notion to the object, but a relation that annuls itself, thereby making itself simple and identical. This reflection-into-self is only subjective, because in its mediation the difference is present still only in the form of the presupposed *implicit* difference, as difference *of the object* within itself. The determination, therefore, brought about by this relation, is the form of simple *identity*, of *abstract universality*. Accordingly, analytic cognition has in general this identity for its principle; and transition into an other, the connexion of different terms, is excluded from itself and from its activity.

If we look now more closely at analytic cognition, we see that it starts from a *presupposed*, and therefore individual, *concrete* subject matter; this may be an object already *complete in itself* for ordinary thought, or it may be a *problem*, that is to say, given only in its circumstances and conditions, but not yet disengaged from them and presented on its own account in simple self-subsistence. Now the analysis of this subject matter cannot consist in its being merely *resolved* into the particular *picture thoughts* which it may contain; such a resolution and the apprehension of such picture thoughts is a business that would not belong to cognition, but would merely be a matter of a closer *acquaintance*, a determination within the sphere of *picture-thinking*. Since analysis is based on the Notion, its products are essentially Notion-determinations, and that too as determinations *immediately contained* in the subject

matter. We have seen from the nature of the Idea of cognition, that the activity of the subjective Notion must be regarded from one side merely as the *explication* of *what is already in the object*, because the object itself is nothing but the totality of the Notion. It is just as one-sided to represent analysis as though there were nothing in the subject matter that was not *imported* into it, as it is one-sided to suppose that the resulting determinations are merely *extracted* from it. The former view, as everyone knows, is enunciated by subjective idealism, which takes the activity of cognition in analysis to be merely a one-sided *positing*, beyond which the *thing-in-itself* remains concealed; the other view belongs to so-called realism which apprehends the subjective Notion as an empty identity that *receives* the thought determinations into itself *from outside*. Analytic cognition, the transformation of the given material into logical determinations, has shown itself to be two things in one: a *positing* that no less immediately determines itself as a *presupposing*. Consequently, by virtue of the latter, the logical element may appear as something *already complete* in the object, just as by virtue of the former it may appear as the *product* of a merely subjective activity. But the two moments are not to be separated; the logical element in its abstract form into which analysis raises it, is of course only to be found in cognition, while conversely it is something not merely *posited*, but possessing *being in itself*.

Now since analytic cognition is the transformation indicated above, it does not pass through any further *middle term*; the determination is in so far *immediate* and has just this meaning, to be peculiar to the object and in itself to belong to it, and therefore to be apprehended from it without any subjective mediation. But further, cognition is supposed also to be a *progress*, an *explication of differences*. But because, in accordance with the determination it has here, it is Notion-less and undialectical, it possesses only a *given difference*, and its progress takes place solely in the determinations of the *material*. It seems to have an *immanent* progress only in so far as the derived thought determinations can be analysed afresh, in so far as they are a concrete; the highest and ultimate point of this process of analysis is the abstract highest essence, or abstract subjective identity—and over against it, diversity. This progress is, however, nothing but the mere repetition of the one original act of analysis, namely, the fresh

determination as a *concrete*, of what has already been taken up into the abstract form of the Notion; this is followed by the analysis of it, then by the determination afresh as a concrete of the abstract that emerges from it, and so forth. But the thought-determinations seem also to contain a transition within themselves. If the object is determined as a whole, then of course one advances from this to the *other* determination of *part*, from *cause* to the other determination of *effect*, and so on. But here this is no advance, since whole and part, cause and effect, are *relationships* and moreover, for this formal cognition, relationships *complete in themselves* such that in them one determination is *already found* essentially linked to the other. The subject matter that has been determined as *cause* or as *part* is *ipso facto* determined by the *whole* relationship, that is, determined already by both sides of it. Although the relationship is *in itself* something synthetic, yet for analytic cognition this connexion is as much a mere *datum* as any other connexion of its material and therefore is not relevant to its own peculiar business. Whether a connexion of this kind be otherwise determined as *a priori* or *a posteriori* is here a matter of indifference, for it is apprehended as something *found already there*, or, as it has also been described, as a *fact* of consciousness that with the determination *whole* is linked the determination *part*, and so forth. While Kant has made the profound observation that there are synthetic *a priori* principles and has recognized their root in the unity of self-consciousness and therefore in the identity of the Notion with itself, yet he adopts the *specific* connexion, the concepts of relation and the synthetic principles themselves *from formal logic* as *given*; their justification [*Deduktion*] should have been the exposition of the transition of that simple unity of self-consciousness into these its determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the trouble of demonstrating this genuinely synthetic progress—the self-producing Notion.

It is a familiar fact that *arithmetic* and the more general *sciences of discrete magnitude* especially, are called *analytical science* and *analysis*. As a matter of fact, their method of cognition is immanently analytical in the highest degree and we shall briefly consider the basis of this fact. All other analytic cognition starts from a concrete material that in itself possesses a contingent manifoldness; on this material depends all distinction of content and progress to a further content. The material of arithmetic and

algebra, on the other hand, is something that has already been made wholly abstract and indeterminate and purged of all peculiarity of relationship, and to which, therefore, every determination and connexion is something external. Such a material is the principle of discrete magnitude, the *one*. This relationless atom can be increased to a *plurality*, and externally determined and unified into a sum; this process of increasing and delimiting is an empty progression and determining that never gets beyond the same principle of the abstract one. How *numbers* are further combined and separated depends solely on the positing activity of the cognizing subject. *Magnitude* is in general the category within which these determinations are made; it is the determinateness that has become an *indifferent* determinateness, so that the subject matter has no determinateness that might be immanent in it and therefore a *datum* for cognition. Cognition having first provided itself with a contingent variety of numbers, these now constitute the material for further elaboration and manifold relationships. Such relationships, their discovery and elaboration, do not seem, it is true, to be anything immanent in analytic cognition, but something contingent and given; and these relationships and the operations connected with them, too, are usually presented *successively* as *different* without any observation of an inner connexion. Yet it is easy to discover a guiding principle, and that is the immanent principle of analytic identity, which appears in the diverse as *equality*; progress consists in the reduction of the unequal to an ever greater equality. To give an example in the first elements, addition is the combining of quite contingently *unequal* numbers, multiplication, on the contrary, the combination of *equal* numbers; these again are followed by the relationship of the *equality* of *amount* and *unity*, and the relationship of powers makes its appearance.

Now because the determinateness of the subject matter and of the relationships is a *posited* one, the further operation with them is also wholly analytic, and the science of analysis possesses not so much *theorems* as *problems*. The analytical theorem contains the problem as already solved for it, and the altogether external difference attaching to the two sides equated by the theorem is so unessential that a theorem of this kind would appear as a trivial identity. Kant, it is true, has declared the proposition $5 + 7 = 12$, to be a *synthetic* proposition, because the same thing is presented

on one side in the form of a plurality, 5 and 7, and on the other side in the form of a unity, 12. But if the analytic proposition is not to mean the completely abstract identity and tautology 12 = 12 and is to contain any advance at all, it must present a difference of some kind, though a difference not based on any quality, on any determinateness of reflection, and still less of the Notion. 5 + 7 and 12 are out and out the same content; the first side also expresses the *demand* that 5 and 7 shall be combined in *one* expression; that is to say, that just as 5 is the result of a counting up in which the counting was quite arbitrarily broken off and could just as well have been continued, so now, in the same way, the counting is to be continued with the condition that the ones to be added shall be seven. The 12 is therefore a result of 5 and 7 and of an operation which is already posited and in its nature is an act completely external and devoid of any thought, so that it can be performed even by a machine. Here there is not the slightest trace of a transition to an *other*; it is a mere continuation, that is, *repetition*, of the same operation that produced 5 and 7.

The *proof* of a theorem of this kind—and it would require a proof if it were a synthetic proposition—would consist merely in the operation of counting on from 5 for a further 7 ones and in discerning the agreement of the result of this counting with what is otherwise called 12, and which again is nothing else but just that process of counting up to a defined limit. Instead, therefore, of the form of theorem, the form of *problem* is directly chosen, the *demand* for the operation, that is to say, the expression of only *one* side of the equation that would constitute the theorem and whose other side is now to be found. The problem contains the content and states the specific operation that is to be undertaken with it. The operation is not restricted by any unyielding material endowed with specific relationships, but is an external subjective act, whose determinations are accepted with indifference by the material in which they are posited. The entire difference between the conditions laid down in the problem and the result in the *solution*, is merely that the specific mode of union or separation indicated in the former is *actual* in the latter.

It is, therefore, an utterly superfluous bit of scaffolding to apply to these cases the form of geometrical method, which is relevant to synthetic propositions and to add to the *solution* of the problem a *proof* as well. The proof can express nothing but the tautology

that the solution is correct because the operation set in the problem has been performed. If the problem is to add several numbers, then the solution is to add them; the proof shows that the solution is correct because the problem was to add, and addition has been carried out. If the problem contains more complex expressions and operations, say for instance, to multiply decimal numbers, and the solution indicates merely the mechanical procedure, a proof does indeed become necessary; but this proof can be nothing else but the analysis of those expressions and of the operation from which the solution proceeds of itself. By this separation of the *solution* as a mechanical procedure, and of the *proof* as a reference back to the nature of the subject matter to be treated, we lose what is precisely the advantage of the analytical problem, namely that the *construction* can be immediately deduced from the problem and can therefore be exhibited as *intelligible* in and for itself; put the other way, the construction is expressly given a defect peculiar to the synthetic method. In the higher analysis, where with the relationship of powers, we are dealing especially with relationships of discrete magnitude that are qualitative and dependent on *Notion* determinatenesses, the problems and theorems do of course contain synthetic expressions; there *other* expressions and relationships must be taken as intermediate terms besides those *immediately specified* by the problem or theorem. And, we may add, even these auxiliary terms must be of a kind to be grounded in the consideration and development of some side of the problem or theorem; the synthetic appearance comes solely from the fact that the problem or theorem does not itself already name this side. The problem, for example, of finding the sum of the powers of the roots of an equation is solved by the examination and subsequent connexion of the functions which the coefficients of the equation are of the roots. The determination employed in the solution, namely, the functions of the coefficients and their connexion, is not already expressed in the problem—for the rest, the development itself is wholly analytical. The same is true of the solution of the equation $x^{m-1} = 0$ with the help of the sine, and also of the immanent algebraic solution, discovered, as is well known, by Gauss, which takes into consideration the *residuum* of $x^{m-1} - 1$ divided by m, and the so-called primitive roots—one of the most important extensions of analysis in modern times. These solutions are synthetic because the terms employed to help, the sine or

the consideration of the residua, are not terms of the problem itself.

The nature of the analysis that considers the so-called infinitesimal differences of variable magnitudes, the analysis of the differential and integral calculus, has been treated in greater detail in the *first part* of this *logic*. It was there shown that there is here an underlying qualitative determination of magnitude which can be grasped only by means of the Notion. The transition to it from magnitude as such is no longer analytic; and therefore mathematics to this day has never succeeded in justifying by its own means, that is, mathematically, the operations that rest on that transition, because the transition is not of a mathematical nature. Leibniz, who is given the credit of having reduced calculation with infinitesimal differences to a *calculus*, has, as was mentioned in the same place, made the transition in the most inadequate manner possible, a manner that is as completely unphilosophical [*begrifflos*] as it is unmathematical; but once the transition is presupposed—and in the present state of the science it is no more than a presupposition—the further course is certainly only a series of ordinary operations.

It has been remarked that analysis becomes synthetic when it comes to deal with *determinations* that are no longer *posited* by the problems themselves. But the general transition from analytic to synthetic cognition lies in the necessary transition from the form of immediacy to mediation, from abstract identity to difference. Analytic cognition in its activity does not in general go beyond determinations that are self-related; but by virtue of their *determinateness* they are also essentially of such a nature that they *relate themselves to an other*. It has been already remarked that even when analytic cognition goes on to deal with relationships that are not an externally given material but thought determinations, it still remains analytic, since for it even these relationships are *given* ones. But because abstract identity, which alone analytic cognition knows as its own, is essentially the *identity of distinct terms*, identity in this form too must belong to cognition and become for the subjective Notion also the *connexion* that is posited by it and identical with it.

(*b*) *Synthetic Cognition*

Analytic cognition is the first premiss of the whole syllogism—the

immediate relation of the Notion to the object; *identity*, therefore, is the determination which it recognizes as its own, and analytic cognition is merely the *apprehension* of what *is*. Synthetic cognition aims at the *comprehension* of what *is*, that is, at grasping the multiplicity of determinations in their unity. It is therefore the second premiss of the syllogism in which the *diverse* as such is related. Hence its aim is in general *necessity*. The different terms which are connected, are on the one hand connected in a *relation*; in this relation they are related and at the same time mutually indifferent and self-subsistent; but on the other hand, they are linked together in the *Notion* which is their simple yet determinate unity. Now synthetic cognition passes over, in the first instance, from *abstract identity* to *relation*, or from *being* to *reflection*, and so far it is not the absolute reflection of the Notion that the Notion cognizes in its subject matter. The reality it gives itself is the next stage, namely, the stated identity of the different terms as such, an identity therefore that is at the same time still *inner* and only necessity, not the subjective identity that is *for itself*; hence not yet the Notion as such. Synthetic cognition, therefore, has indeed the Notion determinations for its content, and the object is posited in them; but they only stand in *relation* to one another, or are in *immediate* unity, and just for that reason, not in the unity by which the Notion exists as subject.

This constitutes the finitude of this cognition; because this real side of the Idea in it still possesses identity as an *inner* identity, its determinations are to themselves still *external*; because the identity is not in the form of subjectivity, the Notion's own pervasion of the object still lacks *individuality*; what corresponds to the Notion in the object is indeed no longer the abstract but the *determinate* form and therefore the *particularity* of the Notion, but the *individual* element in the object is still *a given* content. Consequently, although this cognition transforms the objective world into Notions, it gives it Notion-determinations only in respect of form, and must *find* the object in respect of its *individuality*, its specific determinateness; such cognition is not yet self-determining. Similarly, it *finds* propositions and laws, and proves their *necessity*, but not as a necessity of the subject matter in and for itself, that is, not from the Notion, but as a necessity of the cognition that works on given determinations, on the differences of the phenomenal aspect of the subject matter, and cognizes *for itself* the

proposition as a unity and relationship, or cognizes the ground of phenomena from the *phenomena* themselves.

We have now to consider the detailed moments of synthetic cognition.

1. *Definition*

First, the still *given* objectivity is transformed into the simple and first form, hence into the form of the *Notion.* Accordingly the moments of this apprehension are none other than the moments of the Notion, *universality*, *particularity* and *individuality.* The *individual* is the object itself as an *immediate representation*, that which is to be defined. The universality of the object of definition we have found in the determination of the objective judgement or judgement of necessity to be the *genus*, and indeed the *proximate* genus; that is to say, the universal with this determinateness that is at the same time a principle for the differentiation of the particular. This difference the object possesses in the *specific difference*, which makes it the determinate species it is and is the basis of its disjunction from the remaining species.

Definition, in thus reducing the subject matter to its *Notion,* strips it of its externalities which are requisite for its concrete existence; it abstracts from what accrues to the Notion in its realization, whereby it emerges first into Idea, and secondly into external existence. *Description* is for *representation*, and takes in this further content that belongs to reality. But definition reduces this wealth of the manifold determinations of intuited existence to the simplest moments; the form of these simple elements, and how they are determined relatively to one another, is contained in the Notion. The subject matter is thus, as we have stated, grasped as a universal that is at the same time essentially determinate. The subject matter itself is the third factor, the individual, in which the genus and the particularization are posited in one; it is an *immediate* that is posited *outside* the Notion, since the latter is not yet self-determining.

In the said moments, which are the form-difference of definition, the Notion finds itself and has in them the reality correspondent to it. But the reflection of the Notion-moments into themselves, which is individuality, is not yet contained in this reality, and therefore the object, in so far as it is in cognition, is not yet determined as subjective. Whereas, cognition on the contrary is subjective

and has an external starting point, or it is subjective by reason of its external starting point in the individual. The content of the Notion is therefore a *datum* and contingent. Consequently, the concrete Notion itself is contingent in a twofold aspect: first it is contingent in respect of its content as such; secondly it is contingent which determinations of the content from among the manifold qualities that the object possesses in external existence are to be selected for the Notion and are to constitute its moments.

The latter point requires closer consideration. For since individuality, which is determined in and for itself, lies outside the Notion-determination peculiar to synthetic cognition there is no principle available for determining which sides of the subject matter are to be regarded as belonging to its Notion-determination and which merely to the external reality. This constitutes a difficulty in the case of definitions, a difficulty that for synthetic cognition cannot be overcome. Yet here a distinction must be made. In the first place, the definition of products of self-conscious purposiveness is easily discovered; for the end that they are to serve is a determination created out of the subjective resolve and constituting the essential particularization, the form of the concrete existent thing, which is here the sole concern. Apart from this, the nature of its material and its other external properties, in so far as they correspond to the end, are contained in its determination; the rest are unessential for it.

Secondly, geometrical objects are abstract determinations of space; the underlying abstraction, so-called absolute space, has lost all further concrete determinations and now too possesses only such shapes and configurations as are posited in it. These objects therefore *are* only what they are *meant* to be; their Notion determination in general, and more precisely the specific difference, possesses in them its simple unhindered reality. To this extent, they resemble the products of external purposiveness, and they also agree with the subject matter of arithmetic in which likewise the underlying determination is only that which has been posited in it. True, space has still further determinations: its *three-dimensionality*, its continuity and divisibility, which are not first posited in it by external determination. But these belong to the accepted material and are immediate presuppositions; it is only the combination and entanglement of the former subjective determinations with this peculiar nature of the domain into which

they have been imported that produces synthetic relationships and laws. In the case of numerical determinations, since they are based on the simple principle of the One, their combination and any further determination is simply and solely a positedness; on the other hand, determinations in space, which is explicitly a continuous *mutual externality*, run a further course of their own and possess a reality distinct from their Notion; but this no longer belongs to the immediate definition.

But, thirdly, in the case of definitions of *concrete* objects of Nature as well as of spirit, the position is quite different. In general such objects are, for representation, *things of many properties*. Here, what we have to do in the first instance is to apprehend what is their proximate genus, and then, what is their specific difference. We have therefore to determine which of the many properties belong to the object as genus, and which as species, and further which among these properties is the essential one; this last point involves the necessity of ascertaining their interrelationship, whether one is already posited with the other. But for this purpose there is so far no other criterion to hand than *existence* itself. The essentiality of the property for the purpose of the definition, in which it is to be posited as a simple, undeveloped determinateness, is its universality. But in existence universality is merely empirical. It may be universality in time—whether the property in question is lasting, while the others show themselves transitory in the subsistence of the whole; or it may be a universality resulting from comparison with other concrete wholes and in that case it goes no further than community. Now if comparison indicates as the common basis the total *habitus* as empirically presented, reflection has to bring this together into a simple thought determination and to grasp the simple character of such a totality. But the only possible attestation that a thought determination, or a single one of the immediate properties, constitutes the simple and specific essence of the object, is the *derivation* of such a determination from the concrete properties of the subject matter. But this would demand an analysis tranforming the immediate properties into thoughts and reducing what is concrete to something simple. Such an analysis, however, would be higher than the one already considered; for it could not be abstractive, but would have to preserve in the universal what is specific in the concrete, unify it and show it to be dependent on the simple thought determination.

The relations of the manifold determinations of immediate existence to the simple Notion would however be theorems requiring proof. But definition is the first, still undeveloped Notion; therefore, when it has to apprehend the simple determinateness of the subject matter, which apprehension has to be something immediate, it can only employ for the purpose one of its *immediate* so-called properties—a determination of sensuous existence or representation. The isolation, then, of this property by abstraction, constitutes simplicity, and for universality and essentiality the Notion has to fall back onto empirical universality, the persistence in altered circumstances, and the reflection that seeks the Notion-determination in external existence and in picture thinking, that is, seeks it where it is not to be found. Definition, therefore, automatically renounces the Notion-determinations proper, which would be essentially principles of the subject matter, and contents itself with *marks*, that is, determinations in which *essentiality* for the object itself is a matter of indifference, and which are intended merely to be *distinguishing* marks for an external reflection. A single, *external* determinateness of this kind is too inadequate to the concrete totality and to the nature of its Notion, to justify its selection for its own sake, nor could it be taken for the true expression and determination of a concrete whole. According to Blumenbach's[1] observation, for example, the lobe of the ear is absent in all other animals, and therefore in the usual phraseology of common and distinguishing marks it could quite properly be used as the distinctive characteristic in the definition of physical man. But how inadequate such a completely external determination at once appears when compared with the conception of the total *habitus* of physical man, and with the demand that the Notion determination shall be something essential! It is quite contingent whether the marks adopted in the definition are pure makeshifts like this, or on the other hand approximate more to the nature of a principle. It is also to be observed that, on account of their externality, they have not been the starting point in the cognition of the Notion of the object; on the contrary, an obscure feeling, an indefinite but deeper sense, an inkling of what is essential, has preceded the discovery of the genera in nature and in spirit, and only afterwards has a specific externality

[1] Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 1752–1840, Professor at Jena; a pioneer in comparative anatomy and physiology.

been sought to satisfy the understanding. In existence the Notion has entered into externality and is accordingly explicated into its differences and cannot be attached simply to a single one of such properties. The properties, as the externality of the thing, are external to themselves; that is why, as we pointed out in the sphere of Appearance when dealing with the thing of many properties, properties essentially become even self-subsistent matters; spirit, regarded from the same standpoint of Appearance, becomes an aggregate of a number of self-subsistent forces. Through this standpoint, the single property or force, even where it is posited as indifferent to the others, ceases to be a characterizing principle, with the result that the determinateness, as determinateness of the Notion, vanishes altogether.

Into concrete things, along with the diversity of the properties among themselves, there enters also the difference between the *Notion* and its *actualization*. The Notion in nature and in spirit has an external presentation in which its determinateness shows itself as dependence on the external, as transitoriness and inadequacy. Therefore, although any actual thing no doubt shows in itself what it *ought* to be, yet in accordance with the negative judgement of the Notion it may equally show that its actuality only imperfectly corresponds to this Notion, that it is *bad*. Now the definition is supposed to indicate the determinateness of the Notion in an immediate property; yet there is no property against which an instance cannot be brought in which the total habitus, though it enables one to discern the concrete thing to be defined, yet the property taken as its characteristic shows itself immature or stunted. In a bad plant, a poor specimen of an animal, a contemptible human being, a bad state, aspects of its concrete existence are defective or entirely obliterated that otherwise might have been adopted for the definition as the distinguishing mark and essential determinateness in the existence of such a concrete. But for all that, a bad plant or a bad animal, etc., still remains a plant or an animal. If, therefore, bad specimens too are to be covered by the definition, then all the properties that we wanted to regard as essential elude us through instances of malformations in which those properties are lacking. Thus for example the essentiality of the brain for physical man is contradicted by the instance of acephalous individuals, the essentiality of the protection of life and property for the state, by the instance of despotic states

and tyrannous governments. If the Notion is asserted against such an instance and the instance, being measured by the Notion, is declared to be a bad specimen, then the Notion is no longer attested by phenomena. But the self-subsistence of the Notion is contrary to the meaning of definition; for definition is supposed to be the *immediate* Notion, and therefore can only draw on the immediacy of existence for its determinations for objects, and can justify itself only in what it finds already to hand. Whether its content is *in and for itself* truth or a contingency, this lies outside its sphere; but formal truth, the agreement between the Notion subjectively posited in the definition and an actual object outside it, cannot be established because the individual object may also be a bad specimen.

The content of definition is in general taken from immediate existence, and being an immediate content has no justification; the question of its necessity is precluded by its origin; in enunciating the Notion as a mere immediate, the definition refrains from comprehending the Notion itself. Hence it represents nothing but the form determination of the Notion in a given content, without the reflection of the Notion into itself, that is, *without the Notion's being-for-self.*

But immediacy in general proceeds only from mediation, and must therefore pass over into mediation. Or, in other words, the determinateness of the content contained in the definition, because it is determinateness, is not merely an immediate, but is mediated by its opposite; consequently definition can apprehend its subject matter only through the opposite determination and must therefore pass over into *division.*

2. *Division*

The universal must *particularize* itself; so far, the necessity for division lies in the universal. But since definition itself already begins with the particular, its necessity for passing over into division lies in the particular, that by itself points to another particular. Conversely, it is precisely in the act of holding fast to the determinateness in the need to distinguish it from its other, that the particular separates itself off from the universal; consequently the universal is *presupposed* for division. The procedure is, therefore, that the individual content of cognition ascends through particularity to the extreme of universality; but now the

latter must be regarded as the objective basis, and with this as the starting point, division presents itself as disjunction of the universal as the *prius*.

This has introduced a transition which, since it takes place from the universal to the particular, is determined by the form of the Notion. Definition by itself is something individual; a plurality of definitions goes with the plurality of objects. The progress, proper to the Notion, from universal to particular, is the basis and the possibility of a *synthetic science*, of a *system* and of *systematic cognition*.

The first requisite for this is, as we have shown, that the beginning be made with the subject matter in the form of a *universal*. In the sphere of actuality, whether of nature or spirit, it is the concrete individuality that is given to subjective, natural cognition as the *prius*; but in cognition that is a *comprehension*, at least to the extent that it has the form of the Notion for basis, the *prius* must be on the contrary something *simple*, something *abstracted* from the concrete, because in this form alone has the subject-matter the form of the self-related universal or of an immediate based on the Notion.

It might perhaps be objected to this procedure in the scientific sphere that, because intuition is easier than cognition, the object of intuition, that is, concrete actuality, should be made the beginning of science, and that this procedure is more *natural* than that which begins from the subject matter in its abstraction and from that proceeds in the opposite direction to its particularization and concrete individualization. But the fact that the aim is *to cognize*, implies that the question of a comparison with *intuition* is already settled and done with; there can only be a question of what is to be the first and what is to be the nature of the sequel *within the process of cognition*; it is no longer a *natural* method, but a method appropriate to *cognition* that is demanded. If it is merely a question of *easiness*, then it is self-evident besides, that it is easier for cognition to grasp the abstract simple thought determination than the concrete subject matter, which is a manifold connexion of such thought determinations and their relationships; and it is in this manner that we have now to apprehend the concrete, and not as it is in intuition. The *universal* is in and for itself the first moment of the Notion because it is the *simple* moment, and the particular is only subsequent to it because it is the mediated moment; and

conversely the *simple* is the more universal, and the concrete, as in itself differentiated and so mediated, is that which already presupposes the transition from a first. This remark applies not only to the order of procedure in the specific forms of definitions, divisions, and propositions, but also to the order of cognition as a whole and simply with respect to the difference of abstract and concrete in general. Hence in learning to read, for example, the rational way is not to begin with the reading of whole words or even syllables, but with the *elements* of the words and syllables, and the signs of *abstract* sounds: in written characters, the analysis of the concrete word into its abstract sounds and their signs is already accomplished; for this very reason, the process of learning to read is a primary occupation with abstract objects. In *geometry*, a beginning has to be made not with a concrete spatial figure but with the point and line, and then plane figures, and among the latter not with polygons, but with the triangle, and among curves, with the circle. In *physics* the individual natural properties or matters have to be freed from their manifold complications in which they are found in concrete actuality, and presented with their simple necessary conditions; they too, like spatial figures, are objects of intuition; but first the way for their intuition must be prepared so that they appear and are maintained free from all modifications by circumstances extraneous to their own specific character. Magnetism, electricity, the various gases, and so forth, are objects the specific character of which is ascertained by cognition only by apprehending them in isolation from the concrete conditions in which they appear in the actual world. Experiment, it is true, presents them to intuition in a concrete case; but for one thing experiment must, in order to be scientific, take only the conditions necessary for the purpose; and for another, it must multiply itself in order to show that the inseparable concretion of these conditions is unessential, and this it does by exhibiting the things in another concrete shape and again in another, so that for cognition nothing remains but their abstract form. To mention one more example, it might seem natural and intelligent to consider *colour* first, in the concrete manifestation of the animal's subjective sense, next, as a spectral phenomenon suspended outside the subject, and finally as fixed in objects in the actual external world. But for cognition, the universal and therefore truly primary form is the middle one of the above-named,

in which colour hovers between subjectivity and objectivity as the familiar spectrum, completely unentangled as yet with subjective and objective circumstances. The latter above all merely disturb the pure consideration of the nature of this subject matter because they behave as active causes and therefore make it uncertain whether the specific alterations, transitions, and relationships of colour are founded in its own specific nature, or are rather to be attributed to the pathological specific constitution of those circumstances, to the healthy and the morbid particular affections and effects of the organs of the subject, or to the chemical, vegetable, and animal forces of the objects. Numerous other examples might be adduced from the cognition of organic nature and of the world of spirit; everywhere the abstract must constitute the starting point and the element in which and from which spread the particularities and rich formations of the concrete.

Now although the difference of the particular from the universal makes its appearance, strictly speaking, with division or the particular this universal is itself already determinate and consequently only a member of a division. Hence there is for it a higher universal, and for this again a higher, and so on, in the first instance, to infinity. For the cognition here considered there is no immanent limit, since it starts from the *given*, and the form of abstract universality is characteristic of its *prius*. Therefore any subject matter whatever that seems to possess an elementary universality is made the subject matter of a specific science, and is an absolute beginning to the extent that *ordinary thought* is *presupposed* to be acquainted with it and it is taken on its own account as requiring no derivation. Definition takes it as immediate.

The next step forward from this starting point is *division*. For this progress, only an immanent principle would be required, that is, a beginning from the universal and the Notion; but the cognition here considered lacks such a principle, for it only pursues the form determination of the Notion without its reflection-into-self, and therefore takes the determinateness of the content from what is given. For the particular that makes its appearance in division, there is no ground of its own available, either in regard to what is to constitute the basis of the division, or in regard to the specific relationship that the members of the disjunction are to have to one another. Consequently in this

respect the business of cognition can only consist, partly, in setting in order the particular elements discovered in the empirical material, and partly, in finding the universal determinations of that particularity by comparison. These determinations are then accepted as grounds of division, and there may be a multiplicity of such grounds, as also a similar multiplicity of divisions based on them. The relationship between the members, the species, of a division, has only this general determination, that they are determined relatively to one another *in accordance with the assumed ground of division*; if their difference rested on a different consideration, they would not be co-ordinated on the same level with one another.

Because a principle of self-determination is lacking, the laws for this business of division can only consist of formal, empty rules that lead to nothing. Thus we see it laid down as a rule that division shall *exhaust* the notion; but as a matter of fact each individual member of the division must exhaust *the notion.* It is, however, really the *determinateness* of the notion that one means should be exhausted; but with the empirical multiplicity of species devoid of any immanent determination, it contributes nothing to the exhaustion of the notion whether more or fewer are found to exist; whether, for example, in addition to the sixty-seven species of parrots another dozen are found is for the exhaustion of the genus a matter of indifference. The demand for exhaustion can only mean the tautological proposition that all the species shall be presented in their *completeness*. Now with the extension of empicical knowledge it may very well happen that species are found which do not fit in with the adopted definition of the genus; for frequently the definition is adopted more on the basis of a vague conception of the entire habitus, rather than in accordance with a more or less individual mark that is expressly meant to serve for its definition. In such a case the genus would have to be modified and a justification would have to be found for regarding some other number of species as species of a new genus; in other words, the genus would be defined by what we group together in accordance with some principle or other that we choose to adopt as unity; and in this case the principle itself would be the basis of division. Conversely, if we hold to the determinateness originally adopted as characteristic of the genus, that material which we wished to group, as species, in a unity with the earlier species would be

excluded. This unsystematic procedure, which sometimes adopts a determinateness as essential moment of the genus and then either subordinates the particulars to it or excludes them from it, and sometimes starts with the particular and in grouping it lets itself again be guided by some other determinateness, gives the appearance of the play of a caprice to which it is left to decide which part or which side of the concrete it will fix on and use as its principle of arrangement. Physical nature presents of itself such a contingency in the principles of division. By reason of its dependent external actuality it stands in a complex connectedness that for it likewise is given; accordingly there exists a crowd of principles to which it has to conform, and therefore in one series of its forms follows one principle, and in other series other principles, as well as producing hybrids that belong at the same time to different sides of the division. Thus it happens that in one series of natural objects marks stand out as very characteristic and essential that in others become inconspicuous and purposeless, so that it becomes impossible to adhere to a principle of division of this kind.

The general *determinateness* of empirical species can only consist in their being simply *different* from one another without being opposed. The *disjunction* of the *Notion* has been exhibited at an earlier stage in its determinateness; when particularity is assumed as immediate and given and without the negative unity of the Notion, the difference remains only at the stage of diversity as such, a form of reflection that we considered earlier. The externality in which the Notion chiefly exists in Nature brings with it the complete indifference of the difference; consequently, a frequent determination for division is taken from *number*.

Such is the contingency here of the particular in face of the universal and therefore of division generally, that it may be attributed to an *instinct* of reason when we find in this cognition grounds of division and divisions that, so far as sensuous properties permit, show themselves to be more adequate to the Notion. For example, in the case of animals, the instruments of eating, the teeth and claws, are employed in systems of classification as a broad radical ground of division; they are taken, in the first instance, merely as aspects in which the distinguishing marks for the subjective purposes of cognition can be more easily indicated. But as a matter of fact these organs do not merely imply a differ-

entiation belonging to external reflection, but they are the vital point of animal individuality where it posits itself as a self-related individuality distinct from its other, from the nature that is external to it, and as an individuality that withdraws itself from continuity with the other. In the case of the *plant*, the fertilizing organs constitute the highest point of vegetable life, by which the plant points to the transition into sex difference, and thereby into individual individuality. The system of botany has therefore rightly turned to this point for a principle of division that, if not adequate is far-reaching, and has thereby taken as its basis a determinateness that is not merely a determinateness for external reflection for purposes of comparison, but is in and for itself the highest of which the plant is capable.

3. *The Theorem*

1. The stage of this cognition that advances on the basis of the Notion-determinations is the transition of particularity into individuality; this constitutes the content of the *theorem*. What we have to consider here, then, is the *self-related determinateness*, the immanent difference of the object and the relation of the differentiated determinatenesses to one another. Definition contains only *one determinateness*, division contains determinateness *in relation to others*; in individualization the object has gone asunder within itself. Whereas definition stops short at the general concept, in theorems, on the contrary, the object is cognized in its reality, in the conditions and forms of its real existence. Hence, in conjunction with definition, it represents the *Idea*, which is the unity of the Notion and reality. But the cognition here under consideration, which is still occupied in seeking, does not attain to this presentation in so far as the reality it deals with does not proceed from the Notion, and therefore the dependence of reality on the Notion and consequently the unity itself is not cognized.

Now the theorem, according to the stated definition, is the genuinely *synthetic* aspect of an object in so far as the relationships of its determinatenesses are *necessary*, that is, are founded in the *inner identity* of the Notion. The synthetic element in definition and division is an externally adopted connexion; what is found given is brought into the form of the Notion, but, as given, the entire content is merely *presented* [*monstriert*], whereas the theorem has to be *demonstrated*. As this cognition *does not deduce* the content

of its definitions and the principles of its divisions, it seems as if it might spare itself the trouble of *proving* the relationships expressed by theorems and content itself in this respect, too, with observation. But what distinguishes cognition from mere observation and representation is the *form of the Notion* as such that cognition imparts to the content; this is achieved in definition and division: but as the content of the theorem comes from the Notion's moment of *individuality*, it consists in determinations of reality that no longer have for their relationship the simple and immediate determinations of the Notion; in individuality the Notion has passed over into *otherness*, into the reality whereby it becomes Idea. Thus the synthesis contained in the theorem no longer has the form of the Notion for its justification; it is a connexion of [merely] *diverse* terms. Consequently the unity not yet posited with it has still to be demonstrated, and therefore proof becomes necessary even to this cognition.

Now here we are confronted first of all by the difficulty of clearly *distinguishing* which of the *determinations* of the *subject matter* may be admitted *into the definitions* and which are to be relegated to the *theorems*. On this point there cannot be any principle ready to hand; such a principle seems, perhaps, to be implied in the fact that what immediately belongs to an object appertains to the definition, whereas the rest, since it is mediated, must wait for its mediation to be demonstrated. But the content of definition is in general a determinate one, and therefore is itself essentially a mediated content; it has only a *subjective* immediacy, that is, the subject makes an arbitrary beginning and accepts a subject matter as presupposition. Now since this subject-matter is in general concrete within itself and must also be divided, the result is a number of determinations that are by their nature mediated, and are accepted not on the basis of any principle, but merely subjectively as immediate and unproved. Even in Euclid, who has always been justly recognized as the master in this synthetic kind of cognition, we find under the name of *axiom* a *presupposition* about *parallel lines* which has been thought to stand in need of proof, and various attempts to supply this want have been made. In several other theorems, people have thought that they had discovered presuppositions which should not have been immediately assumed but ought to have been proved. As regards the axiom concerning parallel lines, it may be remarked that it is

precisely there that we may discern the sound sense of Euclid, who had appreciated exactly the element as well as the nature of his science. The proof of the said axiom would have had to be derived from the *notion* of parallel lines; but a proof of that kind is no more part of his science than is the deduction of his definitions, axioms and in general his subject matter, space itself and its immediate determinations, the three dimensions. Such a deduction can only be drawn from the Notion, and this lies outside the peculiar domain of Euclid's science; these are therefore necessarily *presuppositions* for it, relative firsts.

Axioms, to take this opportunity of mentioning them, belong to the same class. They are commonly but incorrectly taken as absolute firsts, as though in and for themselves they required no proof. Were this in fact the case, they would be mere tautologies, as it is only in abstract identity that no difference is present, and therefore no mediation required. If, however, axioms are more than tautologies, they are *propositions* from some *other science*, since for the science they serve as axioms they are meant to be presuppositions. Hence they are, strictly speaking, *theorems*, and theorems taken mostly from logic. The axioms of geometry are lemmata of this kind, logical propositions, which moreover approximate to tautologies because they are only concerned with magnitude and therefore qualitative differences are extinguished in them; the chief axiom, the purely quantitative syllogism, has been discussed above. Axioms, therefore, considered in and for themselves, require proof as much as definitions and divisions, and the only reason they are not made into theorems is that, as relatively first for a certain standpoint, they are assumed as presuppositions.

As regards the *content of theorems*, we must now make a more precise distinction. As the content consists in a *relation between determinatenesses* of the Notion's reality, these relations may be more or less incomplete and single relationships of the subject matter, or else may be a relationship embracing the *entire content* of the reality and expressing the determinate relation of that content. But the *unity of the complete determinatenesses of the content* is equivalent to the *Notion*; consequently a proposition that contains them is itself again a definition, but a definition that expresses not merely the immediately assumed Notion, but the Notion developed into its determinate real differences, or the complete

existence of the Notion. The two together, therefore, present the *Idea.*

If we compare closely the theorems of a synthetic science, especially of *geometry*, we shall find this difference, that some of its theorems involve only single relationships of the subject matter, while others involve relationships in which the complete determinateness of the subject matter is expressed. It is a very superficial view that assigns equal importance to all the propositions on the ground that in general each contains a truth and is equally essential in the formal progress, in the context, of the proof. The difference in respect of the content of theorems is most intimately connected with this progress itself; some further remarks on the latter will serve to elucidate in more detail this difference as well as the nature of synthetic cognition. To begin with, Euclidean geometry—which as representative of the synthetic method, of which it furnishes the most perfect specimen, shall serve us as example—has always been extolled for the ordered arrangement in the sequence of the theorems, by which for each theorem the propositions requisite for its construction and proof are always found already proved. This circumstance concerns formal consecutiveness; yet, important as it is, it is still rather a matter of an external arrangement for the purpose of the matter in hand and has on its own account no relation to the essential difference of Notion and Idea in which lies a higher principle of the necessity of the progress. That is to say, the definitions with which we begin, apprehend the sensuous object as immediately given and determine it according to its proximate genus and specific difference; these are likewise the simple, *immediate* determinatenesses of the Notion, universality and particularity, whose relationship is no further developed. Now the initial theorems themselves can only make use of immediate determinations such as are contained in the definitions; similarly their reciprocal *dependence*, in the first instance, can only relate to this general point, that one is simply *determined* by the other. Thus Euclid's first propositions about triangles deal only with *congruence*, that is, *how many* parts in a triangle *must be determined*, in order that the *remaining* parts of one and the same triangle, or the whole of it, shall be *altogether determined.* The comparison of *two* triangles with one another, and the basing of congruence on *coincidence* is a detour necessary to a method that is forced to employ *sensuous concidence* instead of the

thought, namely, the *determinateness* of the triangles. Considered by themselves apart from this method, these theorems themselves contain *two* parts, one of which may be regarded as the *Notion*, and the other as the *reality*, as the element that completes the former into reality. That is to say, whatever completely determines a triangle, for example two sides and the included angle, is already the whole triangle for the *understanding*; nothing further is required for its complete determinateness; the remaining two angles and the third side are the superfluity of reality over the determinateness of the Notion. Accordingly what these theorems really do is to reduce the sensuous triangle, which of course requires three sides and three angles, to its simplest conditions. The definition had mentioned only the three lines in general that enclose the plane figure and make it a triangle; it is a theorem that first expresses the fact that the angle is *determined* by the determination of the sides, just as the remaining theorems contain dependence of three other parts on three others. But the complete *immanent* determinateness of the magnitude of a triangle in terms of its sides is contained in the theorem of Pythagoras; here we have first the *equation* of the sides of the triangle, for in the preceding propositions the sides are in general only brought into a reciprocal *determinateness* of the parts of the triangle, not into an *equation*. This proposition is therefore the perfect, *real definition* of the triangle, that is, of the right-angled triangle in the first instance, the triangle that is simplest in its differences and therefore the most regular. Euclid closes the first book with this proposition, for in it a perfect determinateness is achieved. So, too, in the second book, after reducing to the uniform type those triangles which are not right-angles and are affected with greater inequality, he concludes with the reduction of the rectangle to the square—with an equation between the self-equal, or the square, and that which is in its own self unequal, or the rectangle; similarly in the theorem of Pythagoras, the hypotenuse, which corresponds to the right-angle, to the self-equal, constitutes one side of the equation, while the other is constituted by the self-unequal, the *two* remaining sides. The above equation between the square and the rectangle is the basis of the *second* definition of the circle—which again is the theorem of Pythagoras, except that here the two sides forming the right-angle are taken as variable magnitudes. The first equation of the circle is in precisely that relation-

ship of *sensuous* determinateness to *equation* that holds between the two different definitions of conic sections in general.

This genuine synthetic advance is a transition from *universality* to *individuality*, that is, *to that which is determined in and for itself*, or to the unity of the subject matter *within itself*, where the subject matter has been sundered and differentiated into its essential real determinatenesses. But in the other sciences, the usual and quite imperfect advance is commonly on the following lines; the beginning is, indeed, made with a universal, but its *individualization* and concretion is merely an *application* of the universal to a material introduced from elsewhere; in this way, the really *individual* element of the Idea is an *empirical* addition.

Now however complete or incomplete the content of the theorem may be, it must be *proved*. It is a relationship of real determinations that do not have the relationship of Notion-determinations; if they do have this relation, and it can be shown that they do in the propositions that we have called the *second* or real *definitions*, then first, such propositions are for that very reason definitions; but secondly, because their content at the same time consists not merely in the relationship of a universal and the simple determinateness, but also in relationships of real determinations, in comparison with such first definition, they do require and permit of proof. As real determinatenesses they have the form of *indifferent subsistence* and *diversity*; hence they are not immediately *one* and therefore their mediation must be demonstrated. The immediate unity in the first definition is that unity in accordance with which the particular is in the universal.

2. Now the *mediation*, which we have next to consider in detail, may be simple or may pass through several mediations. The mediating members are connected with those to be mediated; but in this cognition, since mediation and theorem are not derived from the Notion, to which transition into an opposite is altogether alien, the mediating determinations, in the absence of any concept of connexion, must be imported from somewhere or other as a preliminary material for the framework of the proof. This preparatory procedure is the *construction*.

Among the relations of the content of the theorem, which relations may be very varied, only those now must be adduced and demonstrated which serve the proof. This provision of material only comes to have meaning in the proof; in itself it appears blind

and unmeaning. Subsequently, we see of course that it served the purpose of the proof to draw, for example, such further lines in the geometrical figure as the construction specifies; but during the construction itself we must blindly obey; on its own account, therefore, this operation is unintelligent, since the end that directs it is not yet expressed. It is a matter of indifference whether the construction is carried out for the purpose of a theorem proper or a problem; such as it appears in the first instance *before* the proof, it is something not derived from the determination given in the theorem or problem, and is therefore a meaningless act for anyone who does not know the end it serves, and in any case an act directed by an external end.

This meaning of the construction which at first is still concealed, comes to light in the *proof*. As stated, the proof contains the mediation of what the theorem enunciates as connected; through this mediation this connexion first *appears* as *necessary*. Just as the construction by itself lacks the subjectivity of the Notion, so the proof is a subjective act lacking objectivity. That is to say, because the content determinations of the theorem are not at the same time posited as Notion-determinations but as given *indifferent parts* standing in various external relationships to one another, it is only the *formal, external* Notion in which the necessity manifests itself. The proof is not a *genesis* of the relationship that constitutes the content of the theorem; the necessity exists only for intelligence, and the whole proof is in the *subjective interests of cognition*. It is therefore an altogether *external* reflection that *proceeds from without inwards*, that is, infers from external circumstances the inner constitution of the relationship. The circumstances that the construction has presented, are a *consequence* of the nature of the subject matter; here, conversely, they are made the *ground* and the *mediating* relationships. Consequently the middle term, the third, in which the terms united in the theorem present themselves in their unity and which furnishes the nerve of the proof, is only something in which this connexion *appears* and is *external*. Because the *sequence* that this process of proof pursues is really the reverse of the nature of the fact, what is regarded as *ground* in it is a subjective ground, the nature of the fact emerging from it only for cognition.

The foregoing considerations make clear the necessary limit of this cognition, which has very often been misunderstood. The

shining example of the synthetic method is the science of *geometry* —but it has been inaptly applied to other sciences as well, even to philosophy. Geometry is a science of *magnitude*, and therefore *formal* reasoning is most appropriate to it; it treats of the merely quantitative determination and abstracts from the qualitative, and can therefore confine itself to *formal identity*, to the unity that lacks the Notion, which is *equality* and which belongs to the external abstractive reflection. Its subject matter, the determinations of space, are already such abstract subject matter, prepared for the purpose of having a completely finite external determinateness. This science, on account of its abstract subject matter, on the one hand, has this element of the sublime about it, that in these empty silent spaces colour is blotted out and the other sensuous properties have vanished, and further, that in it every other interest that appeals more intimately to the living individuality is silenced. On the other hand, the abstract subject matter is still space, a non-sensuous sensuous; *intuition* is raised into its abstraction; space is a *form* of intuition, but is still intuition, and so sensuous, the *asunderness* of sensuousness itself, its pure *absence of Notion*. We have heard enough talk lately about the excellence of geometry from this aspect; the fact that it is based on sensuous intuition has been declared its supreme excellence and people have even imagined that this is the ground of its highly scientific character, and that its proofs rest on intuition. This shallow view must be countered by the plain reminder that no science is brought about by intuition, but only by *thinking*. The intuitive character of geometry that derives from its still sensuous material only gives it that evidential side that the *sensuous* as such possesses for unthinking spirit. It is therefore lamentable that this sensuousness of its material has been accounted an advantage, whereas it really indicates the inferiority of its standpoint. It is solely to the *abstraction* of its sensuous subject matter that it owes its capability of attaining a higher scientific character; and it is to this abstraction that it owes its great superiority over those collections of information that people are also pleased to call sciences, which have for their content the concrete perceptible material of sense, and only indicate by the order which they seek to introduce into it a remote inkling and hint of the requirements of the Notion.

It is only because the space of geometry is the abstraction and

void of asunderness that it is possible for the figures to be inscribed in the indeterminateness of that space in such a manner that their determinations remain in fixed repose outside another and possess no immanent transition into an opposite. The science of these determinations is, accordingly, a simple science of the *finite* that is compared in respect of magnitude and whose unity is the external unity of *equality*. But at the same time the delineation of these figures starts from various aspects and principles and the various figures arise independently; accordingly, the comparison of them makes apparent also their *qualitative* unlikeness and *incommensurability*. This development impels geometry beyond the *finitude* in which it was advancing so methodically and surely to *infinity*—to the positing of things as equal that are qualitatively different. Here it loses the evidential side that it possessed in its other aspect, where it is based on a stable finitude and is untouched by the Notion and its manifestation, the transition just mentioned. At this point the finite science has reached its limit; for the necessity and mediation of the synthetic method is no longer grounded merely in *positive* but in *negative identity*.

If then geometry, like algebra, with its abstract, non-dialectical [*bloss verständigen*] subject matter soon encounters its limit, it is evident from the very outset that the synthetic method is still more inadequate for *other sciences*, and most inadequate of all in the domain of philosophy. In regard to definition and division we have already ascertained the relevant facts, and here only theorem and proof should remain to be discussed. But besides the presupposition of definition and division which already demands and presupposes proof, the inadequacy of this method consists further in the general *position* of definition and division in relation to theorems. This position is especially noteworthy in the case of the empirical sciences such as physics, for example, when they want to give themselves the form of synthetic sciences. The method is then as follows. The *reflective determinations* of particular *forces* or other inner and essence-like forms which result from the method of analysing experience and can be justified only as *results*, must be *placed in the forefront* in order that they may provide a general *foundation* that is subsequently *applied to the individual* and demonstrated in it. These general foundations having no support of their own, we are supposed for the time being to take them *for granted*; only when we come to the derived

consequences do we notice that the latter constitute the real *ground* of those *foundations*. The so-called *explanation* and the proof of the concrete brought into theorems turns out to be partly a tautology, partly a derangement of the true relationship, and further, too, a derangement that served to conceal the deception practised here by cognition, which has taken up empirical data one-sidedly, and only by doing so has been able to obtain its simple definitions and principles; and it obviates any empirical refutation by taking up and accepting as valid the data of experience, not in their concrete totality but in a particular instance, and that, too, in the direction helpful to its hypotheses and theory. In this subordination of concrete experience to presupposed determinations, the foundation of the theory is obscured and is exhibited only from the side that is conformable to the theory; and in general the unprejudiced examination of concrete observations on their own is made more difficult. Only by turning the entire process upside down does the whole thing get its right relationship in which the connexion of ground and consequent, and the correctness of the transformation of perception into thought can be surveyed. Hence one of the chief difficulties in the study of such sciences is *to effect an entrance into them*; and this can only be done if the presuppositions are *blindly taken for granted*, and straightway, without being able to form any Notion of them, in fact with barely a definite representation but at most a confused picture in the imagination, to impress upon one's memory for the time being the determinations of the assumed forces and matters, and their hypothetical formations, directions and rotations. If, in order to accept these presuppositions as valid, we demand their necessity and their Notion, we cannot get beyond the starting point.

We had occasion above to speak of the inappropriateness of applying the synthetic method to strictly analytic science. This application has been extended by Wolf to every possible kind of information, which he dragged into philosophy and mathematics—information partly of a wholly analytical nature, and partly too of a contingent and merely professional and occupational kind. The contrast between a material of this kind, easily grasped and by its nature incapable of any rigorous and scientific treatment, and the stiff circumlocutory language of science in which it is clothed, has of itself demonstrated the clumsiness of such application and

discredited it.[1] Nevertheless, this misuse could not detract from the belief in the aptness and essentiality of this method for attaining scientific rigour in *philosophy*; Spinoza's example in the exposition of his philosophy has long been accepted as a model. But as a matter of fact, the whole style of previous metaphysics, its method included, has been exploded by Kant and Jacobi. Kant in his own manner has shown that the content of that metaphysics leads by strict demonstration to *antinomies*, whose nature in other respects has been elucidated in the relevant places; but he has not reflected on the nature of this demonstration itself that is linked to a finite content; yet the two must stand or fall together. In his *First Principles of Natural Science*, he has himself given an example of treating as a science of reflection, and in the method of such, a science that he thought by that method to claim for philosophy. If Kant attacked previous metaphysics rather in respect of its matter, Jacobi has attacked it chiefly on the side of its method of demonstration, and has signalized most clearly and most profoundly the essential point, namely, that a method of demonstration such as this is fast bound within the circle of the rigid necessity of the finite, and that *freedom*, that is the *Notion*, and with it *everything that is true*, lies beyond it and is unattainable by it. According to the Kantian result, it is the peculiar matter of metaphysics that leads it into contradictions, and the inadequacy of cognition consists in its *subjectivity*; according to Jacobi's result, the fault lies with the method and the entire nature of cognition itself, which only apprehends a connexion of *conditionedness* and *dependence* and therefore proves itself inadequate to what is in and

[1] For example, in Wolf's *First Principles of Architecture*, the *Eighth Theorem* runs: A window must be wide enough for two persons to be able to look out side by side in comfort.

Proof: It is quite usual for a person to be at the window with another person and to look out. Now since it is the duty of the architect to satisfy in every respect the main intentions of his principal (section 1), he must also make the window wide enough for two persons to look out at side by side in comfort. *Q.E.D.*

The same author's *First Principles of Fortification. Second Theorem:* When the enemy encamps in the neighbourhood, and it is expected that he will make an attempt to relieve the fortress, a line of circumvallation must be drawn round the whole fortress.

Proof: Lines of circumvallation prevent anyone from penetrating into the camp from outside (section 311). If therefore it is desired to keep them out, a line of circumvallation must be drawn round the camp. Therefore when the enemy encamps in the neighbourhood, and it is expected that he will attempt to relieve the fortress, the camp must be enclosed in lines of circumvallation. *Q.E.D.*

for itself, to what is absolutely true. In point of fact, as the principle of philosophy is the *infinite free Notion*, and all its content rests on that alone, the method proper to Notion-less finitude is inappropriate to it. The synthesis and mediation of this method, the *process of proof*, gets no further than a *necessity* that is the opposite of freedom, that is, to an *identity* of the dependent that is merely *implicit* [*an sich*], whether it be conceived as *internal* or as *external*, and in this identity, that which constitutes the reality in it, the differentiated element that has emerged into concrete existence, remains simply an *independent diversity* and therefore something *finite*. Consequently this *identity* does not achieve *concrete existence* here and remains merely *internal*, or, from another point of view, merely *external*, since its determinate content is given to it; from either point of view it is an abstract identity and does not possess within it the side of reality, and is not posited as *identity* that is *determinate* in and for itself. Consequently the *Notion*, with which alone we are concerned, and which is the infinite in and for itself, is excluded from this cognition.

In synthetic cognition, therefore, the Idea attains its end only to the extent that the *Notion* becomes *for the Notion* according to its *moments* of *identity* and *real determinations*, or of *universality* and *particular differences*—further also *as an identity* that is the *connexion* and *dependence* of the diverse elements. But this subject matter of the Notion is not adequate to it; for the Notion does not come to be the *unity of itself with itself in its subject matter or its reality*; in necessity its identity is for it; but in this identity the necessity is not itself the *determinateness*, but appears as a matter external to the identity, that is, as a matter not determined by the Notion, a matter, therefore, in which the Notion does not cognize itself. Thus in general the Notion is not for itself, is not at the same time determined in and for itself according to its unity. Hence in this cognition the Idea still falls short of truth on account of the inadequacy of the subject matter to the subjective Notion. But the sphere of necessity is the apex of being and reflection; through its own essential nature [*an und für sich selbst*] it passes over into the freedom of the Notion, inner identity passes over into its manifestation, which is the Notion as Notion. How this *transition* from the sphere of necessity into the Notion is effected *in principle* [*an sich*] has been shown in treating of necessity; the same transition also presented itself as the *genesis of the Notion*

at the beginning of this book. Here *necessity* has the position of being the *reality* or *subject matter* of the Notion, just as the Notion into which it passes now appears as the Notion's subject matter. But the transition itself is the same. Here too it is only at first *implicit* and lies as yet outside cognition in our reflection; that is, it is still the inner necessity of the cognition itself. It is only the result that is for it. The Idea, in so far as the Notion is now *explicitly* determined in and for itself, is the *practical* Idea, or *action.*

B. THE IDEA OF THE GOOD

The Notion, which is its own subject matter, being determined in and for itself, the subject is determined for itself as an *individual.* As subjective it again presupposes an implicit otherness; it is the *urge* to realize itself, the end that wills *by means of itself* to give itself objectivity and to realize itself in the objective world. In the theoretical Idea the subjective Notion, as the *universal* that *lacks any determination* of its own, stands opposed to the objective world from which it takes to itself a determinate content and filling. But in the practical Idea it is as actual that it confronts the actual; but the certainty of itself which the subject possesses in being determined in and for itself is a certainty of its own actuality and of the *non-actuality* of the world; it is not only the world's otherness as an abstract universality that is a nullity for the subject, but the world's individuality and the determinations of its individuality. The subject has here vindicated *objectivity* for itself; its immanent determinateness is the objective, for it is the universality that is just as much absolutely determined; the formerly objective world, on the contrary, is now only something posited, something *immediately* determined in various ways, but because it is only immediately determined, the unity of the Notion is lacking in it and it is, by itself, a nullity.

This determinateness contained in the Notion and in the likeness of the Notion, and including within it the demand for an individual external actuality, is the *good.* It comes upon the scene with the worth of being absolute, because it is within itself the totality of the Notion, the objective that is at the same time in the form of free unity and subjectivity. This Idea is superior to the Idea of cognition already considered, for it possesses not only the worth

of the universal but also of the out-and-out actual. It is an *urge* in so far as this actuality is still subjective, positing its own self, and not having at the same time the form of immediate presupposition; its urge to realize itself is, strictly speaking, not to give itself objectivity—this it possesses within itself—but merely this empty form of immediacy. Hence the activity of the end is not directed against itself in order to adopt and appropriate a given determination; on the contrary, it is in order to posit its own determination and by sublating the determinations of the external world to give itself reality in the form of external actuality. The Idea of the will as *explicitly* self-determining possesses the *content* within itself. Now it is true that this is a *determinate* content and to that extent something *finite* and *limited*; self-determination is essentially *particularization*, since the reflection of the will into itself as a negative unity in general is also individuality in the sense of the exclusion and presupposition of an other. Nevertheless, the particularity of the content is in the first instance infinite through the form of the Notion, whose own determinateness it is; and in this content the Notion possesses its negative self-identity, and therefore not merely a particular, but its own infinite individuality. Consequently the above-mentioned *finitude* of the content in the practical Idea is tantamount to the latter being in the first instance the not yet realized Idea; the Notion is, *for the content*, something that is in and for itself; it is here the Idea in the form of objectivity that is *for itself*; on the one hand, the subjective is for this reason no longer something merely *posited*, arbitrary or contingent, but an absolute; but on the other hand, *this form of concrete existence, being-for-self*, has not as yet the form of the *in-itself* as well. What thus appears in respect of form as such, as opposition, appears in the form of the Notion reflected into *simple identity*, that is, appears in the content as its simple determinateness; thus the good, although valid in and for itself, is some particular end, but an end that has not to wait to receive its truth through its realization, but is already on its own account the true.

The syllogism of immediate *realization* itself requires no detailed exposition here; it is altogether the same as the syllogism of *external purposiveness* considered above; it is only the content that constitutes the difference. In external as in formal purposiveness, it was an indeterminate finite content in general; here, though it is finite too, it is as such at the same time an absolutely

valid content. But in regard to the conclusion, to the realized end, a further difference comes in. The finite end in its *realization*, all the same, gets no further than a *means*; since in its beginning it is not an end already determined in and for itself, it remains even when realized an end that is not in and for itself. If the good again is also fixed as something *finite*, if it is essentially such, then notwithstanding its inner infinitude it cannot escape the destiny of finitude—a destiny that manifests itself in a number of forms. The realized good is good by virtue of what it already is in the subjective end, in its Idea; realization gives it an external existence; but since this existence is determined merely as an intrinsically worthless externality, in it the good has only attained a contingent, destructible existence, not a realization corresponding to its Idea. Further, since in respect of its content the good is restricted, there are several kinds of good; good in its concrete existence is not only subject to destruction by external contingency and by evil, but by the collision and conflict of the good itself. From the side of the objective world presupposed for it, in the presupposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the good consists, and which as a different world goes its own way, the very realization of the good is exposed to obstacles, obstacles which may indeed even be insurmountable. In this way, the good remains an *ought-to-be*; it is *in and for itself*, but *being*, as the ultimate abstract immediacy, remains *also* confronting it in the form of a *not-being*. The Idea of the realized good is, it is true, an *absolute postulate*, but it is no more than a postulate, that is, the absolute afflicted with the determinateness of subjectivity. There are still two worlds in opposition, one a realm of subjectivity in the pure regions of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality that is an undisclosed realm of darkness. The complete elaboration of the unresolved contradiction between that *absolute* end and the *limitation* of this actuality that *insuperably* opposes it, has been considered in detail in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[1] As the Idea contains within itself the moment of complete determinateness, the other Notion with which the Notion enters into relation in the Idea, possesses in its subjectivity also the moment of an object; consequently the Idea enters here into the *shape of self-consciousness* and in this one aspect coincides with the exposition of the same.

[1] Baillie's translation, pp. 611 ff.

But what is still lacking in the practical Idea is the moment of consciousness proper itself; namely, that the moment of actuality in the Notion should have attained on its own account the determination of *external being*. Another way of regarding this defect is that the *practical* Idea still lacks the moment of the *theoretical* Idea. That is to say, in the latter there stands on the side of the subjective Notion—the Notion that is in process of being intuited within itself by the Notion—only the determination of *universality*; cognition knows itself only as apprehension, as the identity—on its own account *indeterminate*—of the Notion with itself; the filling, that is, the objectivity that is determined in and for itself, is for it a *datum*, and what *truly is* is the actuality there before it independently of subjective positing. For the practical Idea, on the contrary, this actuality, which at the same time confronts it as an insuperable limitation, ranks as something intrinsically worthless that must first receive its true determination and sole worth through the ends of the good. Hence it is only the will itself that stands in the way of the attainment of its goal, for it separates itself from cognition, and external reality for the will does not receive the form of a true being; the Idea of the good can therefore find its integration only in the Idea of the true.

But it makes this transition through itself. In the syllogism of action, one premiss is the *immediate relation of the good end to actuality* which it seizes on, and in the second premiss directs it as an external *means* against external actuality. For the subjective Notion the good is the objective; actuality in its existence confronts it as an insuperable limitation only in so far as it still has the character of *immediate existence*, not of something objective in the sense of a being that is in and for itself; on the contrary, it is either the evil or the indifferent, the merely determinable, whose worth does not reside within it. This abstract being that confronts the good in the second premiss has, however, already been sublated by the practical Idea itself; the first premiss of the latter's action is the *immediate objectivity* of the Notion, according to which the end communicates itself to actuality without meeting any resistance and is in simple identical relation with it. Thus all that remains to be done is to bring together the thoughts of its two premisses. To what has been already immediately accomplished by the objective Notion in the first premiss, the only addition made in the second premiss is that it is posited through mediation, and

hence posited *for the objective Notion.* Now just as in the end relation in general, the realized end is also again merely a means, while conversely the means is also the realized end, so similarly in the syllogism of the good, the second premiss is immediately already present *implicitly* in the first; but this immediacy is not sufficient, and the second premiss is already postulated for the first—the realization of the good in the face of another actuality confronting it is the mediation which is essentially necessary for the immediate relation and the accomplished actualization of the good. For it is only the first negation or the otherness of the Notion, an objectivity that would be a submergence of the Notion in the externality; the second negation is the sublating of this otherness, whereby the immediate realization of the end first becomes the actuality of the good as of the Notion that is for itself, since in this actuality the Notion is posited as identical with itself, not with an other, and thus alone is posited as the free Notion. Now if it is supposed that the end of the good is after all not realized through this mediation, this signifies a relapse of the Notion to the standpoint occupied by it before its activity—the standpoint of an actuality determined as worthless and yet presupposed as real. This relapse, which becomes the progress to the spurious infinity, has its sole ground in the fact that in the sublating of that abstract reality this sublating is no less immediately forgotten, or it is forgotten that this reality is in fact already presupposed as an actuality that is intrinsically worthless and not objective. This repetition of the presupposition of the unrealized end after the actual realization of the end consequently assumes this character, that the *subjective bearing* of the objective Notion is reproduced and made perpetual, with the result that the *finitude* of the good in respect of its content as well as its form appears as the abiding truth, and its actualization appears always as a merely *individual* act, and not as a universal one. As a matter of fact this determinateness has sublated itself in the actualization of the good; what still *limits* the objective Notion is its own *view* of itself, which vanishes by reflection on what its actualization is *in itself*. Through this view it is only standing in its own way, and thus what it has to do is to turn, not against an outer actuality, but against itself.

In other words, the activity in the second premiss produces only a one-sided *being-for-self*, and its product therefore appears as something *subjective* and *individual*, and consequently the first

presupposition is repeated in it. But this activity is in truth no less the positing of the *implicit* identity of the objective Notion and the immediate actuality. This latter is determined by the presupposition as having a phenomenal reality only, as being intrinsically worthless and simply and solely determinable by the objective Notion. When external actuality is altered by the activity of the objective Notion and its determination therewith sublated, by that very fact the merely phenomenal reality, the external determinability and worthlessness, are removed from that actuality and it is *posited* as being in and for itself. In this process the general presupposition is sublated, namely the determination of the good as a merely subjective end limited in respect of content, the necessity of realizing it by subjective activity, and this activity itself. In the result the mediation sublates itself; the result is an *immediacy* that is not the restoration of the presupposition, but rather its accomplished sublation. With this, the Idea of the Notion that is determined in and for itself is posited as being no longer merely in the active subject but as equally an immediate actuality; and conversely, this actuality is posited, as it is in cognition, as an objectivity possessing a true being. The individuality of the subject with which the subject was burdened by its presupposition, has vanished along with the presupposition; hence the subject now exists as *free, universal self-identity*, for which the objectivity of the Notion is a *given* objectivity *immediately to hand*, no less truly than the subject knows itself as the Notion that is determined in and for itself. Accordingly in this result *cognition* is restored and united with the practical Idea; the actuality found as given is at the same time determined as the realized absolute end; but whereas in questing cognition this actuality appeared merely as an objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, here it appears as an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the Notion. This is the absolute Idea.

CHAPTER 3

THE ABSOLUTE IDEA

The absolute Idea has shown itself to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided, possessing the Idea itself only as a sought-for beyond and an unattained goal; each, therefore, is a *synthesis of endeavour*, and has, but equally has *not*, the Idea in it; each passes from one thought to the other without bringing the two together, and so remains fixed in their contradiction. The absolute Idea, as the rational Notion that in its reality meets only with itself, is by virtue of this immediacy of its objective identity, on the one hand the return to *life*; but it has no less sublated this form of its immediacy, and contains within itself the highest degree of opposition. The Notion is not merely *soul*, but free subjective Notion that is for itself and therefore possesses *personality*—the practical, objective Notion determined in and for itself which, as person, is impenetrable atomic subjectivity—but which, none the less, is not exclusive individuality, but explicitly *universality* and *cognition*, and in its other has *its own* objectivity for its object. All else is error, confusion, opinion, endeavour, caprice and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is *being*, imperishable *life*, *self-knowing truth*, and is *all truth*.

It is the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains *all* determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to cognize it in these. Nature and spirit are in general different modes of presenting *its existence*, art and religion its different modes of apprehending itself and giving itself an adequate existence. Philosophy has the same content and the same end as art and religion; but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea, because its mode is the highest mode, the Notion. Hence it embraces those shapes of real and ideal finitude as well as of infinitude and holiness, and comprehends them and itself. The derivation and cognition of these particular modes is now the further business of the particular philosophical sciences. The

logical aspect of the absolute Idea may also be called a *mode* of it; but whereas *mode* signifies a *particular* kind, a *determinateness* of form, the logical aspect, on the contrary, is the universal mode in which all particular modes are sublated and enfolded. The logical Idea is the Idea itself in its pure essence, the Idea enclosed in simple identity within its Notion prior to its *immediate reflection* [*Scheinen*] in a form-determinateness. Hence logic exhibits the self-movement of the absolute Idea only as the original *word*, which is an *outwardizing* or *utterance* [*Äusserung*], but an utterance that in being has immediately vanished again as something outer [*Äusseres*]; the Idea is, therefore, only in this self-determination of *apprehending itself*; it is in *pure thought*, in which difference is not yet *otherness*, but is and remains perfectly transparent to itself. Thus the logical Idea has itself as the *infinite form* for its content—form which constitutes the opposite to *content* to this extent that the content is the form-determination withdrawn into itself and sublated in the identity in such a manner that this concrete identity stands opposed to the identity explicated as form; the content has the shape of an other and a *datum* as against the form which as such stands simply in *relation*, and its determinateness is at the same time posited as an illusory being [*Schein*]. More exactly, the absolute Idea itself has for its content merely this, that the form determination is its own completed totality, the pure Notion. Now the determinateness of the Idea and the entire course followed by this determinateness has constituted the subject matter of the science of logic, from which course the absolute Idea itself has issued into *an existence of its own*; but the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape of a *content*, but exists wholly as *form*, and that accordingly the Idea is the absolutely *universal Idea*. Therefore what remains to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its form—that is, the *method*.

Method may appear at first as the mere *manner* peculiar to the process of cognition, and as a matter of fact it has the nature of such. But the peculiar manner, as method, is not merely a modality of *being determined in and for itself*; it is a modality of cognition, and as such is posited as determined by the *Notion* and as form, in so far as the form is the soul of all objectivity and all otherwise determined content has its truth in the form alone. If the content again is assumed as given to the method and of a peculiar nature

of its own, then in such a determination method, as with the logical element in general, is a merely *external* form. Against this however we can appeal not only to the fundamental Notion of the science of logic; its entire course, in which all possible shapes of a given content and of objects came up for consideration, has demonstrated their transition and untruth; also that not merely was it impossible for a given object to be the foundation to which the absolute form stood in a merely external and contingent relationship but that, on the contrary, the absolute form has proved itself to be the absolute foundation and ultimate truth. From this course the method has emerged as the *self-knowing Notion that has itself*, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, *for its subject matter*, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete existence that is the Notion itself.

Accordingly, what is to be considered here as method is only the movement of the *Notion* itself, the nature of which movement has already been cognized; but *first*, there is now the added *significance* that the *Notion is everything*, and its movement is the *universal absolute activity*, the self-determining and self-realizing movement. The method is therefore to be recognized as the unrestrictedly universal, internal and external mode; and as the absolutely infinite force, to which no object, presenting itself as something external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer resistance or be of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be penetrated by it. It is therefore *soul and substance*, and anything whatever is comprehended and known in its truth only when it is *completely subjugated to the method*; it is the method proper to every subject matter because its activity is the Notion. This is also the truer meaning if its *universality*; according to the universality of reflection it is regarded merely as the method for *everything*; but according to the universality of the Idea, it is both the manner peculiar to cognition, to the *subjectively* self-knowing Notion, and also the *objective* manner, or rather the *substantiality*, of *things*—that is of Notions, in so far as they appear primarily to *representation* and *reflection* as *others*. It is therefore not only the highest *force*, or rather the *sole* and absolute *force* of reason, but also its supreme and sole *urge* to find and cognize *itself by means of itself in everything*. Here, *secondly*, is indicated the *difference* of the *method from the Notion as such*, the *particular* aspect of the method. The Notion, when it was considered by

itself, appeared in its immediacy; the *reflection*, or *the Notion that considered it*, fell within *our* knowing. The method is this knowing itself, for which the Notion is not merely the subject matter, but knowing's own subjective act, the *instrument* and means of the cognizing activity, distinguished from that activity, but only as the activity's own essentiality. In the cognition of enquiry, the method likewise occupies the position of an *instrument*, of a means standing on the subjective side by which this side relates itself to the object. In this syllogism the subject is one extreme and the object the other, and the former by means of its method unites with the latter, but in doing so it does not *unite with itself*. The extremes remain diverse because subject, method, and object are not posited as *the one identical Notion*; the syllogism is therefore still the formal syllogism; the premiss in which the subject posits the form on its side as its method is an *immediate* determination, and therefore contains the determinations of form, as we have seen, of definition, division, and so forth, as facts *found existing in the subject*. In true cognition on the contrary, the method is not merely an aggregate of certain determinations, but the Notion that is determined in and for itself; and the Notion is the middle term only because it has equally the significance of the objective, and consequently in the conclusion the objective does not merely attain an external determinateness by means of the method, but is posited in its identity with the subjective Notion.

1. Thus what constitute the method are the determinations of the Notion itself and their relations, which we have now to consider in their significance as determinations of the method. In doing so we must first begin with the *beginning*. Of the beginning we have already spoken at the beginning of the *Logic* itself, and also above, when dealing with subjective cognition, and we have shown that, if it is not made arbitrarily and with a categorical unconsciousness, it may indeed seem to involve a number of difficulties but nevertheless is of an extremely simple nature. Because it is the beginning, its content is an immediate, but an immediate that has the significance and form of *abstract universality*. Be it otherwise a content of *being*, or of *essence*, or of the *Notion*, it is as an immediate something *assumed, found already in existence, assertorical*. But first of all it is not an immediate of *sensuous intuition* or of *representation*, but of *thinking*, which on account of its immediacy may also be called a supersensuous

inner intuition. The immediate of sensuous intuition is a *manifold* and an *individual*. But cognition is thinking by means of notions, and therefore its beginning also is *only in the element of thought*—it is a *simple* and a *universal*. This form has already been discussed under definition. At the beginning of finite cognition universality is likewise recognized as an essential determination, but it is taken as a determination of thought and of Notion only in opposition to being. In point of fact this *first* universality is an *immediate* one, and for that reason has equally the significance of *being*; for being is precisely this abstract relation-to-self. Being requires no further derivation, as though it belonged to the abstract product of definition only because it is taken from sensuous intuition or elsewhere, and in so far as it is pointed out to us. This pointing out and derivation is a matter of *mediation*, which is more than a mere beginning, and is a mediation of a kind that does not belong to a comprehension by means of thinking, but is the elevation of ordinary thinking, of the empirical and ratiocinative consciousness, to the standpoint of thought. According to the current opposition of thought or concept and being it is regarded as an important truth that no being belongs as yet to the former, taken on its own, and that the latter has a ground of its own that is independent of thought. But the simple determination of *being* is in itself so meagre that, if only for that reason, there is no need to make much fuss about it; the universal is immediately itself this immediate, since as abstract it also is merely the abstract relation-to-self, which is being. As a matter of fact, the demand that being should be exhibited for us to see has a further, inner meaning involving more than this abstract determination; what is meant by it is in general the demand for the *realization of the Notion*, which realization does not lie in the *beginning* itself, but is rather the goal and the task of the entire further development of cognition. Further, since the *content* of the beginning is supposed to be justified and authenticated as something true or correct by its being pointed out in inner or outer perception, it is no longer the *form* of universality as such that is meant, but its *determinateness*, of which we shall need to speak presently. The authentication of the *determinate content* with which the beginning is made seems to lie *behind* it; but in fact it is to be considered as an advance, that is, if it belongs to philosophical [*begreifenden*] cognition.

Hence the beginning has for the method no other determinate-

ness than that of being simple and universal; this is itself the *determinateness* by reason of which it is deficient. Universality is the pure simple Notion, and the method, as consciousness of the Notion, knows that universality is only a moment and that in it the Notion is not yet determined in and for itself. But with this consciousness that would carry the beginning further only for the sake of the method, the method would be a formal affair, something posited in external reflection. Since however it is the objective immanent form, the immediate of the beginning must be *in its own self* deficient and endowed with the *urge* to carry itself further. But in the absolute method the universal has the value not of a mere abstraction but of the objective universal, that is, the universal that is *in itself* the *concrete totality*, though that totality is not yet *posited*, is not yet *for itself*. Even the abstract universal as such, considered in its Notion, that is in its truth, is not merely the *simple*, but as *abstract* is already *posited* as infected with a *negation*. For this reason too *there is* nothing, whether in *actuality* or in *thought*, that is as simple and as abstract as is commonly imagined. A simple thing of this kind is a mere *presumption* that has its ground solely in the unconsciousness of what is actually present. Above, that with which the beginning is made was determined as the immediate; the *immediacy of the universal* is the same thing that is here expressed as the *in-itself* that is without a *being-for-self*. Hence it may indeed be said that every beginning must be made *with the absolute*, just as all advance is merely the exposition of it, in so far as its *in-itself* is the Notion. But because the absolute is at first only *in itself* it equally is *not* the absolute nor the posited Notion, and also not the Idea; for what characterizes these is precisely the fact that in them the *in-itself* is only an abstract, one-sided moment. Hence the advance is not a kind of *superfluity*; this it would be if that with which the beginning is made were in truth already the absolute; the advance consists rather in the universal determining itself and being *for itself* the universal, that is, equally an individual and a subject. Only in its consummation is it the absolute.

It is to be recalled that the beginning, which is *in itself* a concrete totality, may as beginning also be *free* and its immediacy have the determination of an *external existence*; the *germ of the living being* and the *subjective end* in general have proved themselves to be such beginnings and therefore both are themselves *urges*. The

non-spiritual and inanimate, on the contrary, are the Notion only as *real possibility*; *cause* is the highest stage in which the concrete Notion, as a beginning in the sphere of necessity has an immediate existence; but it is not yet a subject that maintains itself as such even in its actual realization. The *sun*, for example, and in general all inanimate things, are determinate concrete existences in which real possibility remains an *inner* totality and the moments of the totality are not *posited* in subjective form in them and, in so far as they realize themselves, attain an existence by means of *other* corporeal individuals.

2. The concrete totality which makes the beginning contains as such within itself the beginning of the advance and development. As concrete, it is *differentiated within itself*; but by reason of its *first immediacy* the first differentiated determinations are in the first instance merely a *diversity*. The immediate, however, as self-related universality, as subject, is also the *unity* of these diverse determinations. This reflection is the first stage of the movement onwards—the emergence of *real difference*, *judgement*, the *process of determining* in general. The essential point is that the absolute method finds and cognizes the *determination* of the universal within the latter itself. The procedure of the finite cognition of the understanding here is to take up again, equally externally, what it has left out in its creation of the universal by a process of abstraction. The absolute method, on the contrary, does not behave like external reflection but takes the determinate element from its own subject matter, since it is itself that subject matter's immanent principle and soul. This is what Plato demanded of cognition, that it should *consider things in and for themselves*, that is, should consider them partly in their universality, but also that it should not stray away from them catching at circumstances, examples and comparisons, but should keep before it solely the things themselves and bring before consciousness what is immanent in them. The method of absolute cognition is to this extent *analytic*. That it finds the further determination of its initial universal simply and solely in that universal, is the absolute objectivity of the Notion, of which objectivity the method is the certainty. But the method is no less *synthetic*, since its subject matter, determined immediately as a *simple universal*, by virtue of the determinateness which it possesses in its very immediacy and universality, exhibits itself as an other. This relation of differentiated elements which the

subject matter thus is within itself, is however no longer the same thing as is meant by synthesis in finite cognition; the mere fact of the subject matter's no less analytic determination in general, that the relation is relation within the *Notion*, completely distinguishes it from the latter synthesis.

This is no less synthetic than analytic moment of the *judgement*, by which the universal of the beginning of its own accord determines itself as the *other of itself*, is to be named the *dialectical* moment. *Dialectic* is one of those ancient sciences that have been most misunderstood in the metaphysics of the moderns, as well as by popular philosophy in general, ancient and modern alike. Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that, just as Thales was the founder of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy, so Plato was the founder of the third science pertaining to philosophy, namely, *dialectic*—a service which the ancient world esteemed his highest, but which often remains quite overlooked by those who have most to say about him. Dialectic has often been regarded as an *art*, as though it rested on a subjective *talent* and did not belong to the objectivity of the Notion. The shape it takes and the result it reaches in Kantian philosophy have already been pointed out in the specific examples of the Kantian view of it. It must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is once more recognized as necessary to reason, although the result to be drawn from it must be the opposite of that arrived at by Kant.

Besides the fact that dialectic is generally regarded as contingent, it usually takes the following more precise form. It is shown that there belongs to some subject matter or other, for example the world, motion, point, and so on, some determination or other, for example (taking the objects in the order named), finitude in space or time, presence in *this* place, absolute negation of space; but further, that with equal necessity the opposite determination also belongs to the subject matter, for example infinity in space and time, non-presence in this place, relation to space and so spatiality. The older Eleatic school directed its dialectic chiefly against motion, Plato frequently against the general ideas and notions of his time, especially those of the Sophists, but also against the pure categories and the determinations of reflection; the more cultivated scepticism of a later period extended it not only to the immediate so-called facts of consciousness and maxims of common life, but also to all the notions of

science. Now the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the *contradiction* and *nullity* of the assertions made. But this conclusion can be drawn in either of two senses—either in the objective sense, that the *subject matter* which in such a manner contradicts itself cancels itself out and is null and void—this was, for example, the conclusion of the Eleatics, according to which *truth* was denied, for example, to the world, to motion, to the point; or in the subjective sense, that *cognition is defective.* One way of understanding the latter sense of the conclusion is that it is only this dialectic that imposes on us the trick of an illusion. This is the common view of so-called sound common sense which takes its stand on the evidence of the senses and on *customary conceptions and judgements.* Sometimes it takes this dialectic lightly, as when Diogenes the cynic exposes the hollowness of the dialectic of motion by silently walking up and down; but often it flies into a passion, seeing it in perhaps a piece of sheer foolery, or, when morally important objects are concerned, an outrage that tries to unsettle what is essentially established and teaches how to supply wickedness with grounds. This is the view expressed in the Socratic dialectic against that of the Sophists, and this is the indignation which, turned in the opposite direction, cost even Socrates his life. The vulgar refutation that opposes to thinking, as did Diogenes, *sensuous consciousness* and imagines that in the latter it possesses the truth, must be left to itself; but in so far as dialectic abrogates moral determinations, we must have confidence in reason that it will know how to restore them again, but restore them in their truth and in the consciousness of their right, though also of their limitations. Or again, the conclusion of subjective nullity may mean that it does not affect dialectic itself, but rather the cognition against which it is directed, and in the view of scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, *cognition in general.*

The fundamental prejudice in this matter is that dialectic has *only a negative result*, a point which will presently be more precisely defined. First of all as regards the above-mentioned *form* in which dialectic is usually presented, it is to be observed that according to that form the dialectic and its result affect the *subject matter* under consideration or else subjective *cognition*, and declare either the latter or the subject matter to be null and void, while on the other hand the *determinations* exhibited in the subject

matter as in a *third* thing receive no attention and are presupposed as valid on their own account. It is an infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy to have drawn attention to this *un*critical procedure and by so doing to have given the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic in the sense of the examination of the *determinations of thought in and for themselves*. The subject matter, kept apart from thinking and the Notion, is an image or even a name; it is in the determinations of thought and the Notion that it *is* what it *is*. Therefore these determinations are in fact the sole thing that *matters*; they are the true subject matter and content of reason, and anything else that one understands by subject matter and content in distinction from them has value only through them and in them. It must not therefore be considered the fault of a subject matter or of cognition that these determinations, through their constitution and an external connexion, show themselves dialectical. On that assumption, the subject matter or the cognition is represented as a subject into which the *determinations* in the form of predicates, properties, self-subsistent universals, are introduced in such a manner that, fixed and correct as they are by themselves, they are brought into dialectical relationships and contradiction only by extraneous and contingent connexion in and by a third thing. This kind of external and fixed subject of imagination and understanding and these abstract determinations, far from meriting the status of *ultimates*, of secure and permanent substrates, are rather to be regarded as themselves immediate, as just that kind of presupposed and initial immediate that, as was shown above, must in its own essential nature [*an und für sich selbst*] submit to dialectic, because it is to be taken as *in itself* the Notion. Thus all the oppositions that are assumed as fixed, as for example finite and infinite, individual and universal, are not in contradiction through, say, an external connection; on the contrary, as an examination of their nature has shown, they are in and for themselves a transition; the synthesis and the subject in which they appear is the product of their Notion's own reflection. If a consideration that ignores the Notion stops short at their external relationship, isolates them and leaves them as fixed presuppositions, it is the Notion, on the contrary, that keeps them steadily in view, moves them as their soul and brings out their dialectic.

Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal *first, considered in and for itself*, shows itself to be the

other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first *immediate* now appears as *mediated*, *related* to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the *negative* of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the *first negative*. The immediate, from this negative side, has been *extinguished* in the other, but the other is essentially not the *empty negative*, the *nothing*, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the *other of the first*, the *negative* of the *immediate*; it is therefore determined as the *mediated—contains* in general the *determination of the first* within itself. Consequently the first is essentially *preserved* and *retained* even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in *its* negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as *examples* of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists of such.

Accordingly, what we now have before us is the *mediated*, which to begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a *simple* determination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is present. Now since the first also is *contained* in the second, and the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its predicate; for example, *the finite is infinite*, *one is many*, *the individual is the universal*. However, the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the *judgement* it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form of the *positive* judgement, is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the *negative* judgement, would at least have to be added as well. In the judgement the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in them is not posited—which would be precisely the purpose of employing a proposition.

The second determination, the *negative* or *mediated*, is at the same time also the *mediating* determination. It may be taken in

the first instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a *relation* or *relationship*; for it is the negative, *but the negative of the positive*, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent—in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship —rather it is the *other in its own self*, the *other of an other*; therefore it includes *its* own other within it and is consequently *as contradiction*, the *posited dialectic of itself*. Because the first or the immediate is *implicitly* the Notion, and consequently is also only *implicitly* the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in it the *difference* that it *implicitly* contains. The second, on the contrary, is itself the *determinate* moment, the *difference* or relationship; therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the *unity* that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgement, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the *opposed* determinations in *one relation*, is already *posited* and at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which the contradictories are held *asunder* in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation.

Now the negativity just considered constitutes the *turning point* of the movement of the Notion. It is the *simple point of the negative relation* to self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublating of the opposition between Notion and reality, and the unity that is truth. The *second* negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have arrived, is this sublating of the contradiction, but just as little as the contradiction is it an *act of external reflection*, but rather the *innermost*, *most*

objective moment of life and spirit, through which a *subject*, a *person*, a *free being*, exists. The *relation of the negative to itself* is to be regarded as the *second premiss* of the whole syllogism. If the terms *analytic* and *synthetic* are employed as opposites, the *first* premiss may be regarded as the *analytic* moment, for in it the immediate stands in *immediate* relationship to its other and therefore *passes over*, or rather has passed over, into it—although this relation, as already remarked, is also synthetic, precisely because that into which it passes over is its *other*. The second premiss here under consideration may be defined as *synthetic*, since it is the relation of the *differentiated term as such to the term from which it is differentiated.* Just as the first premiss is the moment of *universality* and *communication*, so the second is determined by *individuality*, which in its relation to its other is primarily exclusive, for itself, and different. The negative appears as the *mediating* element, since it includes within it itself and the immediate whose negation it is. So far as these two determinations are taken in some relationship or other as externally related, the negative is only the *formal* mediating element; but as absolute negativity the negative moment of absolute mediation is the unity which is subjectivity and soul.

In this turning point of the method, the course of cognition at the same time returns into itself. As self-sublating contradiction this negativity is the *restoration* of the *first immediacy*, of simple universality; for the other of the other, the negative of the negative, is immediately the *positive*, the *identical*, the *universal.* If one insists on *counting*, this *second* immediate is, in the course of the method as a whole, the *third* term to the first immediate and the mediated. It is also, however, the third term to the first or formal negative and to absolute negativity or the second negative; now as the first negative is already the second term, the term reckoned as *third* can also be reckoned as *fourth*, and instead of a *triplicity*, the abstract form may be taken as a *quadruplicity*; in this way, the negative or the difference is counted as a *duality*. The third or fourth is in general the unity of the first and second moments, of the immediate and the mediated. That it is this *unity*, as also that the whole form of the method is a *triplicity*, is, it is true, merely the superficial external side of the mode of cognition; but to have demonstrated even this, and that too in a more specific application —for it is well known that the abstract number form itself was

advanced at quite an early period, but, in the absence of the Notion, without result—must also be regarded as an infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy. The *syllogism*, which is also threefold, has always been recognized as the universal form of reason; but for one thing it counted generally for a quite external form that did not determine the nature of the content, and for another thing, since it progresses in the formal sense merely in the understanding's determination of *identity*, it lacks the essential *dialectical* moment of *negativity*; yet this moment enters into the triplicity of determinations because the third is the unity of the first two, and these, since they are different, can be in the unity only as sublated determinations. Formalism has, it is true, also taken possession of triplicity and adhered to its empty *schema*; the shallow ineptitude and barrenness of modern philosophic *construction* so-called, that consists in nothing but fastening this schema on to everything without Notion and immanent determination and employing it for an external arrangement, has made the said form tedious and given it a bad name. Yet the triteness of this use of it cannot detract from its inner worth and we must always value highly the discovery of the shape of the rational, even though it was at first uncomprehended.

Now more precisely the *third* is the immediate, but the immediate *resulting from sublation of mediation*, the simple resulting from *sublation of difference*, the positive resulting from sublation of the negative, the Notion that has realized itself by means of its otherness and by the sublation of this reality has become united with itself, and has restored its absolute reality, its *simple* relation to itself. This *result* is therefore the *truth*. It is *equally* immediacy *and* mediation; but such forms of judgement as: the third *is* immediacy and mediation, or: *it is the unity* of them, are not capable of grasping it; for it is not a quiescent third, but, precisely as this unity, is self-mediating movement and activity. As that with which we began was the *universal*, so the result is the *individual*, the *concrete*, the *subject*; what the former is *in itself*, the latter is now equally *for itself*, the universal is *posited* in the subject. The first two moments of the triplicity are *abstract*, untrue moments which for that very reason are dialectical, and through this their negativity make thmselves into the subject. The Notion itself is *for us*, in the first instance, *alike* the universal that is in itself, *and* the negative that is for itself, *and* also the third, that which is both

in and for itself, the *universal* that runs through all the moments of the syllogism; but the third is the conclusion, in which the Notion through its negativity is mediated with itself and thereby posited *for itself* as the *universal* and the *identity of its moments*.

Now this result, as the whole that has withdrawn into and is *identical* with itself, has given itself again the form of *immediacy*. Hence it is now itself the same thing as the *starting-point* had determined itself to be. As simple self-relation it is a universal, and in this universality, the *negativity* that constituted its dialectic and mediation has also collapsed into *simple determinateness* which can again be a beginning. It may seem at first sight that this cognition of the result is an analysis of it and therefore must again dissect these determinations and the process by which it has come into being and been examined. But if the treatment of the subject matter is actually carried out in this analytic manner, it belongs to that stage of the Idea considered above, to the cognition of enquiry, which merely states of its subject matter what *is*, but not the necessity of its concrete identity and the Notion of it. But though the method of truth which comprehends the subject matter is, as we have shown, itself analytic, for it remains entirely within the Notion, yet it is equally synthetic, for through the Notion the subject matter is determined dialectically and as an other. On the new foundation constituted by the result as the fresh subject matter, the method remains the same as with the previous subject matter. The difference is concerned solely with the relationship of the foundation as such; true, it is now likewise a foundation, but its immediacy is only a *form*, since it was a result as well; hence its determinateness as content is no longer something merely picked up, but something *deduced* and *proved*.

It is here that the *content* of cognition as such first enters into the circle of consideration, since, as deduced, it now belongs to the method. The method itself by means of this moment expands itself into a *system*. At first the beginning had to be, for the method, wholly indeterminate in respect of content; to this extent it appears as the merely formal soul, for and by which the beginning was determined simply and solely in regard to its *form*, namely, as the immediate and the universal. Through the movement we have indicated, the subject matter has obtained for itself a *determinateness* that is a *content*, because the negativity that has withdrawn into simplicity is the sublated form, and as simple determinateness

stands over against its development, and first of all over against its very opposition to universality.

Now as this determinateness is the proximate truth of the indeterminate beginning, it condemns the latter as something imperfect, as well as the method itself that, in starting from that beginning, was merely formal. This can be expressed as the now specific demand that the beginning, since it is itself a determinate relatively to the determinateness of the result, shall be taken not as an immediate but as something mediated and deduced. This may appear as the demand for an infinite *retrogression* in proof and deduction; just as from the fresh beginning that has been obtained, a result likewise emerges from the method in its course, so that the advance equally rolls *onwards* to infinity.

It has been shown a number of times that the infinite progress as such belongs to reflection that is without the Notion; the absolute method, which has the Notion for its soul and content, cannot lead into that. At first sight, even such beginnings as *being*, *essence*, *universality*, seem to be of such a kind as to possess the complete universality and absence of content demanded for a wholly formal beginning, as it is supposed to be, and therefore, as absolutely first beginnings, demand and admit of no further regress. As they are pure relations to self, immediate and indeterminate, they do not of course possess within themselves the difference which in any other kind of beginning, is directly posited between the universality of its form and its content. But it is the very indeterminateness which the above logical beginnings have for their sole content that constitutes their determinateness; this consists, namely, in their negativity as sublated mediation; the particularity of this gives even their indeterminateness a particularity by which *being*, *essence*, and *universality* are distinguished from one another. The determinateness then which belongs to them if they are taken by themselves is their *immediate determinateness*, just as much as the determinateness of any other kind of content, and therefore requires a deduction; for the method it is a matter of indifference whether the determinateness be taken as determinateness of *form* or of *content*. That a content has been determined by the first of its results is not in fact for the method, the beginning of a new mode; the method remains neither more nor less formal than before. For since it is the absolute form, the Notion that knows itself and everything as Notion, there is no

content that could stand over against it and determine it to be a one-sided external form. Consequently, just as the absence of content in the above beginnings does not make them absolute beginnings, so too it is not the content as such that could lead the method into the infinite progress forwards or backwards. From one aspect, the *determinateness* which the method creates for itself in its result is the moment by means of which the method is self-mediation and converts *the immediate beginning into something mediated.* But conversely, it is through the determinateness that this mediation of the method runs its course; it returns *through* a *content* as through an apparent *other* of itself to its beginning in such a manner that not only does it restore that beginning—as a *determinate* beginning however—but the result is no less the sublated determinateness, and so too the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began. This it accomplishes as *a system of totality.* We have still to consider it in this determination.

We have shown that the determinateness which was a result is itself, by virtue of the form of simplicity into which it has withdrawn, a fresh beginning; as this beginning is distinguished from its predecessor precisely by that determinateness, cognition rolls onwards from content to content. First of all, this advance is determined as beginning from simple determinatenesses, the succeeding ones becoming ever *richer and more concrete.* For the result contains its beginning and its course has enriched it by a fresh determinateness. The *universal* constitutes the foundation; the advance is therefore not to be taken as a *flowing* from one *other* to the next *other.* In the absolute method the Notion *maintains* itself in its otherness, the universal in its particularization, in judgement and reality; at each stage of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding content, and by its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind, but carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself.

This *expansion* may be regarded as the moment of content, and in the whole as the first premiss; the universal is *communicated* to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it. But the relationship has also its second, negative or dialectical side. The enrichment proceeds in the *necessity* of the Notion, it is held by it, and each determination is a reflection-into-self. Each new stage of *forthgoing*, that is, of *further determination*, is also a withdrawal

inwards, and the greater *extension* is equally a *higher intensity*. The richest is therefore the most concrete and most *subjective*, and that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth is the mightiest and most all-embracing. The highest, most concentrated point is the *pure personality* which, solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, no less *embraces and holds everything within itself*, because it makes itself the supremely free—the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality.

It is in this manner that each step of the *advance* in the process of further determination, while getting further away from the indeterminate beginning is also *getting back nearer* to it, and that therefore, what at first sight may appear to be different, the retrogressive grounding of the beginning, and the *progressive further determining* of it, coincide and are the same. The method, which thus winds itself into a circle, cannot anticipate in a development in time that the beginning is, as such, already something derived; it is sufficient for the beginning in its immediacy that it is simple universality. In being that, it has its complete condition; and there is no need to deprecate the fact that it may only be accepted *provisionally* and *hypothetically*. Whatever objections to it might be raised—say, the limitations of human knowledge, the need to examine critically the instrument of cognition before starting to deal with the subject matter—are themselves *presuppositions*, which as *concrete determinations* involve the demand for their mediation and proof. Since therefore they possess no formal advantage over the *beginning* with the subject matter against which they protest, but on the contrary themselves require deduction on account of their more concrete content, their claim to prior consideration must be treated as an empty presumption. They have an untrue content, for they convert what we know to be finite and untrue into something incontestable and absolute, namely, a *limited* cognition determined as *form* and *instrument relatively to its content*; this untrue cognition is itself also the form, the process of seeking grounds, that is retrogressive. The method of truth, too, knows the beginning to be incomplete, because it is a beginning; but at the same time it knows this incompleteness to be a necessity, because truth only comes to be itself through the negativity of immediacy. The impatience that insists *merely* on getting beyond the *determinate*—whether called beginning, object, the finite, or in whatever other form it be taken—and finding itself immediately

in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words, a *presumed* absolute, that is presumed because it is not *posited*, not *grasped*; grasped it can only be through the *mediation* of cognition, of which the universal and immediate is a moment, but the truth itself resides only in the extended course of the process and in the conclusion. To meet the subjective needs of unfamiliarity and its impatience, a survey of the *whole* may of course be given *in advance*—by a division for reflection which, after the manner of finite cognition, specifies the particular of the universal as something *already there* and to be awaited in the course of the science. Yet this affords us nothing more than a picture for *ordinary thinking*; for the genuine transition from the universal to the particular and to the whole that is determined in and for itself, in which whole that first universal itself according to its true determination is again a moment, is alien to the above manner of division, and is alone the mediation of the science itself.

By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a *circle* returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; this circle is moreover a *circle of circles*, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences [of logic, nature and spirit], each of which has an *antecedent* and a *successor*—or, expressed more accurately, *has* only the *antecedent* and *indicates* its *successor* in its conclusion.

Thus then logic, too, in the absolute Idea, has withdrawn into that same simple unity which its beginning is; the pure immediacy of being in which at first every determination appears to be extinguished or removed by abstraction, is the Idea that has reached through mediation, that is, through the sublation of mediation, a likeness correspondent to itself. The method is the pure Notion that relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the *simple self-relation* that is *being*. But now it is also *fulfilled being*, the *Notion that comprehends* itself, being as the *concrete* and also absolutely *intensive* totality. In conclusion, there remains only this to be said about this Idea, that in it, first, the *science of logic* has grasped its own Notion. In the sphere of *being*, the beginning of its *content*, its Notion appears as a knowing in a subjective reflection

external to that content. But in the Idea of absolute cognition the Notion has become the Idea's own content. The Idea is itself the pure Notion that has itself for subject matter and which, in running itself as subject matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science [of logic], and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby superseding its standing as content and subject matter and cognizing the Notion of the science. Secondly, this Idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought, and is the science only of the divine *Notion*. True, the systematic exposition is itself a realization of the Idea but confined within the same sphere. Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the *urge* to sublate this, and pure truth as the last result becomes also the *beginning of another sphere and science*. It only remains here to indicate this transition.

The Idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute *unity* of the pure Notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of *being*, is the *totality* in this form—*nature*. But this determination has not *issued from a process* of *becoming*, nor is it a *transition*, as when above, the subjective Notion in its totality *becomes objectivity*, and the *subjective end becomes life*. On the contrary, the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the Notion is itself raised into Notion, is an absolute *liberation* for which there is no longer any immediate determination that is not equally *posited* and itself Notion; in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place; the simple being to which the Idea determines itself remains perfectly transparent to it and is the Notion that, in its determination, abides with itself. The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea *freely releases* itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free—the *externality of space and time* existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity. In so far as this externality presents itself only in the abstract immediacy of being and is apprehended from the standpoint of conscious ness, it exists as mere objectivity and external life; but in the Idea it remains essentially and actually [*an und für sich*] the totality of the Notion, and science in the relationship to nature of divine cognition. But in this next resolve of the pure Idea to determine itself as external Idea, it thereby only posits for itself the mediation

out of which the Notion ascends as a free Existence that has withdrawn into itself from externality, that completes its self-liberation in the *science of spirit*, and that finds the supreme Notion of itself in the science of logic as the self-comprehending pure Notion.